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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



EXCELLENCE IN THE SURFACE NAVY

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I. INTRODUCTION

Ever wonder what criteria the commodore used to rate your ship against the others in the squadron, what those captains on the type commanders staff used to judge the performance of one ship in the force against another, or maybe how that ship across the pier which won the Battle "E" or the Marjorie Sterrett award did things differently than your ship? Well, we did. And for a change, we had the time to attempt to find answers to these questions. But where to begin? How about by asking these senior officers what they were thinking when they were observing and judging the ships in the Surface Navy, getting their recommendations of ships that personified their definition of excellence, and then going aboard those ships to find out how they conducted business. That's what we did. We learned that a lot of our hunches were correct, a couple were dead wrong, and that talking with the bosses and observing the superstars was an opportunity from which every member of the surface community could benefit.

In our research of "excellence in the Surface Navy" we wanted to find ships that were the embodiment of superior performance and then, as best we could, to tell their story: what they look like, what they emphasize, why they manage and lead the way they do, and how they go about achieving the results that gain them the reputation of being excellent. Obviously, this was no small undertaking. But undertake it we did, and we think our findings will be of interest to surface warfare officers and enlisted personnel, not because this is a definitive study or because this study provides in an easy-to-understand cookbook manner how one achieves excellence in surface ships, but because this

allows the reader to approach the subject of shipboard leadership and management from a positive perspective instead of the all too common "don't do this because ..." teaching we frequently encounter in the surface community. Obviously there is a place for learning from the mistakes of others (no one likes to repeat a mistake or relearn a painful lesson), but we feel that there is a lot to be learned from those who have been successful at shipboard leadership and management, and that in the past, this source of positive information has not been tapped to the extent it could or should be.

Rather than rely on a group of numerical indicators (e.g., inspection results, readiness ratings, retention ratings) to identify a group of excellent ships, we elected to identify the ships that we would study by getting the subjective opinions of senior naval officers intimately involved with surface ships in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. We chose this approach because, in the final analysis, it is the opinions of senior officers in the surface warfare community that count the most when determining what is considered good and bad in the community and who will be selected to lead the community in the future. For, although a lot of attention is given to scores on exercises and inspections and statistics for retention and readiness ratings, the selection of Battle "E" winners and the criteria used to select officers for promotion still rely primarily on subjective judgement by seniors of their juniors. In conducting our study, we interviewed twenty one officers who were either senior, post-command officers on the surface type commander staffs or were squadron or group commanders. We asked these officers to explain how they judged surface ships and how they differentiated between top performing excellent ships and fleet average ships. We also asked them to provide any insight they might have regarding

how they thought top performing ships conducted business, that is, what did the top performing ships appear to be doing differently than the other ships? After these senior officers provided us with their views on surface ship excellence, we asked them to identify ships that personified excellence as they had just described it. This they did with gusto. They did not have to do a lot of thinking to come up with the names of ships that stood out for their excellence. Many ships were mentioned. In general, there was a feeling that there are a lot of good ships sitting at the piers and steaming to their next station assignment; however, there were a relatively small number of ships that were consensus stand cuts, the type of ships we were after. We ended up with a list of ten ships in each fleet. We then were able to identify four ships in each fleet that were (1) on the consensus excellent ship list and (2) available for interviews during the time we wanted to conduct the interviews.

In chapters two through five, we will take you to the commodore's cabin and to the halls of the type commander to let you hear what twenty one senior surface warfare officers had to say about excellence in the Surface Navy. Then in chapters six through fifteen we will take you aboard ships that these senior officers felt were the embodiment of excellence, and we will attempt to tell their story.

There were few surprises in listening to senior officers discuss excellence in the Surface Navy; yet, we believe many surface warfaremen will be interested in hearing what they had to say about such topics as the roles they see captains and chiefs filling on their excellent ships and what they look for when they sit in their offices and visit their ships, all the time judging and determining how effective a ship is. We would describe our interviews with senior officers as interesting and informative, and if we had finished

our study with just the interviews, we would have considered it a highly rewarding and worthwhile experience. We felt that the interviews provided us with insight into what excellence in the Surface Navy looks like and how it is achieved, and that with this insight we could become more effective naval officers. However, we did not appreciate that the best was yet to come, for if seeing is believing, we are now believers. We believe that there is excellence in the Surface Navy. There are ships that are not just better than other ships, but ships that stand head and shoulders above the ships they steam in company with. And going aboard these excellent ships is not only interesting, it is enlightening. Having seen excellence in action, we now feel that we are much better prepared to strive for it in the remainder of our careers. We hope that the reader can share in our enlightenment as he reads our description of excellence in the Surface Navy.

II. THEY'RE WATCHING

They're out there....the commanders and captains and commodores and admirals who work on the group and type commander staffs. They're the ones who give your ship a mission, who read your messages, who monitor your inspection results, who hear the latest gossip about your ship. You may or may not ever see them face to face. But they're out there. And somehow they're sizing up your ship. How do they do it? What do they think the best ships are doing that average ones aren't? How long does it take them to formulate an opinion of a ship? What characteristics of excellence can they "see" from their desks? What do they find when they arrive aboard the best ships? These are the questions we sought answers for as we talked to these officers.

Having the opportunity to get their candid opinions was a very rewarding experience, to say the least. After all, how often do a couple of mid grade surface warfare officers get to find out what so many senior officers think about excellence in the surface Navy? Without exception, we were impressed with the candor and energy of the officers we interviewed. We left every meeting feeling the Navy had done something very right in placing such dynamic officers in their current positions of leadership.

What we learned from talking to these officers was that on the one hand there definitely is a general consensus at their level as to what excellence in the Surface Navy looks like. On the other hand, variety enters the discussion when you ask them how such excellence is achieved, although the basic tenets of leadership and management remain.

But we are getting ahead of ourselves. Let us give you some insight into the process we used to gather and distill our data. In developing our interview questions, we used a model for analyzing organizations called the 7S model. We hit upon the idea of using the 7S model while reading Peters and Waterman's book, In Search of Excellence, a recent best seller that attempted to do with excellent American businesses what we were attempting to do with excellent U. S. Navy ships, namely identify what made them excellent. This model, as adapted by us for Navy ships, looks at organizations from the following perspectives:

- STYLE: Officer and enlisted leadership style.
- SKILLS: Unique talents and experiences of key officers and enlisted personnel.
- STRATEGY: A command's direction and plan of action for the future.
- STAFF: Professional background and experience of officers and enlisted personnel.
- SYSTEMS: How information moves around the ship, and how specific programs are administered.
- STRUCTURE: Characteristics of the ship's organization chart, including both primary responsibilities and collateral/secondary responsibilities.
- SHARED VALUES: Intangibles, such as the command attitude, values, norms, and guiding concepts.

We began the process of summarizing our findings by listing the indications of excellence identified by each officer. From this list, we identified those indications which were stressed repeatedly. We further grouped these indications into two broad categories, namely "external" and "waterfront" indicators of excellence. The external indicators of excellence are those which senior officers can monitor without physically seeing the ship. These frequently

would be the measures by which the type commander or an officer on his staff would judge a ship. Waterfront indicators of excellence are those which senior officers observe by actually visiting the ship and observing it first hand, on the deck plates. These indicators would normally be observed by squadron commodores, their staffs, and others who gain impressions of ships by visiting them.

We begin by summarizing the external indicators of excellence. Keep in mind that what you are about to read is not presented as a recipe for leadership or management success. These are just the points which the officers we interviewed stressed.

III. EXTERNAL INDICATORS OF EXCELLENCE

A. GOING THE EXTRA MILE

It almost goes without saying that senior officers consider operational performance to be an important, the most important, measure of excellence in the fleet. They expect all ships to be able to get underway and meet their commitments. However, once they are underway, a group of ships emerges as standouts, not in any one area, but across the board. Furthermore, when these superstars return to port, they perform as they had at sea. There is a definite link between excellence in port and underway. It is the ships which are both top steamers and tops pierside which personify excellence in the Surface Navy.

But what are these ships doing differently? To begin with, the best ships invariably demonstrate a willingness to "go the extra mile." They put forth greater effort than average ships when carrying out assigned tasking. A commodore cited the example of a replenishment ship in his squadron that routinely provided an extra measure of service to the ships it was resupplying. The crew of this ship had a reputation of being willing to work long into the night to provide fuel and supplies to other ships in the squadron. Here was a ship that seemed to be saying "We're going to 'make it happen' no matter what it takes."

Ships that carry out assignments with flair impressed the officers we interviewed. One commodore admired a commanding officer who shot the ship's guns at every opportunity and steamed at flank speed when proceeding from one commitment to the next. The commodore pointed to the positive impact this had on the crew, saying that "they loved

their commanding officer and would do anything for him." Another commodore sighted the example of a commanding officer who, during a routine transit, had shown a lot of initiative by conducting a drug raid on a fishing vessel that was suspected of transporting illegal drugs. The operation was carried out without a hitch, despite the fact that the commanding officer found it necessary to fire warning shots across the bow of the fishing vessel before the master would permit his vessel to be searched. Every aspect of this operation was carried out flawlessly, including keeping senior officers in the chain of command fully informed of the operation as it progressed. Such excellent performance was considered typical of this ship.

B. SHOOTING STRAIGHT WITH THE BOSS

The next indicator of excellence relates to the manner in which the best ships communicate up the chain of command. They seem to produce higher quality messages and reports than fleet average ships. Not only are their messages timely, clear, and concise but they don't raise more questions than they answer. Senior officers find it very frustrating when they have to dig through a message for five minutes to pick out the main point.

It's clearly important to be candid when reporting information to seniors. This means that the best ships build credibility by not hesitating to report bad news along with the good. As one officer put it, "They put their marker down," meaning they let their boss know exactly where they stand. Also, when reporting problems, they simultaneously discuss alternative solutions and then state which alternative they intend to follow. Typical of senior officer comments on this subject were those of a commodore who noted that his best ships did a better job of keeping

him informed. Their messages reflected detailed planning. Every report told what and why something had happened and what action was being taken, when appropriate. The messages pointed out not only the symptoms but also the causes of problems along with the action they were taking to resolve the causes of the problems. Such thorough staffing by a ship made the commodore's and his staff's job easy, and this impressed him.

Although one group commander felt that the best ships tended to have fewer equipment casualty reports (CASREPTs) than other ships, virtually every senior officer thought the best ships would usually have an average number of them. One commodore's comments were fairly representative. He said he gets a little suspicious if ships in his squadron have unusually high or low numbers of CASREPTs. He wonders if those with many CASREPTs are maintaining their equipment properly. Conversely, he wonders if those that have submitted few or no CASREPTs are failing to report or are aware of all their equipment deficiencies.

C. ALPHABET SOUP ON THE BRIDGE WING

We found that senior officers consider departmental awards to be fairly good indicators of excellence. But most don't think the best ships make winning these awards an end in itself. Rather, attainment of these awards appears to be a fallout of having done other things right.

It was interesting listening to commodores describe how they decided which ship in the squadron would be awarded the battle efficiency (battle "E") award. We sensed they try very hard to award the battle "E" to the best ship in the squadron. But because many squadrons have two or more ships which a commodore believes are worthy of the award, he is sometimes forced to split hairs in choosing the recipient.

The consensus was that all battle "E" winners are excellent ships, but frequently there are one or two other ships in the squadron that are just as excellent, if not more so, as the battle "E" winner. Sometimes there are external factors beyond a ship's control that might preclude it from winning the battle "E".

How about the Golden Anchor Award? With all the talk about retention these days, we made a point of asking how much emphasis senior officers place on retention ratings. The answer is that to be perceived as a top performer, a ship doesn't have to have a high retention rate. An officer would typically tell us that a good ship's retention rate might be low because the commanding officer needed to discharge a number of sailors who should have never been allowed in the Navy in the first place. However, an excellent ship would not have consistently below average retention over an extended period of time.

D. FINISHING FOOT RACES

In general, the best ships get better results than other ships on inspections which require ship wide involvement, such as Planned Maintenance System (PMS) Inspection, Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV), Command Inspection, Supply Management Inspection (SMI), Nuclear Technical Proficiency Inspection (NTPI), and Operational Propulsion Plant Exam (OPPE). Of these, the OPPE is considered to be by far the most important because of the complexity of the inspection. Another characteristic of the best ships is that they avoid the need for last minute crisis inspection preparations by staying in a state of constant inspection readiness. They excel at both scheduled and surprise inspections.

One senior officer said that the type commander's attention is drawn to those ships that have either barely passed a major inspection or passed it with exceptionally few discrepancies. Doing exceptionally well on inspections does a lot to build a ship's reputation as a top performer. In contrast, those that fail or barely pass them can very quickly gain a poor reputation. In the words of this officer, "It's the guy who ends up \$2000 short in his disbursing audit who really gets our attention." Our impression is that inspections are an indicator that can be compared to a foot race. You're still in the race for excellence if you pass all of the key inspections, but you can put yourself on the sidelines for a relatively long time if you fail just one.

E. THEY FIX THEMSELVES

The best ships are self-sufficient in the sense that they do a superior job of maintaining and repairing their equipment. For example, a rear admiral noted that the top performing ships have officers and technicians who know how to tell if their equipment is operating at peak efficiency. He cited the example of non-excellent ships that have their anti-submarine warfare (ASW) sonar streamed and don't even know if it is operating up to design parameters. He thought that better ships detect and correct equipment degradations much more quickly than average ships.

A number of senior officers stressed that the best ships only ask for technical assistance after all on board resources have been exhausted. Then, if a technical expert has occasion to visit the ship, the cognizant shipboard technicians eagerly learn as much as they can from him about how to maintain and repair their equipment. These ships also know how to make the repair system work for them. A

commodore noted that these ships don't assume they will see results by merely filling out a work request and submitting it to an intermediate maintenance activity (IMA). Instead they follow up on the IMAs, closely monitoring the progress of repairs.

F. SUPPORT FOR THE STAFF

Senior officers find that officers on the best ships have good rapport with their squadron staffs. Staff officers find that their counterparts on these ships have fewer problems and are generally less trouble to work with. In short, the best ships make the staff's job easy. In describing one of the finest ships that an officer was familiar with, he said that she "had her act together, had a game plan, and kept the staff informed." He mentioned that this ship made a habit of passing information to the staff such as the ship's family-gram, copies of "kudo" messages they had received for jobs well done, and a description of problems the ship was currently tackling.

Another mark of excellent ships is that they seek help from their staff counterparts well in advance of scheduled evolutions such as inspections. For example, one senior officer said that if the best ships needed help in preparing for an OPPE, they would ask for it as much as six months ahead of time. They would not wait until two weeks before the inspection to announce a myriad of deficiencies that would require shipboard and staff personnel to go into a crisis mode in order to correct them.

IV. WATERFRONT INDICATORS OF EXCELLENCE

We continue to summarize our findings by presenting the "waterfront indicators of excellence," namely those which senior officers say they observe when they arrive aboard excellent ships. The vast majority of senior officers believe they can do a fairly accurate job of sizing up the overall quality of a ship within a relatively short time after arriving aboard. Some added that on occasion they subsequently decide that their initial evaluations are incorrect. Sometimes they might think a ship is weak only to decide later that it is strong. Hardly ever do they think a ship is strong and later find it weak. Some said they would need several hours to a full day or more aboard ship to do a fair job of appraising it. Others said they could do it within their first five to ten minutes on board. None felt it would take an extended period of time. One commodore explained his visit strategy. He spends twenty minutes with the captain, takes a tour of the ship, meets with the chiefs, lunches with the wardroom, and has a question and answer session with the officers and chiefs. From such a visit, he is able to formulate an impression of how good the ship is. He added that there are times when he changes his opinion of a ship after having an initial favorable or unfavorable impression, but this did not happen very often.

A. CLEANLINESS IS NEXT TO EXCELLENCE

If one message came through loud and clear from these officers, it was that the best ships are also the cleanest and the best looking topside and between decks. The sponge

and the paint brush held positions of honor for the officers we interviewed. The importance they place on ship cleanliness would be difficult to overemphasize. Although they have different reasons for emphasizing cleanliness, they all think it goes hand in hand with top performance. For example, a commodore said that cleanliness standards reflect the quality of standards that will be set in other areas such as preservation and maintenance. A rear admiral drove home the importance of cleanliness when he said that of all the top operational ships he had ever encountered, he could only think of one that was not extremely clean.

As trite as the expression "first impressions are lasting impressions" may be, it holds true for almost all the officers we interviewed. Most of them start building their impression of a ship the moment they set foot on the quarterdeck, which, on the best ships, is normally an impressive looking area, manned by sharp looking and attentive watchstanders. They continue to build upon their impression of the ship as they are escorted to and from various spaces. A commodore, with forty years of naval experience said he could tell what a ship is like by walking from the quarterdeck to the wardroom. He was dead serious. Specifically, he sizes up the ship by its outward appearance and the appearance of the quarterdeck area, the passageways, and the mess specialist on duty in the wardroom.

Speaking of the wardroom, a number of senior officers indicated its appearance says a lot about the ship. One commodore was especially impressed by the manner in which one of his top ships had redone its wardroom to give it a "pub type" atmosphere. The commodore felt this was innovative and effective because, with such a fine wardroom, the officers would be more likely to frequent it. This would lead to a stronger sense of unity among the officers.

Another commodore said he examined the wardroom for some tangible evidence that officer qualifications were recognized, such as a board on the bulkhead with the names of qualified surface warfare officers. Such trademarks tended to show up on excellent ships but not on others.

Putting forth the extra effort that reflects special attention to detail in the appearance of shipboard spaces is also a mark of excellence. In talking about one of his favorite ships, a commodore said he was most impressed not only by the cleanliness of the engineering spaces, but also by the extra effort the engineers took to make their spaces look sharp. Polishing bright work was considered indicative of pride in their spaces. Another example that comes to mind occurred just before we began an interview with an embarked commodore. As the chief staff officer escorted us from the quarterdeck to the commodore's office, he pointed with admiration to the shining decks and the wire brushed rungs on one of the ladders we had to climb. There is no doubt that senior officers really do notice when ships put forth the extra effort to make their ship shine.

B. IT'S MY SHIP!

The attitude displayed by shipboard personnel is considered a very important indication of excellence. On the best ships virtually all hands have a positive view of themselves, their duties, their commanding officer, and their ship. But how do senior officers go about sizing up a crew's attitude? There are a variety of ways. One is to listen to the line of thought running through the questions and comments made by shipboard personnel when they have discussions with the senior officer. For example, a rear admiral finds that on the best ships the atmosphere during discussion sessions tends to be more congenial and the

subject matter more broad than that which he hears on other ships. He doesn't hear a lot of people "grinding axes."

Other officers indicated that a positive crew attitude is demonstrated by crewmen who don't look the other way or avoid encounters with senior officers such as the commodore when he appears on scene. Instead, they appear to enjoy meeting the commodore and telling him about their gear and their ship. One commodore said he gets a general impression of crew attitude by walking around a ship and noting how crew members respond when he appears. A positive attitude is exemplified by crew members and junior officers who look him straight in the eye as he passes. Poor attitude is exemplified by those who avoid him.

An attitude of ownership tends to pervade the excellent ships. Personnel at all levels of the command talk with pride about "my ship," "my space," or "my job." On these ships, you are more likely to hear a chief saying things like "my MPA" rather than "the MPA" when referring to his division officer.

Most senior officers also find that a professional, businesslike attitude is a hallmark of excellence. Take the underway bridge watch, for example. In stressing the importance of a formal and professional watch, a commodore asked, "Does the officer of the deck say 'Hey Frank. Check the starboard pelorus.' or does he say 'Mr Smith! Check the starboard pelorus!'" Other officers stressed that a professional attitude is manifested in the way day-to-day work is undertaken. When visiting excellent ships, they can sense that productive, purposeful work is in progress. By this they meant that the best ships have officers and crewmen that are hard at work during working hours, even if it's the duty section on a Saturday in port, and they are working to a plan.

These officers read a lot from the chiefs' attitude. On excellent ships, they see a positive attitude being displayed by chief petty officers. The chiefs assume their proper role, meaning they are very much involved in the management of the ship. For example, a commodore mentioned that on his best ships the chiefs were very visible in the working spaces. He also noted that the chiefs, although present, were not the ones doing the hands on work. Instead they were supervising and instructing junior personnel.

Finally, crews of excellent ships demonstrate a positive, "can do" attitude which is reflected in a greater degree of support for the command than usually found on ships. One officer reflected on the most impressive examples of "can do," and he cited the example of an aircraft carrier in which seventy six restrictive deficiencies were identified during the first day of an Operational Propulsion Plant Examination. This crew viewed the inspectors as their enemy and there was no way they were going to be bested. They worked through the night and by the time the inspection team returned the next day, the crew had not only corrected every one of the deficiencies, they also had identified and corrected numerous other discrepancies that the inspection party had not noticed. This kind of effort convinced the commodore he was dealing with an unusually fine crew. A commodore told us how impressed he was with a ship in the squadron that had been tasked on short notice with taking over the deployment of another ship which was experiencing material problems. At first the commodore was concerned that this tasking would have a devastating effect on the morale of the crew which had returned recently from a six month deployment. However, it didn't. Morale remained high throughout the deployment and the ship performed in an exemplary manner. This same ship also received a surprise OPPE enroute to the short notice deployment. Again the ship

excelled, passing the inspection with flying colors. She seemed to take everything in stride. All the commodore saw from this ship was "can do," and it was not just the captain who was a "can doer," it was also his crew. The commodore was not certain why this ship had such a positive attitude, but he was very impressed with what he saw. Sometimes little things told senior officers a lot about a ship. A commodore described the attitude of the crew on one of his very best ships. When inspectors detected a leaking valve during an INSURV inspection, the petty officer with the inspectors had the valve tagged immediately for repair. His taking the initiative was in keeping with the actions of all the other personnel in this engineering department. The crew seemed to be committed to doing well not because of the inspection, but because they had a broader "can do" attitude that guided their routine, day-to-day actions.

C. ATTENTION TO KEY PLAYERS AND KEY RELATIONSHIPS

The relationship between the commanding officer and executive officer is one that senior officers think is very important. However, there was little offered in the way of advice as to what to do when this relationship was not strong. Excellent ships invariably have a commanding officer and executive officer who relate well, trust each other, and have similar leadership styles. One admiral noted that in two of his four previous commands he and his executive officer did not have a good relationship and the command suffered as a result. Reflecting on the executive officer's relationship with his subordinates, the admiral added that the executive officer should never be the social equal of the department heads. There must be a barrier.

Discussing the importance of infusing trust into the commanding officer/executive officer relationship, a

commodore with forty years of naval experience said he was particularly impressed by one commanding officer in the squadron who had left his ship by helo one day, leaving the executive officer to bring the ship to port so that he (the commanding officer) could attend a meeting the commodore had called for all commanding officers in the squadron. Both the executive officer and the crew would know by such a bold step that the commanding officer truly trusted his executive officer.

A positive officer/chief petty officer relationship was mentioned repeatedly as being a key indicator of excellence. On the best ships, it is professional and respectful, but not "buddy-buddy." The chiefs and officers have mutual respect for each other and they work well together. The chiefs don't need or get a lot of "rudder orders" from the officers because they (the chiefs) take the initiative and plan and supervise their men's work. A commodore attributed one of the reasons his ships performed well to the chiefs on these ships who performed roles that were often performed by officers in other ships. Furthermore, the chiefs were part of the decision making process. This tended to get them more involved in the running of their ships with the result that their talents were more fully utilized.

Strong relationships on the best ships (such as between the commanding officer and crew, the officers and crew, and the commanding officer and officers) were also mentioned to a lesser extent by senior officers as items they keyed on when forming an opinion of a ship. Unity and teamwork are typically characteristic in each of these relationships on excellent ships. One commodore called it "unit integrity," a term he used to describe a pervasive feeling on the best ships wherein all individuals tend to feel they are an important part of the command.

V. THE TRIED AND TRUE METHODS

So far, we have summarized what senior officers have said about external and waterfront indications of excellence. But how do they think the best ships are achieving excellence? Do they perceive a recipe for success being used by excellent ships? The senior officers we met were struck by both the similarities and differences they saw when they observed excellence in the Surface Navy. Styles varied immensely, but there were certain basics associated with excellence. These officers do not think there is any one best leadership style ("You have to go with what got you to your command"), nor do they think innovative leadership and management techniques are needed to operate a ship in an excellent manner. As one commodore put it, "All you have to do is do well those things that you have heard about all of your career." A staff officer's views were similar when he said, "A ship's ability to achieve excellence is based on its ability to use the 'tried and true methods' of leadership and management." But what are the tried and true methods which these officers saw as most critical towards achieving excellence? Some senior officers gave very specific examples of management techniques which they are convinced all excellent ships use. Others said they weren't certain how the best ships were being managed, but they offered up some of their opinions as to what they thought was fundamental in achieving excellence. In this portion of the paper we will summarize the management techniques, methods, and strategies which these senior officers think excellent ships are applying. As the reader will see, it quickly becomes obvious that they think excellence starts with the captain.

A. THE CAPTAIN HAS A PHILOSOPHY

One point that was repeatedly emphasized during our interviews was that commanding officers of the best ships arrive on board with a "command philosophy" or a "game plan" of leadership and management for achieving excellence. All of the captains of the excellent ships the senior officers dealt with in the present or the past had their command philosophy fixed firmly in their minds prior to assuming command. Some of these senior officers felt that not all captains had well thought out command philosophies aimed at excellence. One officer commented that he was amazed to find that officers he interviewed for command qualification were frequently unable to talk about their command philosophy because they hadn't given it any thought.

No one command philosophy was thought to be the best. But it was clear that the captain should have a plan to lead and manage his ship and that he should be working continuously at implementing it. A commodore, for example, felt it was important that the captain have and promulgate his command philosophy both in writing and at frequent meetings with all levels of the chain of command. He suggested that the captain discuss elements of his philosophy with department heads at formal weekly meetings and with division officers and chiefs every other week. Having a philosophy was a starting point on the road to excellence, and getting this philosophy to every member of the crew was the next step.

Although they felt there is no one best way to lead, several did state that a consistently autocratic style would not lead to excellence. Such a style, it was felt, could bring about good short term performance but the ship's performance would decline in the long run. A dictatorial manner would eventually alienate a crew and without the support of the crew excellence could not be maintained.

B. THE CAPTAIN IS OUT AND ABOUT

If there is one thing senior officers said that commanding officers of excellent ships avoid, it is staying tied to their stateroom. They think the best commanding officers routinely get around their ships to observe what is going on and keep in touch with the crew. Being out and about is one of the primary means effective commanding officers stay in tune with their crew. While making their rounds, these commanding officers are not meddling in the affairs of their crew. Rather, primarily they are demonstrating their interest in what their crewmembers are doing.

A commodore, whose comments were typical, said he saw commanding officers of excellent ships as being strong leaders who were active and involved. They insure they have a lot of interaction with the ship's officers and men. This high level of interaction hardly ever took on the trappings of micro-management, however.

C. THESE ARE THE CAPTAIN'S STANDARDS

Senior officers feel very strongly that commanding officers of the best ships devote a lot of attention to and are extremely effective at setting standards and goals and communicating them to all hands.

In commenting on the importance of high standards in general, a staff officer said the captain should "preach his views on what he expects, regularly and continuously." The chief staff officer of a tactical amphibious squadron said he thought it was important that the captain communicate to the crew his standards "using all forms of communication," and the message should be "these are my standards." A commodore commented, "Tell them (the crew) what you want and you will be surprised. They will give it to you." During his previous ship command, he had gathered the crew

immediately after assuming command and told them the ship was the dirtiest he had ever seen and that he expected them to clean it up immediately. They did. The commodore said, "These guys just wanted to be told what to do." Another commodore said that having high standards was one of the key elements of shipboard leadership and management that set excellent commands apart from the rest. On excellent ships, he felt that the standards were higher across the board and their attainment of standards was not viewed as something that could be negotiated. Commanding officers of excellent ships did not take it for granted that people know what he expects of them. The captain must first tell them his standards and then, if need be, demand that they be met. He added that "The crew will do whatever you ask of them."

To achieve excellence, the link between standards and accountability had to be made known to every crewmember. In discussing the enforcement of standards, a commodore said that the captain "can't be a nice guy." When people do something wrong, they have to be told, and this starts with the captain pointing out errors when he sees them occur. This was not to say that the chain of command should be ignored, but it is important that the officers and men know that subpar performance will be noted and action will be taken to remedy any below standard reoccurrence.

E. EVERYTHING IS PUSHED DOWNHILL

Tasks are delegated to the maximum extent possible on the best ships. A staff officer summed up most senior officers' attitude towards delegation when he commented, "Pushing things downhill should become a way of life." On a typical excellent ship, delegation starts with the captain, who realizes he cannot do everything. The captain goes out of his way to let the executive officer make some of the

decisions that are traditionally made by the commanding officer. Such trust and delegation not only develops the executive officer, but it also pervades other senior-subordinate relationships from the department heads to the mess cooks. The net result is that almost everyone is growing professionally and becoming qualified for their next at sea assignment.

E. THEY IGNORE THE RIGHT THINGS

Senior officers stated repeatedly that the best ships recognize their limitations and live within them. They don't take on too much at one time nor do they try to do things they aren't capable of doing. In other words, they set priorities, have their subordinates do likewise, and act in accordance with their established priorities. When a commodore stated that the best ships work smarter not harder, he attributed the attainment of this primarily to the ability of these ships to plan and set proper priorities. Another commodore said that his best captains knew that they could not do everything that was required of them. They demonstrated an the ability to "know what is really important," and they were skilled at "selectively ignoring the right things." A third commodore said that there are a thousand things the commanding officer is responsible for, but only a handful he needs to keep on his mind all the time, examples being safety, CMS, disbursing, and nuclear matters. Yet another commodore said that top ships realize they cannot do everything. They make the effort to learn what the commodore expects of the ship, and they give it to him. They know what is important and have the ability to prioritize their work.

F. THEY HAVE "GOOD" DISCIPLINE

There was nothing surprising or unique about what senior officers' views on discipline. However, they all mentioned the importance of discipline and stressed that it must be firm, fair, consistent, and speedily administered. As one staff officer put it, "Good ships have good discipline." Many senior officers did mention that they think the best ships try to reform problem sailors rather than just discharge them from the Navy. For example, one officer said he thought the best ships made an attempt to "turnaround" poor performers before initiating separation procedures. He did not think the top ships conducted massive house cleanings of poor performers.

G. CHIEFS ASSUME THEIR PROPER ROLE

We've already mentioned that senior officers we interviewed find that, on excellent ships, the chief petty officers assume a greater role in the day-to-day management of their ships than on most other ships. How does the commanding officer get this high degree of commitment and involvement from the chiefs? The answer lies in the captain's actions aimed at elevating his chiefs to their "rightful" position of leadership. One way he does this is by going on record regarding his expectations of his chiefs. He tells them he realizes the importance of their experience and expertise, emphasizing that he expects them to be the backbone of the ship's leadership and that he wants them to be highly involved in all aspects of the ship's management. Another way the captain does this is by making certain the chiefs know he expects them to train junior officers, and by making certain the junior officers know that he expects them to work closely with their chiefs and to learn from them.

H. THE CREW KNOWS WHAT'S GOING ON

Senior officers said repeatedly that they think crews of the best ships are kept well informed of a broad range of information concerning their ship. This included not only being made aware of scheduled ship events, but also events impacting on the ship, and feedback from the captain on how well he thought the ship was doing. Excellent ships have excellent communications, and they don't assume that all that needs to be done to communicate effectively is to put the word out at officer's call and in the plan of the day. The key to excellent communications is the captain. He keeps the crew informed by using the ship's public announcing system (1MC), holding periodic meetings such as captain's call with it and most importantly by talking to individuals one-on-one during his daily tours of the ship.

A staff officer's comments on this subject were typical. He considered communication with the crew to be very important and stressed that the captain should personally talk to the crew regularly. This not only helped get the word out but it also had the secondary positive effect of allowing the crew to get to know the captain. A commodore said that keeping the crew informed on "how they are doing" was one of the captain's primary responsibilities and was key to having an effective command. He added that he thought it imperative that the commanding officer hold meetings with the crew on a regular basis.

I. THEY CARE FOR THEIR PEOPLE

The importance of concern for the individual sailor was given much emphasis during the interviews and we heard many examples of ways in which this concern is demonstrated on excellent ships. One commodore stated he had concluded that excellent leaders were "tuned to people and their needs,"

and they were "in frequency and in harmony with the ship." The commodore implied that caring for people and being in touch with them were means needed to gain commitment of individual sailors to the goals of their command.

An officer described how concern for sailors was demonstrated on one of the better ships with which he was familiar. It was standard procedure that a new man's rack be made up and his name stenciled on both his rack and his locker before he was taken to his berthing compartment for the first time. This relatively insignificant act was felt to have a powerful impact on both newly reporting sailors and old hands. Among other things, it symbolized the command's concern for its personnel. Coupled with other acts aimed at demonstrating concern for the welfare of the crew, this ship had developed a highly committed crew.

Another hallmark of excellence is that the captain plays a major role in showing concern for people. One of the primary ways he does this is by recognizing good performance. In commenting on the best ship in his group, a group commander noted it had an exceptionally strong education program and many of her sailors received their high school diplomas while assigned to the ship. The captain of this ship went out of his way to recognize the accomplishments of his crew. He invited the commodore and other VIPs to award high school diplomas and to acknowledge other achievements. This appeared to have a very positive impact on the crew and was reflected in their extremely positive attitude.

In discussing another excellent ship, a commodore spoke very highly of the emphasis the commanding officer placed on recognizing those who had successfully completed their Enlisted Surface Warfare Specialist qualification. Gaining the silver cutlasses meant a lot to both the recipients and the captain. The commanding officer made it a point to pin the silver cutlasses to his uniform on the day prior to a

formal ceremony at which the insignia was awarded. He did this to show every man in the crew that this accomplishment meant a lot to the captain. The commodore was very favorably impressed by the extra effort the captain had made to recognize the crew in this manner.

Excellent captains also are seen as showing concern for individuals by being fair, firm, and consistent in administering discipline. One commodore stated that when a man went to mast, it was important that his entire chain of command attend the mast and be prepared to provide frank and candid comments on the man's performance. The commodore stated that when he had command of a ship, he weighed the comments of the chain of command very carefully and was inclined to give a man a break when the man's superiors so recommended because of prior good performance. Alternatively, he would "hammer" an offender for a similar infraction when the chain of command indicated that he was not a good performer. This was a means he used as commanding officer to let the crew know that he would take care of the good personnel but would not put up with those who did not support the ship.

J. THEY PLAN AHEAD

The ability to look ahead, to develop a plan, and then to implement the plan was emphasized time and again by the officers we interviewed as a key to being an excellent ship. They believe the best ships prepare today for events that will take place months in the future. Rather than coming up with elaborate schemes for planning, excellent ships emphasize that planning should be done in a simple and straightforward manner. One commodore summed it up when he said that the best ships plan to achieve that which they want. He added that this was one way they work smarter, not harder.

Inspections were the primary area in which senior officers said good planning manifests itself. One officer said he believed that excellent ships did a much better job of planning and preparing for inspections. He noted that he never seemed to find poor inspection results on ships that had a commanding officer and department heads who had taken the time to meet with his inspection party personnel a couple of months before the inspection.

K. THEIR PROGRAMS ARE BETTER ACROSS THE BOARD

It was evident that the officers we interviewed think that excellent ships do a better job of managing shipboard programs than fleet average ships. As one commodore put it, "The programs of excellent ships are better across the board." Although all programs were considered important, zone inspections, Planned Maintenance System, Enlisted Surface Warfare Specialist qualifications, "I" (Indoctrination) Division, and the Ombudsman program were mentioned most frequently.

In providing an example of how an effective equipment maintenance program improves the outcome of materiel inspections, a staff officer, who had previously been assigned as a materiel inspector, said he found that ships with aviator commanding officers tended to perform better on materiel inspections than those with surface warfare commanding officers who did not have previous engineering experience. He attributed this to the fact that the aviators have a built in respect for the Planned Maintenance System and that they saw the Engineering Operating Sequencing System (EOSS) as being similar to the Naval Aviation Training and Operations Procedures Standard (NATOPS).

I. CN TO THE SHIPS

There you have it....the "tried and true methods" which senior officers mentioned most often when discussing "excellence in the Surface Navy." Combined with the "external" and "waterfront" indicators of excellence, one can gain an appreciation of how these senior officers judge their ships, and how they believe their top ships go about achieving excellence. Let us now go aboard six ships that these senior officers singled out for their excellence and see if there are any surprises.

VI. ON THE DECK PLATES

Battle "E" winner, Marjorie Sterrett winner, Arleigh Burke winner, OPPE standout, top operator, inspection standout, high retainer, high morale, a captain who thinks the world of his crew and a crew that feels the same about their captain, chiefs running the ship and the officers managing their divisions and departments while growing professionally, pride in being not only the fightingest ship on the waterfront but also the cleanest. Seem the like the best of all worlds? Well, perhaps to the surprise of some, there are ships out there that have much of this lock about them.

For our study of excellence in the Surface Navy, we wanted to interview a wide variety of senior surface force officers and to observe a diverse group of excellent surface force ships. Our interviews with senior officers included (1) amphibious and cruiser-destroyer group commanders, (2) amphibious, service force, and cruiser-destroyer squadron commanders, and (3) captains on the Atlantic and Pacific Surface Force type commands. Because of ship operating schedules we were unable to get as broad a range of surface force ships as we desired. However, we did end up with five different types of ships. Originally we selected the following ships to visit: two cruisers, one destroyer, two frigates, one amphibious transport dock, one amphibious assault ship, and one salvage ship. In selecting ships to interview, we used the following criteria: the number of officers recommending a given ship as excellent; the strength of the views of the senior officers recommending a specific ship; and the availability of the ship for our interviews. All of the ships selected were recommended by

at least twenty five percent of the senior officers we interviewed and some by over ninety percent. There were several ships strongly recommended for our project which could not be observed because of their being deployed. We conducted day long interviews on the eight ships that met our criteria. Subsequent to our interviews, we decided to drop two ships from our analysis, one frigate and the amphibious assault ship, because we concluded that we were not able to get adequate information from these ships.

We went aboard each ship at 0900 and conducted one hour individual interviews with the captain and the executive officer. Then we conducted one hour interviews with each of the following groups: two department heads, two to four division officers, four to twenty chiefs, ten to twenty E5's and E6's, and ten to twenty E4's and below.¹ During the interviews we were attempting to identify what each ship did that made it perform well, why the ship performed better than others, and how the ship went about conducting its business. However, we did not want to do this in such a way that our questions drove the answers, that is, we avoided questions that could be answered with a simple yes or no. We did not ask questions like "Is retention important on this ship?" Instead we asked open ended questions, questions that usually began with the words "what" and "how" with some "why" questions added after receiving answers to the "what" and "how" questions. For example, we would ask everyone we interviewed, "To what do you attribute the success of this ship?" and "How would you compare your ship's performance to the other ships in your squadron/homeport?" And after we got an answer we might add "Why do you think your ship is the best in the squadron?"

¹Summaries of all of our senior officer and ship interviews are on file at the Naval Postgraduate School.

In addition to using the 7S model (see the introduction to Part I for details of this model) to develop our questions, we also included questions relating to those categories senior officers discussed the most when we asked them for their views on excellence in the Surface Navy. These categories were departmental and battle efficiency awards, cleanliness/appearance of ship, appearance of crew, attitude of crew, role of captain, role of chiefs, commanding officer/executive officer relationship, retention, discipline, communications, task accomplishment, inspections, innovation, self-sufficiency, programs, and personnel.

Having completed our ship interviews, we needed to decide upon a method for providing the reader with our findings. When we started, we had hoped that we would be able to group the information in one or more of the currently popular models used to describe organizations, such as the 7S mentioned earlier; however, we found that such an approach, although appealing for its simplicity and neatness, tended to remove from our analysis the energy and personalities of the ships we visited, and it was these qualities that had impressed us the most. Therefore, we elected a less structured but, we hope, more interesting and enlightening approach to telling the story of these excellent ships. We chose to identify those qualities that the people on these ships felt contributed the most to their success.

After many false starts, the attributes that we ended up with as the best descriptors of these excellent ships were grouped into the following categories, each of which is amplified in the chapters that follow.

- Good ships getting better
- Pride in evidence at all levels
- Teamwork, not just a concept but a way of life
- The ship in automatic

- High energy level/bias towards action
- Presence of a common vision and shared values
- As the captain, so is the ship
- Sailors, our most important resource
- Oh yes, task accomplishment²

The story we want to tell is about excellent ships that in the past were good but are on their way to becoming great; ships that have crews that think of themselves as family and take great pride in themselves and their ships; ships that are well managed, possessing many of the qualities extolled in present day leadership and management literature, even though people are not sure why these attributes exist in their ship and not in others they have served in or known about; ships that know one thing for sure, their captain is the key to the success of their ship, not because he is so smart or works so hard but because he understands people and, to quote a frequently heard phrase, "because he acts like a human being"; and ships that view their success at getting the job done as almost an after thought, "We just

²Peters and Waterman in their book, In Search of Excellence, use the following descriptive phrases to describe the basics of success they saw working in the excellent American business they studied: managing ambiguity and paradox, a bias for action, close to the customer, autonomy and entrepreneurship, productivity through people, hands-on/value-driven, stick to the knitting, and simple form/lean staff. Peters and Waterman's work provided us with the idea to attempt our study of excellence in the Surface Navy, and much of what they described as being at work in the successful American business also was observed by us on the decks and between the bulkheads of excellent U.S. Navy ships. Obviously, because of the different environments of business and defense, there were a lot of differences in the dynamics of ships as opposed to those in businesses; however, we were struck more by the similarities in our observations than the differences. Two of Peters and Waterman's attributes, a bias for action and productivity through people, were right on target with our observations, and we have used very similar descriptive phrases in our paper, high energy level/bias towards action and sailors - our most important resource. We commend the reading of In Search of Excellence to Navy leaders and managers. It is relevant to our profession. [Ref. 1]

try to excel at everything we do, and the tasks take care of themselves."

With one more repetition of the caveat that this is not our theory on how to achieve excellence in Navy ships, but just our description of what we saw on six ships that senior officers identified as being excellent, let us now go aboard and take a look at excellence in the Surface Navy.

VII. GOOD SHIPS GETTING BETTER

According to the officers and enlisted personnel we interviewed, none of the ships we visited had made what might be called a miraculous turnaround in the recent past. That is, none of the ships had gone from "basket case" to top performer. Each of these ships had been at least average in the recent past (18 months to two years before the interview), and most of these ships had been top ships for several years, at a minimum. It was interesting to note how many of the senior enlisted personnel attributed the success of their ship to the fact that "Our ship has always been top notch, since the day she was commissioned." However, even though the ships were seen as having been good in the past, everyone we talked with thought the ships were on an upward performance trend. They saw their ship as being better today than a year ago, and they felt that the ship would be even better in the immediate future. The collective feeling of being on an upward performance trend even applied to a ship that a year before had won the Battenberg Trophy, for being the top ship in the fleet. The crew members who had been in this ship during the period it won the Battenberg Trophy stated that their winning the award was well deserved, but they were quick to add that they were a better ship today than when they had been recognized as being the best. Although there was no doubt in the minds of the people on these ships that they were superstars, it was interesting to observe that many personnel, especially the junior officers and junior enlisted men, did not have strong opinions as to why their ship was so good and getting better, they just knew that it was.

Occasionally we would hear a negative comment about a specific aspect of the management of one of these ships (they were excellent ships, not perfect), but what impressed us was that people noting a problem were usually optimistic about the chances of the stated problem being corrected. If an officer commented that the ship did not have as good a Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) or Enlisted Surface Warfare Specialist (ESWS) program as he thought it should have, he would usually follow up with a comment that the problem with the program was appreciated and action was being taken to rectify the situation.

We frequently heard, especially when talking to the chiefs, that their ship's top performing reputation drew good people to the command like a powerful magnet, making being a good ship getting better a little easier to achieve than one might think. We met several chiefs and first and second class petty officers who told us that they had lobbied to get orders to their ship because they had wanted to be on a ship with a great reputation. We also met one commanding officer who said that he attempted, on occasion, to recruit top senior enlisted personnel to his ship, and he found this was not difficult to do because of the ship's fine reputation. To this captain, the appeal of being on a winner was very strong, especially for junior officers and junior enlisted personnel. He noted that young men did not join the Navy to be average. As he put it, to these young men "Being average stinks! They want to stick out." Being on a top ship gave them the chance to stand out from the herd.

Another benefit of being good which made remaining on top a little easier was that the commodores, group commanders, and their staffs tended to leave these ships alone. In general, the officers and enlisted personnel were neutral regarding the staff. The few who did have opinions

of the staffs usually had good words for them. The staff was not seen as the enemy, but more like a distant rich uncle who could be of help when needed and who did not stick his nose where it was not needed. Two of the ships we interviewed spent a lot of time serving as flag ships. Obviously, they had a close relationship with the staff. However, their attitude towards the staff was still positive. This had not happened automatically, but it had happened.

Much of what follows in the next eight chapters gets into the how and the why these ships were good and getting better. But before moving on, it is worth noting that when we asked people on these ships how good were they, the answer was invariably, "We are the best." However, when we asked them why they were good or what it was that they did that made them good, the answers covered the waterfront, and sometimes the answer was not known, especially among the junior officers and junior enlisted personnel. However, when we departed each of these ships, having spent six hours on them talking with personnel at all levels of the chain of command, we felt that we had some good ideas regarding the causes of their success. Read on if you are interested in the look of excellence and some of its causes.

VIII. PRIDE IN EVIDENCE AT ALL LEVELS

The amount of pride the officers and men of these ships had in their ships was truly amazing. Nearly everyone, officer and enlisted, felt that his ship was the best, and they were proud and anxious to tell us that this was the way they felt. When asked how they saw themselves relative to the other ships in their squadron, the people we interviewed, especially the chiefs and junior enlisted personnel, typically would get on the front of their seats and proclaim "There is no doubt about it. We are the best ship in the squadron!" Over and over again we heard junior enlisted, senior enlisted, and officers saying things like "If there is a war tomorrow, this is the ship I want to be on," or "There is not another ship in my homeport that I would rather be on." On two of these ships, we interviewed approximately fifty officers and enlisted personnel, and we did not come across a single person who did not think that his ship was not only the best one in the fleet but also the best one with which he had ever come in contact. The old refrain that the best command is either the one you just came from or the one you are going to was not the case for these officers and enlisted men. To these men, they had found the best command, and we were standing on it. The comments of the chiefs regarding the relative excellence of their present command and their previous commands was especially telling, for the chiefs had numerous ships to compare their present one against. But, even with the chiefs, their conclusion was the same as that of the boot junior officers or seamen, "This is the best ship."³

³In the introduction to the third edition of Command at Sea, Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. stated that "Pride,

The captains were also proud of their ships, although their pride was a lot more reserved and tempered with rational explanations of how their ship achieved its outstanding performance. The captains' pride often seemed a very personal thing, similar to the pride seen in a parent describing a highly successful son or daughter. Some of the captains were excited about the prospect of letting us know how they operated, and others were rather restrained, but all of them did feel that we had come to the right place to study excellence in the Surface Navy.

A. THE POWER OF RECOGNIZING GOOD PERFORMANCE

Why were the people on these ships so proud of their ship and their membership in the crew? Was enhancing crew pride a goal of these commands? If so, how was increased pride achieved? We asked these questions a lot, and we concluded that although pride had a lot to do with passing inspections and meeting operational commitments, there was more to it. Simple, garden variety recognition of good performance probably had more to do with the pride observed on these ships than any other management or leadership technique. Although usually not a stated goal of the commanding officers, recognition of good performance was used on these ships as a means of empowering subordinates and gaining their commitment to command goals. On one ship, the CO would give a dinner party on board the ship for new personnel and their families. Before the dinner, he would learn something about each new man in attendance, and at the dinner he would introduce each new man to the people at the table, making sure that his remarks contained a personal

loyalty, and discipline are the by-products stemming from the proper exercise of command leadership." What we saw in these excellent ships only lends support to his statement. Pride is mentioned here, and as the reader will discover, discipline and loyalty flourished on these ships. [Ref. 2]

touch. The executive officer who related this to us noted that he could see that the people attending the dinner truly appreciated the fact that they were being welcomed in such a unique manner and that they were being recognized as important individuals by the captain. They invariably felt good about themselves and their new home. On another ship, the captain went out of his way to insure that his crew received recognition as a group and as individuals. After a lot of politicking, he was able to arrange for his sailor of the quarter to be recognized not only by himself but also by a nearby Navy League. The sailor of the quarter and his wife were treated to an expense free weekend at a plush resort compliments of this Navy League chapter. The captain noted that not only was this sailor of the quarter impressed and motivated by the recognition, attention, and treatment he received, but the rest of the crew appreciated what was being done for one of their own. They were proud to be on a ship where individual excellence received this type of special recognition.

B. ACCENTUATING THE POSITIVE

Accentuating the positive was a powerful theme observed on many of these ships. One captain went as far as to tell his officers and chiefs that for every man who was disciplined, at least ten would be commended. This was not used as an inflexible rule that sent the executive officer out after every captain's mast looking for "good guys" to fulfill a ten to one rule, rather it was made part of the command climate on this ship. The officers and senior enlisted personnel had been converted to the captain's way of thinking. They gave recognition and recommended personnel for command recognition, not because of some dictum from on high, but because they had seen how powerful

a motivator recognition of good performance could be, and they wanted to use it to spur their personnel to even greater commitment and accomplishment. An officer on this ship proudly related the ten to one rule to us as requiring thirty commendations for every reprimand. Apparently he had not only internalized his captain's thinking, he had expanded upon it.

On the majority of these ships, it was evident that the sequence of getting tasks done started first with gaining individual commitment to the general goals and processes of the command. Once commitment was achieved, accomplishment invariably followed. There was one ship in the group that downplayed the importance of focusing on enhancing commitment. On this ship, commitment was treated as a given and when it was lacking it was achieved through edict. "You just have to demand that people do their job" was the way several officers put it. But, even on this ship, recognition of good performance occurred a lot.

These ships cultivated pride as a farmer might cultivate his crops, and recognition of good performance was one of the key ingredients used to raise an individual's image of himself and his ship. "When we do a good job, we get told that we have done well," and statements similar to this were heard repeatedly on these ships, especially, but not exclusively, at the junior enlisted level. Although recognition of superior performance was used a lot on these ships, the crews felt that the recognition they received was hard earned and well deserved, and not given out just to try and squeeze a little more work out of a person. There seemed to be a fine line between giving recognition when it was due, and giving it unselectively and excessively. On one ship, we heard the comment several times that a previous commanding officer had given more recognition than the present captain, but the recognition from the incumbent

captain did more to motivate the crew because they realized that when this captain recognized someone, it was well deserved.

Recognition was not the sole purview of the captain on these ships. It was used by many levels. The chiefs, in general, seemed concerned especially with recognizing their subordinates when they performed well. On one ship, for example, when VIPs would visit the extremely impressive firerooms, the chief in charge made certain that his personnel appreciated the fact that they were being given a compliment for their efforts just by the fact that the VIPs were there. Additionally, this chief stated that he went out of his way to recognize his personnel when they performed well, which meant that he spent a lot of time giving a lot of recognition.

In addition to verbal recognition, many of the chiefs we met used more tangible forms of recognition, mainly the granting of time off for jobs well done. On most of these ships, the chiefs controlled liberty, which gave them the power to back up their words of praise with action. (Even on excellent ships, the sailors like their liberty.) Furthermore, on these ships, the sailors saw the linkage between effort expended and reward, e.g., liberty, medals, and letters of commendation. Talking to a W4 bosun on one of the ships we visited, we heard that relatively late in his professional life he learned the importance and power of recognizing good performance. Whereas in the past he might not have recognized a job well done because he thought everyone was expected to perform well, he now took the time to give recognition. He said that his change of views regarding recognition resulted from his realizing how good he felt in his last job when he was commended for doing well. This happened a lot in his previous job (getting commended and feeling good because of it), and he said that

it spurred him on to even better performance. He now saw it as his duty to recognize his subordinates' good performance. For example, after a recent long and difficult deck evolution, the first thing he did after securing was to go below and draft letters of commendation for his subordinates who had performed in an exemplary manner during the evolution. Talking with men from all levels of the chain of command on this ship and with men from all the ships we visited, we were struck by the impact recognition of good performance had had on them. Even though they felt they were the best, they still were motivated by hearing from their superiors that their efforts were known and appreciated.

Another aspect of recognition that manifested itself on these ships was that the recognition tended to be done immediately or very soon after the act that warranted the recognition. Monthly awards ceremonies were held on these ships, but initial recognition was not delayed until the ceremony. The captain would get on the 1MC and let the crew know what Petty Officer Jones did the moment his accomplishments were appreciated.⁴

⁴Elancharid in his best selling book, The One Minute Manager, emphasizes the importance of identifying and recognizing good performance. He considers recognition, "one minute praising" is his more descriptive phrase, as one of the members of a triad for effective management at the working level. The other two members of the triad are "one minute reprimanding" and "one minute goal setting." [Ref. 3]

IX. TEAMWORK NOT JUST A CONCEPT BUT A WAY OF LIFE

A. LITTLE THINGS MEAN A LOT

Although usually not an expressed goal of the captain or the officers and chiefs of these excellent ships, teamwork was pervasive on all of these ships, especially among the chiefs, the department heads and the junior enlisted personnel. We repeatedly heard comments similar to one E5 saying, "If I need some help, I can go right to the person who is responsible, and nine out of ten times he will stop what he is doing and help me out."

On another ship, we heard at every level of the command that teamwork was outstanding on the ship, and that every major evolution was approached as a team effort. The term these officers and men used for their form of teamwork was "group grabble." This meant to them that whenever there was a big job for the ship to do everyone was expected to do his part. When the ship had a major seamanship evolution that required people to help out with pulling cables and providing their brawn, everyone turned out without the khaki ever having to resort to the chain of command. People just felt that it was their responsibility to lend a hand. When this same ship had her OPPE, tiger teams of non-engineering department personnel were formed and stationed on the mess decks to respond in any way they could. Again, they were willing to help out their shipmates. If that meant that a radicmar went into the bilges to clean an oil spill during the OPPE, so be it. On another ship we visited, the department heads recollected a recent evolution that to them personified the crew's attitude towards teamwork. The ship had just returned from a month at sea on a Friday afternoon,

and a twenty man working party was required to load stores. The department heads were concerned that it would be difficult to get personnel for the evolution since everyone not in the duty section would want to hit the beach. To their surprise, they ended up with twice as many people as were needed for the evolution, and the attitude of the crew was "Let's all pitch in and get this over so that everyone can hit the beach." As the department heads watched this evolution, it dawned on them that the team spirit they were witnessing was really what separated this ship from others in which they had served, and it was this sense of family that, perhaps more than any other factor, caused this ship to be the best ship with which they had ever been associated.

Supporting our impression of the importance and power of the sense of teamwork on some of these ships was the frequency with which we heard personnel from one department offer unsolicited praise of personnel from a different department. This happened with the department heads, the division officers, the chiefs, the first class, and the junior enlisted. Frequently the supply departments on these ships were cited by engineers, operators, and weaponers for the outstanding service they provided in such things as supply support and crew care, e.g., cooking and laundry services. The supply officers on all of these ships were held in high esteem by their fellow department heads. There were a lot of blue E's on these ships, but when asked to describe the supply officer, we heard comments like, "He stresses service to the ship far ahead of doing whatever it takes to please supply inspectors and win supply E's." On one ship, a hero of the crew was a mess specialist (MS) who had served on the ship for over ten years. He was something of a folk hero. When underway, he worked around the clock. The crew saw him as being driven by a desire to provide the

crew the best food and service possible. People laughed and shook their heads in agreement and amazement as one sailor told us that this MS did not even have a bunk. He just worked until he dropped, and wherever that was he rested until he was ready to work some more. His sacrifice and dedication did a lot to motivate others on this ship to give extra of themselves and to draw other crew members into the powerful sense of family that existed in this ship.

In addition to having a high opinion of their shipmates in general, the personnel on these ships respected and trusted their shipmates. When asked if there was much theft or vandalism on their ship, the sailors made statements that indicated they were unfamiliar with what other ships in the fleet are like. The younger sailors of these ships had difficulty believing that there are ships that have problems with theft and vandalism. Families did not inflict such pains on themselves.

Perhaps these examples were not that atypical of those found on fleet average ships, but what impressed us about these stories was the fact that they meant something special to the people on these ships. They served as examples of the way these ships did business, not as one of occurrences that left people wondering what got into the crew. The air of teamwork that permeated these ships seemed to take on almost mystical proportions. People enjoyed and appreciated the fact that on this ship the level of cooperation and teamwork was something special, and they wanted to do their part to make this positive quality a permanent part of the command fabric. They were not inclined to sit back and just take advantage of the sense of teamwork that did exist, they wanted to contribute to this positive atmosphere and pass it on to future crew members.

B. IT STARTS WITH ONE-ON-ONE RELATIONSHIPS

One-on-one personal relations on these ships also showed evidence of the importance of teamwork and cooperation to overall performance. For example, we did not come across a single example of one department head not getting along with one of his peers. At first we thought we might be getting "fed a line" when the department heads told us of how well they got along with each other, but, as we talked to other officers and enlisted personnel, we heard unsolicited comments about the close cooperation and rapport that existed between the department heads and what a positive impact this had on their command. Somehow, these department heads had dealt successfully with the issue of career competition with their peers. Also, all of these captains felt that they got along well with their executive officers, and the executive officers felt just as positive about their relations with their captains. The captain and the executive officer were not necessarily the best of friends, but there was a mutual respect between these officers. Furthermore, when the captain and the executive officer of these ships had problems with their officers and enlisted personnel, the general feeling among subordinates was that the problems were dealt with in a professional and non-personal manner. Actions, not personalities, tended to be the focus of criticism.

The junior enlisted were especially impressed by the amount of cooperation that existed on their ships. They usually said that they did not know why everyone tended to cooperate, but they added that they were convinced that the high level of cooperation was a major, if not the major, contributor to the success of the ship. The teamwork that did exist seemed to cut across peer and working groups. The officers got along well with the chiefs, the chiefs thought

highly of the officers, the junior enlisted thought that their LPCs were good, etc., etc. As one E3 put it, on his ship there was no prejudice. He was not talking about race prejudice; he was talking about prejudice towards junior personnel by senior personnel. On his ship, as he saw it, his feelings were treated as if they were important, just as important as those of his superiors. This sailor was mess cooking at the time we interviewed him, and he had no misconceptions about who ran the ship and who made the decisions. He knew that this was the responsibility of his seniors, but he was impressed by the fact that the people who had the responsibility for running the ship also had the ability to appreciate that his feelings were just as important to him as theirs were to them. When this sailor was making his point he was in a group of fifteen E4's and E3's, and, to a man, they nodded in agreement as the sailor spoke. As we interviewed these young sailors, the command master chief sat off to one side unobtrusively listening to what we were being told. We could tell that he was proud of what was being said. He had let us know before the group interview that the ship was good and that the crew was turned on; yet, we could tell that every time he saw the manifestations of commitment and cooperation from the crew he got a warm feeling in the pit of his stomach. We were impressed also.

C. TEAM AT THE TOP

On many of these ships the collaboration between the department heads, division officers, and chiefs with the captain was very strong. Rather than operating as distinct camps with similar goals of excellence, these groups and individuals worked as an entity, as a team, with the captain in charge, but also with the captain seen as a member of the

team. The captain was perceived as being sharp and professional and in some cases extremely knowledgeable, but, more importantly to his subordinates, he was also perceived as being approachable and open to suggestions. Furthermore, the captain was viewed as willing to change his mind when one of the other team members had a better way of approaching a problem. The officers and chiefs on these ships responded very positively to their captain's being approachable. They were not familiar with the captain, but they were eager to share their views with him. On these ships, with one exception, the captain did not do anything that he considered out of the ordinary to develop this sense of teamwork at the top, but upon reflection most of the captains did note that they had let it be known that they did not want to be surrounded by a bunch of "yes men," and they somehow were able to convince their subordinates that they were sincere regarding this pronouncement.

On one of the ships, however, the captain took a very proactive approach to developing teamwork among the khaki. He told us proudly that he could not stand "yes men" and to get this point across to his officers and chiefs he periodically would make statements that were diametrically opposed to his true beliefs just to see if the officers and chiefs would call him on these bogus remarks. If they did not, he would give them both barrels, and chastise them for not having the confidence and energy to note the folly of what he was saying. This captain added that it was very easy as a captain to fall into the trap of believing you are always right and to start thinking too much of your own ability and opinions. He felt that he had to be constantly on his guard against deceiving himself, and that he had to convince his subordinates through his words and actions that it was important for him and the ship that he not be allowed to live in a fool's paradise. The honest inputs of everyone

were considered crucial in the quest for excellence, not the dishonest agreeing "aye, aye, sirs" of subordinates afraid and/or unwilling to tell the captain when he was heading in the wrong direction. That is not to say that a form of participative management existed in this ship that had every man telling his superiors his every feeling about every decision. It did not. Yet, the prevailing feeling was that on matters of importance juniors could and were expected to offer opinions at odds with their superiors without being considered disloyal. Such opinions were not given with great frequency, but the fact that the juniors knew that they could be given meant a lot to these people and enhanced their feeling of attachment to their ship.

D. FOR THE NON-TEAM PLAYER, STRIKE TWO, YOU'RE OUT

As mentioned earlier in this section, teamwork was usually not seen as an end in itself or even as a command goal, but on one ship, the captain elevated teamwork to very near the top of his priority list within the first week of his joining. He gathered the crew together on the flight deck for his first of many captain's calls, and he told them something like this. The ship was not the best ship in the squadron, but it could be and would be. He told them that to be the best was not hard; all it took was commitment to be the best and some hard work. He added that if they gave him what he asked, the ship would become the best ship in the fleet, adding that although this would require a lot of hard work, it would be a lot of fun and very rewarding. After he gave this speech, the commanding officer told the crew that he only wanted people on board who were committed to his plan. He then told them that if they personally did not feel committed they should walk to the other side of the flight deck and he would send them to another command. Some

took him up on this. They were off the ship within a week. In addition to getting rid of those who said that they did not want to be "on the team," this commanding officer got rid of a lot of poor performers during the first week of his command. The commanding officer said that he sent twenty six personnel home during his first week command. Several other captains related that they had separated a lot of poor performers in the past year. The great majority of the people we talked with supported their command's efforts to get rid of poor performers. We frequently heard E3's and E4's laud their command's efforts at getting rid of people who did not want to perform or be on their ship. When we asked what was done with personnel who did not fit into the team, the answer was usually, "They are not around long." Although malcontents and poor performers were not removed just because they were not team players, they were removed (if they did not change their ways), and this had a positive impact on the level of cooperation and teamwork on these ships. Enhanced teamwork was viewed as a side benefit of a policy to get rid of dead wood, but its benefits to the ship were considered significant. We did not hear the old saw that ninety percent of the time was being spent with ten percent of the problem personnel. The bottom ten percent appeared to be constantly under the gun, and if they did not modify their behavior relatively quickly, they were gone. Each of the ships differed on how hard and how long they would work to get an individual to modify his ways, but all of them had a breaking point which, when reached, resulted in the departure of the poor performer, and it appeared that

the breaking point was not that high. On one ship this was summarized as follows: "You get one strike, but on strike two you are out."⁵

⁵For an in depth discussion of the causes and values of teamwork in organizations, the reader is referred to Chester I. Barnard's The Functions of the Executive. [Ref. 4]

X. THE SHIP IN AUTOMATIC

Although one could sense a high energy level on these ships at all levels, there did not appear to be a lot of wasted effort. There was little work for work's sake. The ships were in an efficient routine that everyone understood and supported. Crisis management was the exception rather than the norm, especially internally generated crisis management. These ships had their fair share of short fused problems to deal with, but usually these were considered the result of someone off the ship putting a short leadtime demand upon the ship. Although the Ship's Organization and Regulation Manual (SORM) was not a vital document used in the day-to-day management of all of the ships (only one of these ships used the SORM on an almost daily basis), the concept of having "a way to do" various evolutions did exist. With only a few exceptions, the officers and enlisted personnel on these ships did not feel that they were working harder or longer hours than their counterparts across the pier, and they did not feel that their ship rates were above average in intellect or technical ability. Rather, they felt that they were operating more efficiently and getting more out of their men and themselves than other ships.

The wheel was not being reinvented with great regularity on these ships. There seemed to be time for everything, including personal matters and crew recreation. Time management was not stressed, but it appeared that there was a good balance between undertaking short range, not so important, urgent items and the not so urgent, longer range, very important items. The important did not habitually lose to the urgent.

A. THE SHIP DRIVING PROGRAMS, AND NOT PROGRAMS DRIVING THE SHIP

It seemed that all of the various programs that the shore establishment levied on these ships were being complied with and given more or less the attention that the "powers that be" thought each of these programs should get. This is not to say that all programs were, in fact, given equal emphasis, but the officers and enlisted personnel felt that none of the programs was being given just lip service. We heard very few complaints about "such and such a program" not being alive and well. We asked all of these captains which programs they gave the least attention to, and the answer was usually that all programs were given attention. We thought we might find that some of the commanding officers made a conscious decision to downplay certain programs, but this was not the case. One captain's comment, "I cannot think of any programs that we are supposed to be doing that we are not," was typical of what we heard. Furthermore, the programs on these ships were not seen as empires unto themselves. Instead, they were seen as parts that fit into an integrated whole. The purposes behind the programs were known, and they fit into the ships' purposes, as the ships had identified them for themselves. How they fit into the big picture is discussed in the following chapter. Here we will discuss the programs that were emphasized on these excellent ships.

B. THROUGH KNOWLEDGE, BATTLE READINESS

All of these ships had time for training and they did a lot of it. On the average, these ships devoted three hours each week to on ship training for both the officers and the enlisted personnel. Frequently we heard enlisted personnel praising the training they were receiving. Chiefs would

say, "This is the first ship that I have ever been on that actually conducted training as it should be." There was a lot of concern with broadening individuals' knowledge of not only their rating but also their ship and the contributions of their shipmates. In general, the Enlisted Surface Warfare Specialist (ESWS) program received a lot of attention. (It was interesting to note that although all of the ships had active ESWS programs, the vast majority of the personnel we talked with felt that more could be done in this area. They saw the benefits of the program and they wanted to get as much from the program as possible.) Off ship training was also stressed on these ships. The general feeling expressed by supervisors was that people had to learn their jobs to be effective, and if this required others to work a little harder and longer to compensate for the absence of a shipmate off at school, so be it. The ship and the individual would benefit in the long run. Once again, there was a lot of attention on long run benefits, even at the expense of short run hardships. The captains were the ones requiring that training and professional growth be kept high on their ships' priority lists, but they appeared to have the total support of their subordinates. Apparently, the benefits of training had made themselves apparent to these crews.

We came across numerous examples of these ships emphasizing enhanced battle readiness through individual growth, but none more telling than on the ship that conducted its annual naval gunfire support qualification using members of the "second team" on the computer consoles. As all cruiser-destroyermen know, this is an important qualification and the scores on this exercise receive a lot of scrutiny from superiors, but to the captain of this ship and to his crew, the scores were secondary to training the personnel who needed the training the most. As one department head put

it, "When we are off of Lebanon and standing condition III watches, it very likely will be one of the junior men sitting on the gunfire console who will have to perform. We knew our first team could do their jobs well, and we knew that the second and third teams needed the practice the most. Therefore, the second and third teams were the ones who got the training when we fired for qualification. For sure the first team was standing over the shoulders of the less experienced personnel, but when it was over, the younger men knew that they had the ability to do their job." This ship was driven not only by a desire to excel but also by a vision of battle readiness being the standard by which excelling ultimately would be judged. Therefore, lower scores on an exercise could and had to be tolerated in order to enhance the ship's battle readiness. This example is given not because it is representative of how the other excellent ships approached exercises, but because it is typical of the importance they attached to training the entire ship and not just a chosen few and the demonstrated devotion to training and its long term benefits towards personal growth. All of these ships targeted their training programs at battle readiness. Only the direction from which they fired differed.

One captain who put a very high priority on training recounted that when he took command, the ship did not have an effective training program. He realized the inadequacy of the training program during the first week he was on board. He immediately made one of only two edicts he remembered making in his entire command tour. He mandated that training be conducted for the first hour of every Tuesday and Thursday. He said that if he heard a chipping hammer during either of these training periods, he would go berserk. As he was walking around the ship daily, he would ask crew members about their training. Originally he got

feedback from the crew that the training was not good. The captain then went to the executive officer and told him that his training program wasn't hacking it. The executive officer squared away the program and it was very good from then on. This commanding officer also pushed off-ship training. He said that the off-ship training schedule was one of the few pieces of paper that he paid attention to. Again, when he walked around the ship, he would ask the sailors what training they had scheduled in the future. He was looking to see that there was some direction and perceived personal growth. It was the department heads' and division officers' responsibility to insure that such direction existed.

Training was one of another captain's top priorities, and he was very proud of his existing training program. He claimed it was second to none. Officers trained daily. The ship used an available classroom at the head of the pier to do a lot of training. The captain was surprised how few other ships availed themselves of this valuable training location. Several times during our interview he asserted, "We really push training." He noted that meaningful training was hard to do, but that it must be strived for continuously. He had a lot of interest in ESWS, and he was proud of the ship's program. He added, however, that the number of qualified personnel was not that high. His sailors also shared his interest and liking for the ESWS program, as well as the captain's belief that more could be done with the ship's program than was being done currently. However, both the captain and the crew felt that the program was heading in the right direction and that it would continue to improve. This was just one of several examples of less than excellent programs being viewed positively by the crews of these ships because they were pleased with the direction the programs were heading. There was an optimism

and a confidence in the system; once identified, problems would be solved.

C. IT NOT ONLY WORKS, IT LOOKS GOOD

These excellent ships were very clean and well preserved and the crews took pride in this. However, they did not feel that they were having to go to superhuman efforts or spend an inordinate amount of time to achieve the sharp internal and external appearance of their ships. In general, everyone knew his job, and everyone was doing his job (or being taken to task when he was not doing his job), and that was about all the people we met felt it took to get the job done in a professional, non-crisis manner.

Zone inspections were a vital and effective program on all of these ships. Several captains and members of their crews attributed much of the overall improvements in the effectiveness of their ship to the captain initiating an effective zone inspection program. Every captain actively participated in his zone inspection program. On some of the ships the captain would be the only one who conducted zone inspections. On others, the executive officer and department heads might also participate, but on none of the ships did the captain delegate his responsibility for personally inspecting.

Many of the crew thought of and talked of the zone inspection program as not just another ship's program, but as their captain's zone inspection program. It was one of the more effective ways these captains communicated their standards and expectations to their crews, and the crews appreciated their captain personally passing on this information to them. One captain related that he started stressing his zone inspection program the week he took command. He used the zone inspection as a means of setting

and raising standards of cleanliness, material readiness, and management. He noted that it took a lot of his time (two zone inspections per week for the first six months of this captain's command tour) and energy to implement the zone inspection program as he felt was required ("I had to work like a dog"), but he was convinced that his efforts had been well rewarded in terms of enhanced material readiness and cleanliness. Accountability was stressed during zone inspections. This was felt to be the key to making the program successful. The personnel presenting the spaces to the inspecting officers were required to know the status of discrepancies and to brief on what was being done to correct any discrepancies, and woe betide an individual and his supervisors if they were not up to this tasking.

The preventive maintenance programs on these ships received a lot of attention from all levels of the chain of command. The captains went out of their way to demonstrate their interest in this program. Some would include the checking of the PMS program as part of their zone inspections. Others would conduct spot checks of preventive maintenance checks. All insisted that their officers demonstrate a keen interest in the program. One captain noted that when he took command he would have his department heads personally brief him on all preventive maintenance checks that had not been completed during the previous week. He was surprised to find that the department heads did not have sound reasons as to why deferred checks had not been completed. Immediately he made it clear to his department heads that he expected one hundred percent PMS accomplishment, and, in the event this was not possible, the department head would be thoroughly familiar with the reason why a check had not been completed and what was being done to get it completed. This captain concluded by noting that after a couple of weeks the department heads and their personnel saw

the importance of giving PMS a great deal of attention and from then on PMS was more or less put in automatic. On several ships we heard people proudly state that one hundred percent PMS accomplishment was expected of them and their work centers. Working weekends to get caught up on PMS was a norm on many of these ships, a norm that was accepted by the crew as being part of what it took to be the best.

D. BRINGING THEM INTO THE FOLD

Although these ships were in many ways in automatic, they did not rely solely upon the ship's positive momentum rubbing off on new personnel to inculcate in the new men the ship's emphasis on achieving excellence. They gave a lot of attention to indoctrinating new personnel and to telling them that "this is the way things are done on this ship." The captains of all of these ships personally met with every man who joined. During these meetings the captains stressed a few important points that they wanted each man to understand. What was stressed differed from captain to captain, but all of them stressed the command's desire to be the best and some basic values associated with the process that would be followed in the quest for excellence. For example, one of the captains placed special emphasis on indoctrinating young sailors who were just out of the training command and joining their first ship. After shaking hands and giving a new man a ship's ball cap as he welcomed him to the team, the captain would tell him something like this: "You know right from wrong, never do anything that is ethically wrong. No one owes you anything, take care of yourself first. Looking in the mirror in the morning, the only guy that counts is looking back at you." Then he would ask, "When is the last time you wrote home?" adding that if he did not write to his parents, he would be doing so in the captain's

presence. He concluded by telling the new sailor to give his folks good news, as they deserved this for what they had done for the man. The new sailor was learning from the captain personally that each person on the ship was important and that his new command was concerned about his welfare. A positive first impression was being made, and the man was being brought into the family by the head of the family, the captain.

Another captain said that he always pointed out to the new men joining the ship that the ship had a good reputation. He would mention all of the ship's departmental excellence awards. In this way, the new people realized that "they (their leaders) are serious about the ship doing well." At the indoctrination training for new personnel, the commanding officer would always tell them that "the Navy is a way of life" and that pride and responsibility were key elements of this life. Again, the focus was on a few key thoughts (we are after excellence and each individual is key to achieving excellence) that the captain wanted the new man to understand and begin to internalize.

When asked about the discipline on these ships, the answer was invariably "The captain is fair but firm, and he is consistent." In addition to being consistent from mast case to mast case, the captain's discipline philosophy appeared to be consistent with his broader leadership philosophy. People did not attend a mast and leave wondering why the captain did what he did. There were very few surprises at mast. Mast cases got what they expected the captain would give them, and, in general, the mast cases got what the crew felt they should get. The captain and discipline seemed synonymous. People were given a chance if they made a mistake, but they did not get many second chances and they were usually gone by the third chance. On all of these ships the captain tended to "give the max" for

the first drug offense and to get rid of anyone who was involved for drugs for a second time. The officers and men on these ships felt that drug use on their ship was low. On several, this was a big change from a year or so ago when drugs were a big problem.

In general, discipline was automatic on these ships. Mast happened on the same day every week, only people who deserved to go to mast went, and those that did go got what they deserved. Discipline was no big deal. It was handled as it should be in the eyes of officers, chiefs, senior petty officers, junior petty officers, and non-rated personnel. Although each of these ships stuck to the traditional fair, firm and consistent philosophy regarding discipline, they varied a lot in the mechanics they used to carry out the discipline process. On one ship, the chiefs served as a discipline review body charged with investigating all report chits and forwarding their recommendations for processing to the commanding officer via the executive officer. On another ship, every mast was televised and shown on SITE TV during the noon hour. Watching the mast cases on TV was voluntary, but as it turned out, almost every member of the crew turned out to view the proceedings. The captain of the ship that showed the masts on TV stated that his ship had the lowest mast rate in the fleet and that televising masts had a lot to do with the ship's high state of discipline. On one other ship, the captain made masts a mandatory all hands evolution. Masts were conducted on the foc's'le in full view of the entire crew. This was the one ship's captain that we were not able to interview, but everyone else we talked with on this ship, from the executive officer to seamen, felt that the high visibility given mast cases had had a very positive impact on the ship.

E. THE MANAGEMENT PROCESS, SIMPLE AND CONSISTENT

In general, on these ships, the management process tended to be as follows: The captain decided what was most important and what the key priorities were; middle management took care of most of the day-to-day "whats," and when need be, they provided the "why" something was important; and how things were done was delegated to as low a level as possible, frequently to the junior petty officer or non-rated man level. Although the captains of these ships left much of the determining of what would be done on their ships to their subordinates (provided their priorities were being complied with), they went out of their way to know what was being done on their ships; however, they consciously avoided involving themselves directly in the determination of how things would be done. They functioned as monitors and not doers. The captains were conspicuous by their absence in the running of the ship's routine. This was left to the executive officer and the officers and senior enlisted personnel. Several captains commented that frequently they felt the urge to intervene and show the cognizant person a better way (their way) of approaching problems, but they fought this temptation and forced their juniors to come up with suitable solutions on their own.

Planning received a lot of attention on these ships. The captains tended to do much of the long range planning (six months or more into the future). As one captain put it, "I'm the only one who has the time to look six months down the road." The rest of the intra-ship planning was done by the executive officer and the department heads, and monitored to varying degrees by the captain. Some ships used formal documents, such as plans of actions and milestones, and others did not. But all of the ships felt that they spent a lot of time planning and that this investment

in time payed off in the long run in increased efficiency and enhanced performance. The old maxim, "There is never enough time to plan but there is always enough time to do it over," was not the way these ships operated. On one ship the planning function was augmented by rehearsal as a means of achieving excellence. Whenever this ship had a major evolution to complete, such as an OPPE, the ship would add to its planning for the major event a full dress rehearsal several weeks in advance. The executive officer of this ship was convinced that this act alone had much to do with the top results the ship was able to achieve for all its tasking.

Meetings were not a problem on these ships. Meetings were held, but the ships were not "meeting crazy." The meetings that they did have had a purpose and were considered useful by those who attended. They also occurred on time and they did not drag on. One executive officer stated that he had inherited a ship that was in automatic when it came to meetings and daily routine. A lot of time was not spent finding people for evolutions and meetings. Everyone showed up when and where he was supposed to. We never did uncover why this happened on this ship, but, like the executive officer, we were impressed and of the opinion that this efficient routine contributed to the ship's excellence.

F. THE IMPORTANCE OF STANDARDS (NO STANDARDS, NO EXCELLENCE)

On all of these ships, the officers and the crew felt that their ships had very high standards across the board. High standards of cleanliness, appearance, conduct, and interpersonal behavior were, in general (there were some exceptions), a source of pride for the crews of these ships. It was frequently stated that when the incumbent commanding

officer took command, one of the first things he did was raise the standards of cleanliness expected of the ship. The junior enlisted frequently commented that they initially did not like the idea of having to work harder to achieve higher standards, but they were now of the opinion that whatever extra work it took was worthwhile. In general, they liked the fact that when one of the men from their ship walked down the pier he looked sharper than a man from another ship on the pier. They were extremely proud of the fact that their ship "was the cleanest in the fleet." (Just as many people we talked with thought that their ship was the steamingest in the fleet.)

Asked why they were proud that their ship was able to maintain higher standards than their sister ships, sailors would mention how they were proud to bring their family and friends on the ship and to hear them praise the ship's appearance and cleanliness. They also liked hearing such comments from people touring the ship when the ship was deployed. They also would comment frequently that it did not take all that much more effort to keep the ship looking as good as it did.

Another theme that ran through several of the ships regarding cleanliness and appearance had to do with the crew viewing their ship as their home. For those who truly internalized this view, it made complete sense to them to keep their ship looking good. Many of the sailors we talked to on these ships subscribed to what we read on the quarter-deck of one of the ships that we visited, "This is not just a ship, it is your home." This analogy of the ship being the crew's home fit very well with the analogy that the crew was not just a group of officers and sailors, but rather a family. The power of the "family" spirit on these ships was in several incidences incredible to observe. On these ships, the vast majority of the crew had internalized the

vision and the values of the ship as espoused by the captain. There was a powerful sense of ownership that made people think of the ship as "their ship" and not "the ship." High standards played an important part in the developing of such a positive attitude. They were a source of pride.

Asked about how standards fit into his command philosophy, one commanding officer said that cleanliness was the key. "All else revolves around this." He noted that when he took over the ship it was not clean, and, to get his views across to the crew, he told them that they might think that they were good but that it was impossible, in his mind, to be good even if you were dressed in a tuxedo when you were standing in a pig sty with muck up to your ankles, and this is the way he saw the ship. To get the ship clean to the commanding officer's standards, he divided the ship into eighty zones and personally inspected two zones twice a week every week come hell or high water. This was how he got his standards across to the crew. He personally showed them where they did not measure up. He also noted that the fanrooms on the ship were in a poor state of repair when he assumed command. To get them up, he personally involved himself with one of the poorer fanrooms. Working with a small group of sailors, he had the fanroom completely refurbished in strict accordance with the technical guidance on how a fanroom should be. Once this was done and the fanroom looked great, the commanding officer sent a memo (one of his few pieces of written correspondence) to each of the officers and chiefs. It went something like this. There was a major reclamation project taking place in the county of (name of the ship) and the model property (the fanroom) had just been completed and was now open for inspection by everyone. It was anticipated that within the next couple of months all of the units in the county would be of the same high calibre as the model. With this model,

the captain felt his khaki could see what was expected of them and questions did not have to be asked and answered. The ship's fanrooms made a remarkable improvement within six months. The commanding officer felt that they were now the best fanrooms in the fleet. They were not only a source of pride to him, they were a source of pride to the crew.

This captain's method of communicating his standards to his crew was one of the more innovative methods we came across, but all of the captains we met on these ships went to great lengths to communicate their standards. The chain of command was used and so were written policy statements to get across the captain's standards, but much much more was done also. In fact, these captains prided themselves on never missing an opportunity to get across their standards to the crew. In addition to involving themselves totally in the zone inspection program, they pointed out over and over again to their officers and enlisted personnel what they expected, hardly ever missing an opportunity to talk standards. They talked standards to the wardroom, the chiefs mess, the first class mess, various divisions at captain's calls, and to new people joining. Stressing standards was an everyday job, one that these captains took to with all of their energy.

G. IN THE KNOW

On these ships, people were kept very well informed. Great emphasis was made to inform individuals from the day they joined what was expected of them, where they fit into the shipboard organization, and where the ship fit into the "big picture." When we talked with the chiefs, they felt strongly that they were "in the know" and that they had the information they needed to keep their personnel informed. Furthermore, the junior sailors also felt that they had a big picture perspective of what the ship was doing.

These captains went to great lengths to keep their crews informed of how the ship fit into the big picture, why it was going from point alpha to point bravo, the impact the ship's actions would have on the fleet, the Navy, and the nation. Even the most mundane tasks were explained as to the importance they had with regard to the ship being battle ready and able to carry out its mission. The crews appreciated the explanations of how what they were doing contributed to the whole of what the ship was doing.

The captains were key players in the communications process. They held a lot of captain's calls. Two captains held captain's call once a week. Underway, almost all the captains talked to the crew on the 1MC several times a day. When a new man joined, each of the captains met with him and communicated a short message of what was expected of him. They felt that personal communications were the key to getting their message to the sailors. Memos would not do, nor would SITE TV. The chain of command was important and used, but it had to be augmented by one-on-one communications. We were told that you probably could not communicate too much, but it was easy to communicate too little, and the results would be bad if you did not communicate enough. All of the captains felt that it was their responsibility to spend a lot of their time walking around the ship, not for the exercise, but because this was how they showed that they were truly concerned with their personnel and because this was the best way to communicate up and down the chain of command. Several of the captains said that they spent fifty percent of their time in port walking around the ship, asking people what they were doing, noting what wasn't going well (e.g., people working without a sense of direction), and just showing that they were concerned and involved with the ship.

XI. HIGH ENERGY LEVEL/BIAS TOWARDS ACTION

The people we met on these ships were keen. There was a lot of energy about them. Yet these ships also seemed very relaxed. The officers and crew liked to talk about their ship and to discuss what was being done right. They were not hesitant to mention areas where their ship could and should improve. However, we were impressed with how few "gripes" the people we talked with on these ships had. We heard an occasional complaint about the SWO program not being as active as some of the junior officers would like; a couple of junior enlisted personnel took exception with some of the particulars of the command's dress standards; or one of the groups on the ship, e.g., the first class petty officers, might not be performing to as high a level as some of the other groups thought they should be. However, very little energy surrounded these negatives. The people got excited when they discussed what the ship was doing right, not what it was doing wrong.

A. FIX IT NOW

There was also a strong feeling of independence about these ships, especially among the junior officers and the enlisted personnel. They saw their ship standing out from all other ships, and they looked upon the people who wrote the ship's schedule and inspected the ship as the opposition. They saw themselves doing great in spite of these outside influences. It was amusing to hear group after group on ship after ship describe itself as the steamingest ship in the fleet. They did not particularly like that fact that they had to do so much steaming, but they sure were

proud of the fact that they were steamers and not "pier queens." We heard young sailors just as frequently as we heard captains and department heads say that the ship performed best when it was underway a lot. In keeping with their pride in being independent and controllers of their own fate, at least within the bulkheads of their ship, we frequently heard the personnel on these ships speak highly of their ability to fix themselves, and not having to rely on the shore establishment. The general attitude was that their ship had the ability to fix itself ninety five percent of the time. If a problem did occur that was beyond the ability of the ship to handle, the ship would still have a go at it, and only after every effort had been exhausted to make the fix using in house talent would the ship go to outside activities for help. When outside help was requested, these ships would do everything in their power to learn from the outside help and to get the outside help off the ship as soon as possible after the solution to the problem had been found.

Another aspect of the importance attached to self-sufficiency was the fact that it was a norm on these ships that personnel would work as long as required to fix any of their equipment that went down. If that meant working the weekend day and night, so be it. This was one of the shared values of the command that seemed to fit into the quest for the shared vision of the ship as being battle ready. This attitude did not exist solely because the captain or the other officers said that it would; it existed because the crew had internalized this attitude of "my ship." One department head related how the attitude towards self-sufficiency changed when the present commanding officer took command. Prior to his arrival, the ship had a high opinion of itself (higher than that of the ship's superiors). When gear went down, a decision would be made as to how important

the gear was, and if it was very important people would remain onboard until it was fixed; if not so important, they would leave at the end of the day and work on it tomorrow. With the new CO, all equipment would be repaired before people hit the beach. If gear went down at night, people would be brought in to repair it. This policy was not well received by the technicians initially. There were a lot of complaints about working nights. But now, somehow, people had changed their views and no longer complained. They saw it as part of their job to work on their gear until it was up. On all the ships we visited we heard stories from the officers, but also the sailors, that their command's attitude to down equipment was "fix it now." In addition to agreeing on this as the attitude, these people, including those who had to work nights to make the policy a reality, acted as if this were the only way to run a ship, at least as if it were the only way to run an excellent ship. To them, it was a small price to pay to be number one.

B. INVOLVEMENT YES, MICROC-MANAGEMENT NO

The word "involvement" was heard over and over again on these ships when discussing the causes of excellence. The captain felt that it was important that he be very involved in the ship, the crew saw the chiefs as being highly involved in the running of their divisions, the chiefs were impressed by the involvement of the officers, the junior officers saw their captain's high level of involvement as proof that he meant what he said when he talked about the importance of personal sacrifice and concern for the welfare of subordinates. None of these captains, none of these wardrooms, and none of these chiefs messes was viewed by subordinates as being uninvolved in the day-to-day operations of the ship. Just the opposite was true, and their

involvement was perceived as a very positive force contributing greatly to the ship's success. The involvement was seen as a demonstration of interest and concern. It was not perceived as and did not take the form of micro-management. When dealing with specific problems, these commanding officers were seen as being interested and supportive of efforts by both the officer and enlisted personnel to produce not just descriptions of the problem but also solutions. These captains would ask questions and make comments, but they rarely would dictate solutions or courses of action. Several captains commented that they had to fight the urge to solve their subordinates' problems when they were presented to the captain by the subordinate, but they, on the whole, were successful in fighting this urge to take action rather than require action of others. One captain, perhaps the least process oriented commanding officer of the ones we interviewed, noted that the captain must make subordinates develop their own solutions for their own personal growth and, perhaps more importantly, to foster a sense of ownership in each man of the ship's problems. He concluded by saying he was continuously striving to get the junior enlisted men to take ownership for their work and to correct problems on their own, without having to be told to do so. This was seen as a key to achieving excellence.

C. THE QUEST FOR EXCELLENCE STARTS ON DAY ONE

The commanding officers of these ships stepped on board their new commands knowing what they wanted to do with their ships. They did not take a lot of time to assess what they had in the way of a crew before making it known that business would not be conducted as it had been in the past (before their arrival). One captain who was typical said he took about a week to size up his ship. This was all the

time he felt he needed to determine what he had in the way of strengths and weaknesses. This assessment was done very informally by just walking around the ship and watching what people were doing and talking with officers and enlisted personnel. The early stages of these commanding officers' tours were not a time for participative management when it came to deciding upon the direction the ship would proceed and how business would be conducted. Sometimes this bias towards action and bias towards doing business as the captain said it would be done gave some members of the crew problems. There were several stories of difficulties experienced getting used to the new captain's desires and methods, but the transition period was short on all of these ships. Within months the men got on their captain's team (or left the ship), and there was no looking back, except to smile when retelling the story of what it was like when the new captain arrived. Most of the captains we talked with felt that it took about six months to get their ships on board to their way of doing business.

XII. PRESENCE OF A COMMON VISION AND SHARED VALUES

A. A FOCUS ON WHAT'S IMPORTANT

On most of these ships, a great deal of effort had not been expended to develop a grand strategy for success; however, such a strategy did exist on every ship. The strategy existed because the captains of these ships brought with them a vision of what they wanted their ship to look like and practical techniques in leadership and management to take their ships in the direction of their vision of excellence. In addition to knowing what they wanted their ships to look like, these captains realized the importance of inculcating this vision in their officers and enlisted personnel. Sometimes this would take the form of philosophical discussions between the captain and his senior officers, other times it would only manifest itself in a consistency of action and interaction between the captain and various members and groups of the crew, but the presence of a consistent "modus operandi" was discerned by the officers and enlisted personnel as both a tactical game plan for governing day-to-day behavior and as a strategy for achieving a futuristic vision of what the ship could become. In other words, they knew what the captain wanted to do with the ship, where they fit into a plan of action aimed at turning the vision into reality, and how they were going to go about accomplishing whatever it was they wanted. Furthermore, by and large, many of the officers and enlisted personnel, even the most junior (which was truly impressive), had internalized the values associated with the captain's vision, whether or not the strategy to achieve the vision was explicit or implicit. If the captain was pushing

battle readiness, the crew was doing likewise. If the captain was hot on safety, so was the crew. When we asked a groups of E4's and below what was their captain's priority, invariably the answer would be identical to what the captain had told us his primary goal was during our interview with him earlier in the day.

B. FOR THE CAUSE, BATTLE READINESS

As it turned out, the captain's overriding emphasis on all of these excellent ships, as pronounced by the captain and perceived by the crew, was battle readiness. What might be unique about the emphasis on battle readiness on these ships was not that it was the espoused goal of the command, but that the crew had bought into this strategy and accepted it as their own. Most of these captains went out of their way to relate whatever the ship was doing or what an individual was doing to the ship's mission and to being battle ready. As one captain put it, "I stress to the officers and crew why we are here. The bottom line is our mission." Another captain kept reminding his crew, "I want the Russians to quake in their boots when this ship steams over the horizon." He kept this image in front of the crew continuously, and he converted them to his way of thinking. They wanted the same thing their captain wanted, and they internalized his desire to make whatever effort was required to achieve the level of battle readiness needed. On these ships, such things as OPPE's, assist visits, and all the other requirements levied upon ships by outside sources were not viewed as ends in themselves. They were only bridges to cross on the road to battle readiness. Rather than peaking for inspections, these ships prided themselves as being always battle ready and being able to see past the inspections to the real world, the world in which battle

readiness was the ultimate criterion by which a ship would be judged. One captain said that he did nothing special to prepare for inspections and tasking, adding, "Frankly, I did not worry about much. I was just concerned that we would do our best." However, the captain was very proud of the ship's accomplishments.

C. VALUE DRIVEN INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

In addition to being in sync with their captain regarding the purpose, goals, and objectives to be emphasized on their ship, the officers and enlisted men on these ships were, in general, in sync with their captain regarding the means to be used to achieve these outcomes. Values associated with and styles for dealing with subordinates, superiors, and peers tended to be consistent among the various levels of the chain of command on each of these ships. That is not to say that all of these ships had similar values or leadership styles, they did not: but on any given ship in this group, values and leadership style tended to be consistent and similar. However, what seemed important to these crews was not the attention given a specific value or set of values, but the fact that the leaders of these ships were value driven when dealing with people and their actions tended to be consistent and in harmony with their emphasized values. The captains were not viewed as being capricious, and they did not allow their officers and senior enlisted to be so. People knew where the leaders were coming from and they appreciated the sense of stability that resulted.

The people we met felt that they were trusted and treated with respect. They felt that their efforts were appreciated and that it was part of their responsibility to demonstrate their appreciation of the efforts of their

subordinates. The captain was credited on most of these ships as being the man most responsible for enhancing interpersonal interactions by insisting upon behavior consistent with espoused values. He dealt with everyone he met in a professional and gentlemanly manner. This did not mean that he did not show his temper or censure poor performance, but it did mean that when this did occur it was always done in a professional manner and personalities were not attacked; only actions were criticized, not personalities. Also, in addition to setting an example for his subordinates to emulate, the captain either demanded that his subordinates act in a similar manner or he established a climate where such behavior became the norm through choice. We came across very few examples of officers and senior enlisted personnel being seen by peers or subordinates as ill mannered and unprofessional when dealing with shipmates. The feeling was that such behavior was not acceptable. When new people joined who started out on the wrong foot when dealing with their subordinates, their peers would take them aside and set them right. Several groups of junior officers and chiefs related how they had had new members join their groups and not hold up the norms of behavior for dealing with subordinates and how these new men had been set right and brought on board. The captain had set the tone, the officers and senior enlisted had internalized it, and new personnel were being indoctrinated without the captain having to do a thing.

The fact that such a positive type of climate flourished under these captains had very much to do with the high regard in which the captain was held. The phrase we heard over and over again when an officer or an enlisted man was asked to describe his captain was, "He acts like a human being and he treats others as human beings." One got the feeling listening to these junior officers and enlisted men

describe their captains as human beings, that this was one of the highest compliments that a junior could bestow on his senior.

In dealing with both their officers and the crew, most of the captains we met did so in such a way that a man's dignity was enhanced rather than lessened. On most ships, very rarely did leaders resort to emotional outbursts when they detected poor performance. Rather, emotions usually were kept in check. Efforts were made to find the cause of a problem rather than just treat the symptom of a problem. There were a couple of captains in this group who did tend to loose their temper, but somehow the officers and men under these leaders were able to put aside the emotions of their superiors and see them as professionals in search of top performance. Why these captains were not perceived negatively for their emotionalism probably has something to do with their personalities and style, but we were not able to put our finger on the answer to this intriguing question. The emotionalism of these officers was consistent with the high energy they had for excelling at everything they did, and the crew and officers, by and large, saw these officers' behavior directed to the same goal they identified with, excellence. Another attribute that the more emotional captains had that contributed to the crew's respect for these officers was that these captains were viewed as having short memories. In other words, they might get mad, but once the event or act causing their wrath was history, they put it out of their minds and the people involved felt that the captain did not hold it against them.

XIII. AS THE CAPTAIN, SO IS THE SHIP

A. IMPORTANCE OF THE CAPTAIN

Without a doubt, the most obvious attribute observed on all of the excellent ships we studied was the importance of the commanding officer to the success of the ship. Some of the captains found this to be so obvious as to not bear mentioning, while others were a little surprised when we told them that they were seen by their subordinates as the key reason behind the success of the ship.

First we will let you hear what the captains had to say about their importance to their ships and their successes, and then we will hear from their crews. This will be followed by a discussion of the similarities and differences we observed in these commanding officers regarding the roles they assumed, the focus of their efforts, and the beliefs underlying their actions.

B. THROUGH THE CAPTAIN'S EYES

Asked why his ship performed so well, one captain said that it primarily was due to "intense command interest" on his behalf. He noted that he had served previously as a chief staff officer on a tactical destroyer squadron in the Atlantic Fleet, and during this tour he had become convinced that "the captain makes the ship." During his destroyer squadron tour, he attempted to discern and learn the keys to success and top performance by closely observing the squadron's eight commanding officers and their ships. He concluded that there was a perfect positive correlation between the performance of the ships and the involvement and abilities of the captains he observed. The great ships had

great captains, the fair ships had fair captains, and the poor ships had poor captains. He went on to add that he had never seen an exception to the great ship - great captain rule. This captain felt that his current command was a great ship, and much of this was due to the fact that his predecessor had been a great captain. This did not mean that the ship was perfect (neither he nor we have come across a perfect ship), but to him it was one of the best in the fleet and there was no escaping the fact that the previous captain had been the key to the success of the ship. This captain was modest and did not mention his importance to the current success of his ship, but everyone else we talked to on this ship came to a similar conclusion regarding why the ship was great: they had a super captain, the best. They also mentioned that his predecessor had been top notch. Among the more senior officers and enlisted personnel, there was a feeling that they had been very lucky to have had the opportunity to work for such great commanding officers. The junior officers and junior enlisted men also appreciated the ability and importance of their captain to the success of the ship, but, as one might expect, they did not focus on the uniqueness of their captain's abilities to the extent the more senior personnel did.

One commanding officer had very strong views on how one achieved excellence in ships. He stated, however, that before he would provide his views on what a commanding officer, officers, and crew should do to achieve excellence, he wanted to make perfectly clear his fundamental belief that he considered it mandatory that one "decide to use a positive approach" when taking command and not the very common "you can't do" attitude that he saw many captains using. By this he meant that there were reams of instructions and guidance on what a commanding officer could not

do. He felt that these were not worth the paper they were printed on. Instead of paying attention to what "the system" said a commanding officer could not do, he felt that it was critical that a commanding officer concentrate on what he could do to get the job done. He felt that it was his superiors' job to tell him what they wanted him and his ship to do, and then it was his job to determine how he would achieve that which they had told him to do. He added that if a commanding officer played it safe and worried a lot about what he could and could not do, he would, at best, have an average, safe, uneventful and uninspired command tour. "You can't worry about your career. You must be comfortable with yourself. You can't have both the security of doing it by the book and the energy that comes from doing it the way you feel it should be done. Command of a ship must be seen as an end in itself, and the ship as the captain's own little world."

The commanding officer felt that it was important that he instill in his subordinates a "can do" philosophy in sync with his own and that he give his subordinates the latitude to determine for themselves the "how" for the "what" that the commanding officer specified he wanted. In general, this commanding officer thought that he was successful in getting his officers to think positively and to think in terms of how they could accomplish a given task rather than why they could not. However, he was not confident that these officers would be able to retain such a positive frame of mind if they went to their next command and had to work for "can't doers." In general the captain felt that most (ninety five percent) men wanted to do well at what they and their organization were doing. However, the system sometimes limited individuals. As the captain, he felt that it was his job to remove the limitations on individuals and to instill in them the desire to be the best at everything they undertook.

A second captain gave his views on command. Asked to what he attributed the success of his ship, this commanding officer laughed and said that he did not have a one shot answer to this question. After some thought, he said that he stressed uniformity in the way business was conducted on the ship and in the standards used on the ship. He said that there was a sense of fairness and concern for the crew, and that "management knows their people." Regarding showing concern for people, the captain said that he would not settle for anything less than a high level of concern for subordinates. He said that everyone in the chain was responsible for insuring that this requirement was enforced. He added that he insists that division officers be close to their people, and that they strive to make their presence felt. When the captain discussed "concern" for subordinates, he mainly meant such things as insuring that their work and living spaces were up to high standards, that they were given help when they needed it in dealing with personal problems, and that other factors relating to their physical needs were receiving proper attention; however, he also saw the importance of juniors feeling that their superiors truly cared about their welfare, and, in this light, such care was aimed at some of the psychological needs of the crew. Several times the captain came back to the idea of stressing the importance of improving the quality of life of the crew. He noted that the ship was twenty years old and not as habitable as some of the newer ships, and that it took extra effort to enhance the crew's quality of life, but, even so, this could and should be done by all personnel in positions of responsibility. The commanding officer later added that the ship's success was not due to the fact that personnel worked harder than on other ships. He implied that his crew was more committed and more efficient and this led to their being more effective than most ships.

Another captain keyed on the importance of his being involved with his crew and his ship. He stressed that it was important that he display a high personal interest in what the crew was doing on a day-to-day basis. He spent a lot of his time walking around the ship, visiting most spaces daily. He would ask crew members what their problems are and what were their plans for correcting them. He would also point out those things that he thought needed correction. He might also go to the division officer and say "I did not see a sense of direction in the work your men are doing." The captain added that he took the time to get around the ship because he felt that if you take an interest in people they will respond.

As has been mentioned previously, all of the captains of these excellent ships were very oriented to doing well on the tasks confronting their ships and to being battle ready. Some, however, were more inclined to want to do well at everything, while others considered it important to concentrate only on what they thought was important. Whereas one commanding officer might see the Combined Federal Campaign fund raising drive as inconsequential and not contributing to enhancing the ship's battle readiness, another might see it as yet another way for the ship to distinguish itself. The latter group seemed to want to do well in even the incidental matters because they placed a very high importance on the ship and her crew gaining an image of themselves as doers and winners in everything they undertook. The former group seemed to feel that if the crew did well at its mission and those inspections and requirements directly related to its mission, pride would follow.

Whereas all of the captains were very oriented towards accomplishing the tasks assigned to their ships, there was a wide spectrum of beliefs and philosophies regarding how to deal with officers and enlisted personnel and how to

motivate them and gain their commitment for accomplishing the tasks that the captain considered important. All agreed that their personnel were the key to the success of their ships, but they differed on how to get the most out of this most important ingredient. At one end of the spectrum was the captain who described himself as a strict disciplinarian. He believed that it was his job to set standards high and demand that these standards be met. On the opposite end of the spectrum was the captain who had similar views regarding the importance of high standards and excelling at individual tasks, but who was of the opinion that it was his job as commanding officer to develop an environment in the ship that made personnel want to perform well. In the middle of this group was the captain who saw his role as that of a monitor of performance and setter of the proper example for professional behavior. Leadership, not a given leadership style, was one of the keys to excellence.

On these ships, however, it was striking to note the similarity in leadership philosophies found among the officers and senior enlisted personnel. The similarity existed not among the total group of ships but rather on each individual ship. That is, on one ship the captain put a very high emphasis on task accomplishment and a much lower emphasis on getting subordinates to internalize his desire that the ship do well. He felt what was needed primarily to get the results he wanted was to demand that his people put forward the requisite effort. If he had the energy to make these demands and to follow up on them, the ship would do well. Talking to others on this ship, we heard very similar comments from the more senior officers and enlisted personnel. "We tell them what to do and we make sure they do it and as a result we are top notch." On other ships in the group (the majority), the captain would stress the task and also stress the importance of developing a positive

climate throughout the chain of command for undertaking the task. He avoided edicts. On these ships, the more senior officers and chiefs appeared to follow the lead of their captain. They tended to cultivate rather than demand the commitment of their juniors as they went about undertaking tasks. This is not to say that they were "touchy feely" or that they gave priority to the concerns for individuals over concern for the task. The task always dominated on the ships we visited, but on many of the ships a lot of emphasis was given to motivating the crew and gaining their commitment to accomplishing the tasks confronting the ship.

C. THROUGH THE CREW'S EYES

The officers and enlisted personnel working for these captains were quite convinced that their captain was the driving force behind their ship's success. In many cases the captain was held in extremely high esteem, in others he was revered, in none was he considered anything less than a total professional. On some of the ships, the admiration for the captain was amazing to observe. We frequently heard statements at all levels within the ship, such as, "This captain is the finest commanding officer I have ever worked for" and "If I ever have to go to war, this is the guy I want to go with."

When we heard officers and crew members state that their ship was great due mainly to the fact it had a great commanding officer, we would ask, "What makes him a great commanding officer?" The answers covered a wide range. Here is a sampling of what we heard. From a group of chiefs, "He is honest. He will chew you out when necessary but he gives recognition when it is due." From the first class on this ship, "He insures that all programs on the ship are emphasized. He is laid back and not afraid to

mingle with the crew. He talks to you and he is not afraid to listen to ideas. He helps good people when they want to re-enlist, and he is not afraid to get rid of bad people." The junior enlisted shared their seniors' admiration and respect for their commanding officer. They noted that "He knows what is going on in the ship, he gets around a lot, and he will help people when they have problems." They added that he was the driving force behind the high state of cleanliness on the ship. His zone inspections were demanding but highly regarded. One E3 noted that his captain expects outstanding results during zone inspections. He said that when the captain came upon a space that he did not think was up to his standards he would say, "If this is your preparation for a zone inspection, how will you handle everyday work?" This usually got through to the individual the captain was addressing, and as a result the ship was kept very clean.

D. WHAT THEY DID AND WHAT THEY STRESSED

In addition to the roles levied upon all commanding officers by Navy Regulations, numerous directives, and tradition, the commanding officers of these excellent ships assumed the following not so traditional roles which they and/or their subordinates considered important to their ships' achievement of excellence: senser and molder of command climate, champion of excellence, long range planner, instiller of values, and integrator of action and thought. Some of these roles have been addressed in earlier chapters. Those that have not will be discussed here.

There was a uniformity about each of these ships, and it was not just in the results they achieved. On some ships their homogeneity may have evolved without tampering from above, but on others, it was a result of the commanding

officer's concerted efforts to achieve a oneness, to take the numerous parts of his command and transform them into a cohesive whole. None of these captains was prepared to sit back and deal with the organizational climate that they had been dealt. They set out to mold it to their liking, and they succeeded. For example, one commanding officer saw his key role as that of orchestrator of the command climate. To him, this meant putting flare into the ship, and instilling in the crew a sense of uniqueness. He saw himself as the "father figure" for the ship, the one person most responsible for setting the ship's tone. He did this in a number of ways, a key one being, as he put it, "by planning victories for the ship." By this he meant that he constantly was on his guard looking for competition that the ship could enter into reasonably sure that it would emerge victorious. This could be something as trivial as challenging other ships in the task group to a sailing competition, knowing full well that their ship was the only one that had any sail boats, to seeking recognition as the top ship to complete refresher training in a given year. In either case, the crew's image of itself was enhanced by such actions, whether it was by getting a laugh listening to the captain describe how their ship had offered the other ships in the task force to rent their sailboats for the competition, or by enhancing their sense of pride while listening to the Fleet Training Group commodore describe the superlative performance of the ship while undergoing refresher training. This same captain stressed that in searching out victories for his ship it was imperative that his actions be guided by the criteria that whatever he did he did for the crew. If this was not the case, the crew quickly would sense his lack of integrity, and his efforts would be doomed to failure.

These ships had extremely high expectations of themselves. On one ship, they prided themselves as only being

satisfied when they achieved 4.0 results. If they participated in a graded exercise and scored ninety five percent, everyone knew that the captain's first comment would be, "What about the other five percent?" To many, this demanding of perfection, even though they realized that many times they would not be perfect, was a source of pride. The other ships we visited went about stressing the importance of achieving excellence in all undertakings in different ways, but they all focused on the achievement of excellence. Furthermore, the focus and energy devoted to excellence did not just occur. It was directly attributable to the commanding officers of these ships. They made devotion to being the best, to being excellent in everything they and their ship undertook one of their priorities, and they devoted a lot of time and energy to their role as champion of excellence.

Giving his views on why it was important both to implicitly and explicitly stress aspiring to excellence to his officers and enlisted personnel, one commanding officer stated, "Being average stinks. Sailors did not join the Navy to be average. You have to rise above the rest. One of the commanding officer's primary duties is to insure that the ship does rise above the rest." To stand out from the rest took planning. This commanding officer was very concerned with the importance of symbolism (acts that take on important meaning not because of their immediate impact, but because of their harmony with the espoused values of the command; acts that bring about a synergy because they serve to demonstrate results being achieved are greater than the sum of the individual contributions being made). He saw himself as the orchestrator of the symbolism for his ship. A lot of this had to do with developing a positive public relations image of the ship. When the ship did well, those external to the ship were told about it. Why? Because the

crew deserved the recognition, because their families deserved to know that their loved ones were doing something special in an excellent way, and because the crew's image of itself would be enhanced by seeing their names in lights. Again, to achieve the results he was after, this captain stressed his actions had to be motivated by "for the crew" and not the self-aggrandizement of the commanding officer or any other individual.

This commanding officer attached more importance to managing symbolism than the others we met, but there were other examples of these captains being proactive towards symbolism when it came to developing their crew's image of themselves and their ship. On one ship, the crew was very proud of themselves and their perception of their professionalism. Their captain had let it be known that he would not tolerate what he considered unprofessional behavior from anyone on the ship and from anyone with which the ship came into contact. During a highly successful overhaul, the captain had stopped work on the ship when it was brought to his attention that the shipyard workers were not doing their part to keep the ship clean. Later, during refresher training, the captain had thrown one of the inspectors off the ship for what he considered unprofessional behavior, and shortly thereafter, when the ship was not getting any mail on a short deployment, he had sent a blast to the organization responsible for the mail service criticizing them as being unprofessional. Each of these acts was not motivated to rally the crew (at least no one felt that this was the case), but all of them had a very positive impact on the crew. These acts symbolized their command's commitment to professionalism. The crew saw the captain's words about professional behavior at all cost as being in harmony with his actions, and they admired this. In fact, to the officers and enlisted men, including the chiefs, these

stories were a great source of pride. These stories were powerful reminders of what the ship stood for, what the priorities were. They were not just sea stories, they were beginning to take the form of myths that would serve in the future to galvanize the ship's image of itself. We heard these stories from almost every group we met on this ship, from the captain to the E3's, and one got the feeling that these stories were used to let new personnel joining this ship that this is what the ship is all about.

It was interesting to note the similarities and differences in the roles the captains of these excellent ships chose for themselves. They all tended to take a "big picture" outlook on the running of their ships. They felt that they were the setters of policy and the painters and communicators of the vision for the ship. Although many felt that they had the ability to run portions of their ships more effectively than a given department head, they did not think it appropriate to do so. Rather, they saw the temptation to micro-manage their less knowledgeable subordinates, but, by and large, they successfully fought the temptation to do so. They felt that it was important for the effective management of the ship, and, in most cases, for the professional development of the individuals concerned, that the captain serve as the monitor rather than as the implementer of the performance of the ship. As a monitor, however, they differed a lot in how they performed this function. Some kept detailed records of what was going on in the ship and what was being required of the ship by outside activities, whereas others washed their hands of the details almost exclusively. One captain took pride in relating that he did not maintain a single file in his cabin, another showed us his black three ring binder with which he tracked all zone inspection discrepancy lists.

Despite their differences in leadership style, philosophy, and manner, these officers had several common attributes that contributed to their success and their ships' successes. From a simple skills profile derived from discussions with their subordinates, we felt that each of these captains was considered competent to exceptionally competent as technical engineers, administrators, communicators, and seamen. Some stood out as being extremely talented in one or more of these categories. None was considered weak in any of the categories. However, it did not appear that the success of these commanding officers was attributable primarily to their skills as technical experts, administrators, communicators, or seamen. Rather, in the opinion of these commanding officers and the opinion of their subordinates, their success was mainly a result of their ability to specify a direction in which they wanted to take their command and their ability to gain the commitment of their officers and enlisted personnel to follow them in this endeavor. How they did this differed markedly from captain to captain, but there was no denying the fact that each captain was able to get across to his crew where the command was heading and to gain from his crew the commitment and effort to do whatever it took to get to this common vision.

Much of the success of these officers had to do with their attention to the processes needed and used to manage and lead people. But before getting into the specifics of what processes these officers concentrated on and how they influenced the processes to get the results they were after, it is important to reiterate that all of these officers were very task oriented. That is, they had a shared view of the dominance of the mission of the ship being the sole reason for the existence of their ship, and they would not be satisfied with their performance or their ship's performance

if they were judged to be anything but outstanding when it came to accomplishing their ship's mission. This was a given! As such, it did not get a lot of air time when we talked with these officers. Instead of talking about the importance of the task, they preferred, as did their subordinates, to talk about the means used to achieve this one end, mission accomplishment. But don't let anything that has been said or follows give you the impression that task accomplishment was not the bottom line for these commanding officers. These captains were not driven to have the happiest ships in the fleet; they were driven to being the fightingest ships. However, along the way to being the fightingest, a lot of these ships discovered that they were among the happiest; and this had something to do with their being the fightingest. Instead of finding themselves in the proverbial vicious circle, they were where most of us would like to be, on a spiral leading higher and higher towards enhanced performance. One chief saw this happening at his level. As he put it, "We take care of our gear, which causes fewer casualties, which gives us more time for preventive maintenance, which results in better operating equipment, and it just gets better."

Having put mission accomplishment in its rightful place, at the top of each of these commanding officers' priority list, we can now move forward. In addition to an overriding concern for the accomplishment of the tasks facing their ships, these captains focused on their personnel as the one resource over which they had control that could make a major difference in how the ship performed. In dealing with personnel, both officer and enlisted, there were many different views and philosophies on how to lead and manage, but there was a consensus on the importance of personnel to any formula for success. As one captain put it, "The longer

I'm here, the more I come to realize the importance of people to the success of my ship."⁶

⁶Lieutenant Colonel Jim Berg, U.S. Army, has published articles on both high performing individuals and high performing organizations. He describes the attributes of high performing individuals as follows: works smarter not harder, not a workaholic afraid of failure, is "an extraordinary delegater"; has holistic fitness, taking care of his mind and body to combat stress; visualizes what he wants then trusts and believes in himself that he will achieve what he wants; concentrates his energy on actions that fit into his game plan (purpose and goals) and on actions that only he can do; has a positive and confident self-image tending not to get down on himself; networks with both professional and social companions being very much a team player; and believes strongly in the purpose of his organization. Our discussions with the commanding officers of these excellent ships and with their subordinates led us to conclude that these captains possess many of the attributes of the high performing individual that Lieutenant Colonel Berg described. However, although these individual attributes have much to do with the success of these captains' ships, it is our view that their ships' achievement of excellence is due primarily to these officers' ability to transfer many of these positive attributes to their subordinates. [Ref. 5]

XIV. SAILORS, OUR MOST IMPORTANT RESOURCE

By now, it should be self-evident that much of what was right with these excellent ships had to do with their concern for the people who manned them and with developing a climate which nurtured a high level of individual commitment to the ships' visions of excellence. The pride, teamwork, high energy level, common direction, and commitment found on these ships all had to do with the attention given to the officers and men who manned these ships. In fact, one can find the bare essence of the success of these ships by looking at the attitudes of their people, from the captain to the junior mess cook. What follows is a look at those portions of personnel aspects of these ships that contributed to the ships being excellent at not only taking care of their personnel, but also being able to take care of their tasking. For on all of these ships, attention to personnel was not seen as an end in itself, but as the most important variable in their formula for success, for being battle ready.

As was mentioned earlier, teamwork was a recurring attribute found on the excellent ships. It was also an attribute that contributed to the excellent performance of these ships. But how was this positive attribute achieved? Except for one ship whose captain went out of his way to stress the importance of teamwork and the achieving of the feeling of individual ownership for the ship's problems, the other ships, on first glance, may have appeared to have been the benign beneficiaries of a sense of teamwork and all the positive ramifications of this important ingredient. However, upon closer inspection of the leadership and management styles found on these ships, it became clear that

teamwork was a logical by-product of a concern for people in general.

Here are some of the more effective things we observed these ships doing in the area of "personnel readiness," a term used by one of the commanding officers to describe one of the two goals for his ship, "combat readiness" being the other goal.

A. CONCERN FOR THE INDIVIDUAL AND HIS GROWTH

Even though not all felt that their command cared about them as individuals and about the contribution they made to the success of their organization, the majority of officers and enlisted personnel that we talked to on these excellent ships truly believed that their efforts were appreciated and that their command was concerned with their welfare. For example, training programs were not seen as hoops that the ships made their personnel jump through in an effort to meet nebulous requirements from on high or as part of some inspection requirement. Rather the training programs were seen as manifestations of the commands' concern for doing things right and as programs that were in harmony with the commands' pronouncements on the importance they attached to an individual's self-development. Frequently we heard comments like, "I've never been on a ship that had such a great training program" or "This ship really cares about training. It is not just a paper work drill like it was on my other ships." Statements like this were coming from chiefs who had upwards to twenty years in the Navy. When it came to training and to professional and personal growth, their current ship was different than others in which they had served. In general, they felt that the training program was working as they always thought it should have on their other ships, but for various reasons never had. The

training program and their current command, in general, were helping them grow as professional sailors and as individuals.

Although the emphasis on self-development seemed strongest for the enlisted personnel on these ships, officer development was not ignored. Several of the ships had SWO programs with which the junior officers were very pleased, and, in general, the officers felt that they were being adequately prepared for their next level of responsibility. The junior officers were pleased with their preparations for becoming department heads, the department heads were on track for their becoming executive officers, and the executive officers were ready or being made ready for command.

In addition to an emphasis on training, on several of the ships we observed there was a similar emphasis on education, especially for those who did not have a high school diploma. One captain, in particular, put an especially high priority on education. He saw helping a sailor enhance his education as a logical element of an overall command plan that emphasized the importance of personal growth and enhancing crew members' self-image. At this command, education programs were conducted during working hours. To the crew this was perceived as strong action by the command supporting their words regarding their concern for the crew's welfare and personal development. When people completed an education program, and a lot did, the command made a "big deal" out of their accomplishments. Admirals were invited over to the ship to attend graduation ceremonies and to award diplomas and recognize accomplishments. The crew was totally behind the command's efforts to make education and personal development a "big deal." There were all types of positive side effects to this emphasis on education and personal accomplishments. The men's pride in themselves and their unit increased. The command's

reputation with senior officers was enhanced. Such events were great for the ship's public affairs program with the concomitant benefit of raising the image of the ship in the eyes of those who read such things as base newspapers (future crew members, wives and family of current crew members). However, it was important to the captain of this ship, and to the crew, that the education program was viewed not for its secondary benefits, but for its primary aim: developing the ship's most important resource, the average sailor.

A strong concern for the welfare and development of the officers and enlisted personnel existed on each of the ships. The strength of this concern varied from ship to ship as did the relative emphasis on what was considered to be most important for the welfare and growth of the crew, but the concern was always there and it was always appreciated by the crew. On some ships quality of life (messing and berthing, sports, education programs, etc.) was stressed more than the more intangible motivators, such as recognition of good performance and enhancement of self-image, and on other ships the emphasis was reversed. However, every ship gave attention to both the physical and the mental aspects of caring.⁷

B. NC CNE FELT UNDERUTILIZED

Responsibility and accountability had been pushed down the chain of command on these ships. On some of the ships delegation of responsibility occurred because it was pushed down the chain of command by each successive level in the chain; on others, it occurred because the captain had made

⁷Much of the attention to motivation and commitment we saw on these excellent ships correlated very closely to Herzberg's views on motivators falling into two broad categories, hygiene factors and motivational factors. [Ref. 6]

it clear from the beginning of his tour that everyone would pull his fair share, which meant delegating work and its associated accountability to the maximum extent possible. But, no matter how the delegation of responsibility and the pervasiveness of accountability was achieved, it was an integral part of the "modus operandi" of these ships. The chief petty officers were especially key players on many of these ships. On some, the chiefs had been charged with being responsible for day-to-day shipboard management. On such ships, the chiefs had accepted this responsibility with great enthusiasm, and, without exception, they had produced outstanding results in the opinion of their superiors. It was noteworthy that the elevation of the importance of the chief's mess (relative to their perceived importance under their previous commanding officer) had been accomplished without alienating the Wardroom. In fact, on those ships where the chiefs were tasked with "running the ship," the officers invariably praised the chiefs mess.

The captains set the standard for delegation on these ships. They delegated a lot of authority to their executive officers and department heads, but they did so without lessening their perceived involvement in their ships. They also converted many of their subordinates to their views on the importance of pushing responsibility and accountability down the chain of command as far as it would go. One captain got across his views on the importance of each individual assuming responsibility and being accountable for his actions the first time the ship got underway with him in command. Under the previous commanding officer, the officers of the deck (OODs) used to check with the captain before initiating any actions, or they got the captain's input prior to taking action. The current captain let it be known, by his words and his actions, that the COD was responsible for the ship and, as such, he had to develop

solutions to his own problems (always keeping the captain informed). No longer did these officers bring their problems to their captain as a matter of routine. Instead, they solved them by themselves. The captain was always in the background insuring that the ship's safety was not in jeopardy, but this was done in an unobtrusive manner. The officers on this ship read a lot into their captain's actions on the bridge. To them, his actions spoke louder than any words could. His actions showed that he trusted them and that he demanded that they meet their responsibilities. Obviously, they thought very highly of their captain for his demonstrated trust and confidence. They also internalized the effectiveness of the captain's actions and attempted to emulate his behavior when they dealt with their subordinates.

Although personnel were given a lot of responsibility, we did not find any officers or senior enlisted personnel who felt that they were in over their heads or had too much responsibility. This balancing of the individual's abilities and his responsibilities did not occur by chance. A lot of attention was given to putting the right man in the right job, especially those jobs that required a lot of leadership expertise.

XV. OH YES, TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT

Maybe the reader has been wondering if we have short changed the subject of task accomplishment in our discussion of excellence in the Surface Navy. We feel that we have. One day on a ship was not enough time to cover everything, and upon reviewing our notes, we concluded that specifics about task accomplishment were not acquired in the amount we desired; however, we were able to draw some conclusions. They follow. As we have stated several times, if there was one thing all of these ships had in common, it was that they were good at getting the job done. All the operational tasking and hurdles associated with inspections, commitments, assist visits, VIP visits, etc., were accomplished in what the ships' superiors and the ships' personnel thought was an excellent and often superior manner. Furthermore, on each of the ships, there was a strong sense of pride at all levels of the chain of command surrounding their accomplishments.

Getting results and taking pride in the results was what these ships had in common. What differentiated them was the approach these ships followed in accomplishing their results. In general, the ships we observed fell into two categories regarding their approach to achieving outstanding task accomplishment. The first group consisted of those ships which used upcoming short and long range tasking as the focus of the ship's efforts and energy. When a task was identified, an upcoming INSURV inspection for example, the top management made it known that doing well on this inspection was a must and everyone was to do whatever it took to 4.0 the inspection. In this group of ships, we found the commanding officer who stated that achieving top results was

quite easy. You just demanded that people go out and do what the system requires them to do. If they get less than 100 percent, than they did not do their job as well as they should have. In that case, it was his job to exert pressure so that people knew that he was serious about getting the job done. The crews of ships in this group all knew that it meant a lot to the captain that the ship win all of the departmental E's and the battle efficiency "E". These were prized awards that were believed to personify the ship's ability to get the job done. The link between doing well in the competition for these awards and being battle ready was self-evident to the leaders of the ships in this group; therefore, they reasoned, if you want your ship to be battle ready (all of the leaders of these ships did), you go out and get maximum results on the type commander's requirements for departmental excellent awards. If you do a good job at this, you will be pretty close to your overall objective of being battle ready.

In the other group of ships, the importance of departmental awards and the battle efficiency award was downplayed by the top leaders on the ship, and the crew saw winning awards as somewhat of a nice surprise. We really heard comments like, "We don't think about the awards. Every now and then someone shows up and gives us some plaques for departmental excellence. These are nice, but we are not out to win awards. We just want to be the best ship and to excel at everything we do. If we do this, the awards will come, I guess." On these ships, "doing things right, doing everything right" on a day-to-day basis was the rallying cry and the driving force behind their outstanding record of task accomplishment.

As was so common with many of the attributes we observed on these ships, each ship's attitude towards task accomplishment, whatever it was, tended to be consistent

throughout its chain of command. On those ships that focused on winning awards, almost everyone we met felt that it was important that awards be won, and that they do their part to help the ship win the awards. On those ships that concentrated on doing day-to-day activities right and letting the awards take care of themselves, the officers and men we met lined up behind this philosophy four square. Obviously, someone had orchestrated the development of the consensus attitude towards task accomplishment on these ships. The people we talked with did not see some omnipotent hand moving them in the direction of this consensus, but we believe someone was causing this to happen, and that someone was the captain. As was mentioned in the section on command vision, these captains did not always have an explicit plan of attack for developing their command strategy and command climate and attitudes, but an effective strategy and powerful climate always emerged - primarily because of the consistent actions of the leaders of these ships.

XVI. CONCLUSIONS, COMMENTS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

So there you have it, the views of twenty one senior surface warfare officers on what excellence looks like and the stories of six ships that personify excellence. And what's to be concluded from these leaders and these ships?

First, there is a lot to be learned from talking with senior surface warfare officers. A statement of the blinding obvious? Maybe, but maybe not. Every officer we met with imparted to us interesting and insightful information about the criteria used to judge excellence in the Surface Navy. There were very few surprises in what they told us, but we were impressed by the uniformity of what we were told and the strength of feeling surrounding the views expressed by these senior officers. We had always known the importance of squared away quarterdecks and clean and ship-shape ships, but after talking with these senior officers we gained a better appreciation of how the seemingly routine fit into the whole. The linkage between cleanliness and battle readiness, although not fully explained in a strictly rational manner, was explained in terms of the values held by these officers whom we believe to be typical. Chapters two through five tell what the boss wants and some of the why behind his desires and demands. This should make giving him what he wants a little easier, and it should help avoid self-delusion. You might think that you are the best operator in the fleet and that the boss realizes this and does not care very much about the fact that your ship is not as sharp looking or that your crew is not as turned on as some of the others in port, but we did not run across a single senior officer who thought in these terms. Senior officers did not think in terms of operational excellence being the

bottom line and everything else as being inconsequential. Instead, they concentrated on the steps that they believe lead to excellence, such as inspections and the developing of a positive attitude by a crew. They believed in "the system," and they felt that it provided the path to the goal of battle readiness. If one followed this path, battle readiness would result; if one did not, battle readiness would not be achieved. Based upon the benefits we received from talking with a broad group of senior officers on the subject of excellence in the Surface Navy, we strongly recommend that senior officers take the time to have similar discussions with junior officers. We believe the benefits of allowing junior and mid-grade officers the opportunity to talk candidly with senior officers about the "whats" and "hows" of excellence would be of significant value to these officers.

When we went aboard these excellent ships, we were wondering what we would find. Would these ships appear to be no different than those that we had served in previously? Well, it did not take us long to realize that these ships were different. There was a positive atmosphere and high energy about these ships that neither of us had encountered previously and, coupled with the outstanding operational reputations of these ships, we knew that we had hit upon something that would be of value to us as naval officers and something that could be of value to others in the surface community. Unfortunately that "something" was not all that solid and describable. It was there, there was no doubt about it. But to put it into words was another matter. Even the people who were part of these ships and their superiors said things like, "You can't put your finger on it, but you can feel it," when describing these ships. Chapters six through fifteen are our attempt to put our finger on it. There is a lot of "motherhood" in our

observations, and we don't think there are any new concepts of management and leadership. We did not stumble upon a new model for analyzing excellence or a new theory for achieving excellence. Our findings are in agreement with almost every book that we have read on leadership and management. Our observations confirmed for us Herzberg's views on motivation, the effectiveness of attending to all levels of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, Berg's generic attributes of excellent organizations, the power of recognition as described by Blanchard, the validity of McGregor's theory Y assumptions about people in organizations, and the importance of stressing both concern for task and concern for people as Blake and Mouton have pointed out in their managerial grid concept. Peters and Waterman summed up what we saw when they wrote in In Search of Excellence, "Excellent companies were, above all, brilliant on the basics." Excellent surface ships are also brilliant on the basics. As such, they are able to achieve synergy, that is, they are able to take average abilities and combine them in such a manner that the end product is greater than the sum of the parts, the individuals who make up these organizations. The common man can produce uncommon results; you don't need an all-star team to have a great ship. And, if there is a starting point for the achievement of excellence, it is having a captain who knows what excellence looks like and knows how to share his vision with his personnel while simultaneously gaining their commitment to the attainment of excellence.

The value of this study to its authors has been significant, and it is our opinion that the study offers value to the Navy in general. The excellence we observed on these ships was not the result of luck. It was the result of the leadership of the commanding officers of these ships. These officers joined their ships with a vision of excellence and

then they turned their vision into reality. In addition to striving for the common goal of operational excellence, we were struck by the fact that these commanding officers and their ships demonstrated a consistent and common set of attributes that lead to their achievement of excellence. They developed individuals and groups that were proud and energetic and that worked as a team. They not only passed their vision of excellence and the means for achieving excellence to their subordinates, they developed a climate that led to their vision being internalized by the vast majority of their subordinates. Throughout the entire process of achieving excellence, the leaders of these ships focused on the tasks of the ship, but additionally, they focused on gaining the commitment of their crew. It is our strong opinion that the excellence we observed on these ships can be achieved throughout the surface community and should be used as a beacon for those in search of such excellence. There was a consistency that ran through these ships. There are common attributes of excellence. This paper is our attempt to nail down what these attributes are and what they look like. The attributes we identified were:

- Good ships getting better
- Pride in evidence at all levels
- Teamwork, not just a concept but a way of life
- The ship in automatic
- High energy level/bias towards action
- Presence of a common vision and shared values
- As the captain, so is the ship
- Sailors, our most important resource
- Oh yes, task accomplishment

and were chosen (1) to give the reader an appreciation of what excellence looked like on these ships, and (2) to illuminate the means used to achieve this excellence.

Obviously, we do not believe we have written the definitive study on excellence in the Surface Navy. The attributes we have chosen to describe were the ones that impressed us. Others may have interpreted what we saw differently. But we believe we are close to the mark when it comes to describing excellence in the Surface Navy. More should be done, however. There are many excellent ships that we were not able to observe. Furthermore, we limited our study of excellence to the surface community. We hope that our paper will serve as a starting point for further study and discussion of not only excellence in the Surface Navy, but also of excellence in other Navy communities. We fully support the efforts of the Director, Human Resources Management Division (OP 15) and the McBer Company in their on-going study aimed at differentiating between top performing units and average and below average units in both ship and aviation commands. Furthermore, we recommend integrating the lessons of "Excellence in the Surface Navy" into the Navy's leadership and management training. The Navy can only gain from an enhanced understanding at all levels of command of what excellence looks like and how the best are able to achieve excellence. There may be no right or wrong answers when it comes to leadership and management, but there are benefits to be had from an evolving analysis and discussion of what we want our leaders and managers to achieve.

APPENDIX A
SENIOR OFFICER INTERVIEWS

A. COMMODORE OF AN AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON

This commodore felt that he was able to gauge the excellence of a ship in a relatively short time, weeks not months, and often times within an hour of being onboard. He stated that the attitude of the crew was easy to detect and that excellent ships had crews with positive attitudes. To him, cleanliness was a prime indicator of the crew's attitude. A positive and professional attitude would manifest itself as a ship that is always clean. Other indicators of a positive crew attitude were as simple as the manner in which crew members greeted the commodore as he walked around the ship. Positive attitude would come through in the cheeriness of individual greetings, and in the interest the crew displayed in the ship. Comments from sailors, such as, "How do you like our ship?" told the commodore a lot. He also felt that on his best ships almost everyone knew who he was, not so on many of the ships that did not fit into the excellent category.

Other indicators that the commodore used when walking around a ship were the involvement of the officers and chiefs. On the best ships the chiefs were very visible in the working spaces and the officers seemed to be especially involved with their division personnel. He also felt that he could detect a sense of productive work being accomplished. People seemed to know what they were doing and seemed to be working as part of a plan. He also noted that the chiefs, although present, were not the ones doing the hands on work. Instead, they were supervising and instructing junior personnel.

On the best ships, a high degree of commitment existed. The commodore described it as "total commitment." On one of the very best ships the commodore was familiar with, he related how the ship performed during an INSURV. When the INSURV members or a crew member detected a valve that was leaking during the inspection, the responsible petty officer had the valve tagged immediately for repair, all personnel appeared to be committed to doing well on the inspection, and everything appeared as if it was being accomplished in a routine manner with very much of a "can do" attitude. He added that even the best ships have problems and sometimes they might fail an important portion of an inspection, such as, and OPPE class bravo fire drill, but when this does occur, in the excellent ships everyone sits down and goes over the problem, gets the facts, and goes from there. The attitude of these ships when confronting a problem is positive and future oriented towards a solution rather than negative and past oriented.

The commodore also noted that his best ships seemed to stick out in their ability and inclination to keep him informed. Their messages reflected detailed planning. Every report told what and why something had happened and what action was being taken, when appropriate. The messages pointed out both the symptom and causes of problems and the action required to resolve the cause of the problem. The commodore noted that he did not get many undesired surprises from his top ships.

Regarding operational matters, the commodore stated that the best ships seem to produce a little extra when meeting a commitment, e.g.,??

The commodore did not think that retention, by itself, was an indicator of excellence, but he did think that on excellent ships good retention would usually be a

lyproduct of doing other things right. He added that it was important that only good personnel be retained, and if this meant that retention figures would go down, so be it.

The commodore provided the following opinions on how the best ships lead and managed. He stressed that it is extremely important that the captain set a positive tone for a ship. Furthermore, the captain must be very involved in the ship and he must get around the ship a great deal, talking to personnel and rewarding people for good performance at little things by giving them recognition. Keeping the crew informed on "how they are doing" was also considered to be a primary responsibility of an effective captain. The captain also has to develop an aura of trust in the ship so that personnel will pass both positive and negative information up the chain of command so that the captain does not get any surprises and so that he can keep his superiors informed.

Because of the volume of important matters top management must deal with, the commodore stated that it was a good idea for the Captain and Executive Officer to agree on how they would divide up important areas on which they would concentrate. For example, the captain might follow engineering administration closely while the executive officer might keep close tabs on deck department matters.

The commodore did not think that there was any one leadership style that was best for a captain to have, but he did think that a captain "can't be just a nice guy." When people do something wrong, they have to be told, and this starts with the captain pointing out errors when he sees them occur. This is not to say that the chain of command should be ignored, but it is important that the officers and men know that subpar performance will be noted and discussed so as to prevent its recurrence.

The commodore did not think that innovative leadership and management techniques were needed to operate a ship in an excellent manner. He stated that "all you have to do is do well those things that you have heard about all of your career." He did feel that it was important that the captain have and promulgate a command philosophy, especially for big commands. Such a philosophy should spell out the ship's goals and way of doing business. He felt that this philosophy should be promulgated both in writing and at frequent meetings with all levels of the chain of command. For example, he stated that department heads should get the views of the captain at formal weekly meetings, division officers should meet with the captain approximately every two weeks to discuss the captain's philosophy and views and a similar meeting should be held with the chiefs every two weeks. Finally, the captain should meet with the crew every month for similar meetings. He gave as examples of topics at these meetings the following: leadership; command spirit; things that he has noted walking around the ship that they as a group were responsible for, eg, people walking by dirt and not taking action; and standards. He recommended using these meetings to pass on information, such as, upcoming events. He noted that this aids coordination within the ship. As he put it, "You have to help the chain of command get information down the chain."

Discussing achieving goals and standards, the commodore stated, "Tell them (the crew) what you want and they will give it to you." He said on his previous ship command immediately after assuming command he gathered the crew and told them, "The ship was the dirtiest ship he had ever been on, let's clean it up." And, they did. "These guys just wanted to be told what to do."

The commodore stated that it was important that the chain of command truly felt that they were responsible for

the men and their portion of the ship. He felt that it was important that everyone appreciate this. As an example of how to get this across to the crew, the commodore stated that it was important that when a man went to mast, it was important that his entire chain of command attend the mast and be prepared to provide frank and candid comments on the man's performance. The commodore stated that he would weigh the comments of the chain of command very carefully and would be inclined to give a man a break when the man's superiors so recommended because of prior good performance, and alternatively, he would hammer an offender for a similar infraction when the chain of command indicated that he was not a good performer. This was a means of getting across to the crew the values of the organization that the commodore thought were important, that is, we will take care of our good personnel and we will not put up with personnel who do not support the ship.

E. CHIEF STAFF OFFICER OF AN AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON

The following comments were provided by a chief staff officer of a tactical amphibious squadron that had just returned from a seven month deployment off Beirut, Lebanon.

This officer stated that all of the ships in the squadron performed well, but yet one ship stuck out as the most excellent. He noted that all of the ships passed their inspections and did well operationally. Therefore, it was the little things that tended to separate the excellent ship from the good ship. The CSO did not think that the best ship was the one that always got the highest inspection grades, but in describing the top ship in the squadron, the CSO stated that it was always inspection ready. He added that it stood out by having the best external appearance and

the sharpest quarterdeck. These attributes were indicative of a well run ship, a ship that had higher standards, in general, and one that paid attention to details. The CSO stated that there seemed to be a high correlation between operational performance and ship appearance. The best looking ships tended to be the best operating ships.

Another area in which the best ship distinguished itself was in its administration and communications up the chain of command to the commodore. Administrative requirements were always on time and thoroughly completed. In general, the quality of the messages of the best ship tended to be higher than those of the other ships. As with operational matters, the best ship was seen as being proactive rather than reactive. The best ships tended to be those that displayed the most initiative. The CSO added that the commodore and the staff heard more from the good ships, both positive and negative. Furthermore, the excellent ships did not hesitate to tell the staff when the staff made a mistake.

Departmental and battle efficiency awards were thought to be good indicators of ship excellence. The CSO stated that on the best ships the crew was fully aware of the requirements for winning the E and knew that it was a goal of the command to win E's. This did not seem to be the case on many of the ships that were not considered to be in the excellent category. In addition to knowing about E's the best ships had a much better appreciation of the mission of the ship, in this case, how the ship fit into the big picture of the U.S. involvement in Lebanon.

The CSO stated that he had conducted command inspections on all the ships in the squadron (six ships) during the deployment and that he felt that this inspection gave him a good means of judging the relative excellence of the ships. He noted that on the best ship the officers and men had better, more positive attitudes towards their ship.

He was also impressed by the high level of involvement of the chiefs on the best ship, and the positive role played by the command master chief, "He was into all of the ship's programs."

When asked to identify and describe any ships outside of the squadron that the staff was impressed by, the CSO identified two ships. The first, a destroyer, was described as follows: everything worked, the ship was clean, and the ship was responsive. The other ship, a service force ship, stood out for the following attributes: it had a "can do" attitude, she was a hard worker with a positive attitude, and she was willing to go the extra yard to perform a service, for example, she was always willing to work long hours and to work into the night providing fuel and supplies to ships of the squadron, rather than telling the ships to come back in the morning.

Asked about retention as an indicator of ship excellence, the CSC stated that he considered it to be a possible indicator, but he was quick to note that not all top ships are top retainers and that all top retainers are not good ships.

Regarding discipline, the CSO stated that he thought the best ships took a tough stand against drugs. He added that he thought that the best ships made an attempt to develop poor performers before initiating separation procedures. He did not think that the top ships conducted massive house cleaning of poor performers.

The top ship in the squadron distinguished itself for its innovative thinking, for example, when the top ship in the squadron was tasked by the staff to provide her input for an anti-sneak attack plan for the squadron, she came through with a very high quality product that the staff then used.

The CSO noted that the best ships tended to develop a good rapport with the staff, perhaps the best rapport of any ship in the squadron. He added, that, in general, the best ship was "less of a hassle to work with" and this ship "made the staff's job easy".

The CSO provided the following opinions on how he thought the best ships were led and managed. He started by saying that it was important that the crew be kept informed as to where it fit into the big picture. He added that it was important that the Captain communicate to the crew his standards. This should be done "using all forms of communication," and the message should be "these are my standards."

It was important that the Captain be very involved in his ship. He could not be too laid back, and he should conduct inspections, and, despite the administrative burdens of the zone inspection program, he should make it work.

The CSO saw the department heads as being key cogs in the ship management process. He felt that a good department head could do well with weak division officers, but for a ship to do well it was important that the department heads be strong. When describing the best ship in the fleet that he was familiar with, he noted that all of the department heads were top notch. He added that so was the Captain, and the Captain had the ability to bring out the best in his top notch group of department heads. He was also impressed with the allegiance of the department heads to the Captain. The CSO also thought that it was important that the Captain and the Executive Officer had a very good rapport and that they agreed on how they would divide their efforts so that they complemented each other.

The CSO also stressed the importance of delegating work down the chain of command. "The Captain must realize that he cannot do everything."

C. COMMODORE AND CHIEF STAFF OFFICER OF AN AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON

This interview was conducted with the commodore and his chief staff officer, both C6's.

Formal indicators, such as inspections, and informal indicators, such as, crew appearance and attitude and ship appearance, were considered very good indicators of ship performance. The best ships are better looking. On these ships the attitude of the crew is more positive. Quarterdeck appearance and behavior was also felt to be an important indicator of a ship's level of excellence. When being escorted to the quarterdeck, the chief staff officer went out of his way to point out the cleanliness of the spaces leading to the quarterdeck. The fact that this ship appeared to be especially clean seemed to separate this ship from others with which this officer was familiar. He noted with pride the fact that the ladder rungs had been wire brushed clean and that the decks were clean and bright. Obviously, the cleanliness represented more than just fastidiousness, it represented the ship's ability to perform an important task.

The importance of a positive crew attitude ranked very high on the indicators used by these officers to judge ships. General impressions obtained from walking around a ship and noting how crew members responded when a senior officer appeared were thought to be good indicators of the crew's attitude. Positive attitude was exemplified by crew members who looked senior officers in the eye as the officers passed; poor attitude was exemplified by sailors and junior officers who went out of their way to avoid a senior officer once they detected his presence. As with cleanliness, the perceived attitude of the crew took on significance greater than one might think. It represented a manifestation of numerous forces impacting on crew members.

The positive attitude of a ship also came through in its interactions with the staff when tasking was involved. The excellent ships tended to have a "can do" attitude towards additional tasking, and they never tried to get out of commitments.

With regard to material readiness, the chief staff stated that the 3M inspection and the OPPE were considered two inspections which provided reliable indications of a ship's level of excellence. They were hard inspections and they required the involvement of the entire crew to perform well. When asked about the number of CASREPTs as an indicator of material excellence, ie, the smaller the number of CASREPTs the better the material readiness, both officers responded that they did not consider the number of CASREPTs when judging the material condition or the overall excellence of a ship. They added that material self-sufficiency was a good indicator of excellence. The best ships seem to be more self-sufficient when it comes to maintaining their ship's equipment. Along these lines, it was added that becoming self-sufficient required a good training program, something the best ships seemed to do better than the other ships. The commodore added that he thought that the personnel who work in SIMA could give a very good appraisal of which ships are the better materially.

Neither officer considered "kudos" to be good indicators of excellence. It was noted that a ship can almost generate its own "kudos" with a good public relations program.

We then asked these officers to describe their better ships in terms of what they did that seemed to separate them from the other ships and in terms of what accounted for their overall excellence.

Discussing interactions with the staff, it was noted that the best ships are hardly ever the last ones to

respond to an administrative requirement, although they are not always the first ones. The chief staff officer did not think that the quality of the messages received from the best ships was all that different from that received from the other ships.

Regarding the human side of the excellent ships, it was stated that there appeared to be better relations between officers and chiefs of the top ships. Furthermore, the best ships seem to have crews which identify more strongly with their ships, and as a side product, these ships seem to have more fun carrying out their day-to-day duties. Asked about the amount of effort expended by the best ships as compared with the other ships, the response was that the best ships do not work harder, they work smarter. Both officers thought that this was the case. The chief of staff added that a good indoctrination division was very important to achieving excellence in a ship. He noted that one of the better ships he was familiar with went as far as to put a new man's name on his rack and locker before the man joined the ship and that the day he joined his rack was made for him before he was taken to his berthing compartment. It was not felt that this was a lot of extra effort to take for one man, rather it symbolized concern for the welfare of a new man and that it personified the command's attitude to the crew. The commodore added that it was important that the commanding officer meet with all new men when they report onboard so that they can personally pass on to each man what is expected of him. Other examples of concern for individuals were that on the best ship they knew, the commanding officer knew every man by name. On this ship the crew was very proud, and much of this pride was attributed to the leadership of the commanding officer. This commanding officer went out of his way to set standards and to motivate his personnel. When it came time to anchor

the ship, the ship did it in the manner of the "old Navy," as the anchor was let go, the booms went out, the boats were lowered and the accommodation ladder was lowered. This was extra work for the men in the deck force, but they were proud of their professionalism. The Enlisted Surface Warfare program was very active in this ship. Gaining the silver cutlasses meant a lot to the recipients and to the commanding officer. The insignia was awarded at a formal ceremony and on the day preceeding the ceremony, the commanding officer made it a point to pin the silver cutlasses to his uniform so that everyman in the crew knew that this accomplishment meant a lot to the Captain.

The commodore added that the best ships look into the future when planning their work, and that they are more consistent in handling problems when they arise. He emphasized that to achieve excellence, people must be involved in the developing of goals for a ship.

Discipline did not seem to vary a lot between the best and worst ships, however, over the long run it was thought that the best ships would have fewer masts because these ships would have crews with better attitudes which resulted in fewer infractions.

Both officers felt that the best commanding officers have the best ships and that the best commanding officers are those which know how to relate to people the best. Asked about the importance of technical expertise at the department head, executive officer, and commanding officer level, both officers responded that it was important that these officers be technically competent, but that more was needed to be successful, and the additional ingredient was the ability to lead and manage people. Neither officer felt that the recent initiative in the surface warfare community to increase the level of specialization of officers at the department head level would have a significant positive

impact on the fleet. They stated that getting people in command who were able to work with people was the most important means of achieving increased excellence in surface ships.

Neither officer saw retention statistics as a primary indicator of ship excellence, although they both considered retaining top personnel as extremely important. The problem with the statistics was that they "may not tell you what you think they do." They added that some poor ships do have good retention, and that they noted that there were many excellent ships in the amphibious force, even though there were not any amphibious force ships on the current retention superstars list.

The commodore felt that it was very important that a command have high standards. In fact, this was one of the key differentiators between excellent commands and other commands, the standards were higher across the board. The commodore stated that high standards had to be demanded. He added that, "The crew will do whatever you ask of them." He stated that some ships apparently do not know what standards are, especially with regards to cleanliness. Cleanliness standards when adhered to seemed to set the tone for the ship with regards to the maintenance of high standards in other areas, such as preservation and maintenance.

Regarding communications, both officers felt that it was important that the commanding officer tell people what is expected of them, be this when talking with the officers, the chiefs, or a new man in I division. It cannot be taken for granted that people know what you expect of them. You must first tell them your standards and then demand that they meet them.

The relationship between the CO and the XO was considered very important to achieving excellence. Both officers have to be concerned with meeting commitments and

with caring for people. It was especially important that both men appreciate the enlisted men in their ship. On the better ships, the chiefs and the officers seem to have better relationships than on other ships. The chiefs are "not left out of the program" on top ships. They sometimes are on other ships. Again, it was emphasized that the captain must tell the chiefs what he expects of them, especially in the area of grooming junior officers. It is also important that the captain get across to the junior officers the benefits they derive from listening to their senior personnel and seeking their advice.

When at sea, the commodore stated that a lot could be learned about a ship by just observing the performance of a bridge watch team. On the best ships, there was a higher degree of formality displayed by the bridge watch and the level of noise on the bridge was low.

Both officers stated that the best ships were usually better across all phases of shipboard operations, both in port and at sea.

D. CAPTAIN ON SURFACE TYPE COMMANDER'S STAFF

This staff officer felt that the best indicator of a ship's excellence was the day-to-day performance of a ship which is best observed by the squadron commander. He added that additional indicators were: UNITREPS and scores of selective exercises (SELEXS), post-exercise conversations with fellow officers during which ship performance was discussed, cleanliness, and the attitude of a ship's crew. He felt that one could easily detect whether or not a ward-room or a chief's mess had a sense of purpose and whether or not there was a sense of self-motivation, two attributes that this officer placed a lot of emphasis on as indicators of excellence. It was felt that once a ship gained a repu-

tation for performance, it was able to enhance or degrade this reputation by modifying performance in the future, ships were not stuck with a reputation.

This officer provided the following personal views on how a ship should be lead and managed in order to achieve excellence. It was important that the Captain have a game plan. First the Captain and the Executive Officer should reach agreement on where the ship is and where they want it to be in the future. Then they should agree on how they are going to get there. The Executive Officer should feel comfortable regarding what the Captain wants. This plan should then be communicated to the officers and men, using Captain's call for the crew and social communications with the wardroom in addition to the communications down the chain of command. The goals of the ship should be understood by every member of the crew.

It was also emphasized that it was important that the Captain lead by example. He should possess and demonstrate those attributes that he wants his officers and men to use.

This officer did not think that any one leadership style was best for a commanding officer, but he did think that to be effective in the long run, a Captain could not use a dictatorial style. Such a style would lead to a reactive attitude in the ship, in general, and short term performance achievements would be at the expense of long term performance enhancement.

The Executive Officer was considered a key player in a ship's quest for excellence. He should be involved in the operations of the ship in addition to the more traditional administrative role of the executive officer. Furthermore, he should be working himself into the captain's job. The Captain should let the XO make some of the decisions that traditionally are made by many captains. In addition to

developing the XO, this also forces him to unload some of his tasks onto the department heads who will benefit from this shifting of work because it will help prepare them to be XO's. Such delegation should continue down the entire chain of command whereby people are being developed for their next at sea assignment.

Effective communications are required for a ship to be effective. In addition to communications down the chain of command, it is important that communications up the chain of command be cultivated. Sometimes people need to be forced to talk to their superiors. The captain can help set a climate where upward communications are not considered risky and are, in fact, encouraged and appreciated. The Captain should provide feedback to the crew on about a quarterly basis on where the ship is and where she is going. He should point out what is right and where additional effort is needed.

In describing the best ship that this officer was familiar with, he stated that she "had her act together, had a game plan, and kept the staff informed." He mentioned that this ship passed on such things as the ship's family gram, some kudos, and a couple of problems that the ship was currently tackling. He felt that he could sense "the purpose of this ship." He also noted that on this ship the XO felt comfortable and confident because he and the captain "were in sync." The same was true of the command duty officers.

E. CAPTAIN ON SURFACE TYPE COMMANDER'S STAFF

This senior staff officer stated that you could tell a top ship by the following indicators:

- Operational performance

- Results on important inspections, such as, OPPE and CRSE

- The initiative displayed by the Captain. A top captain takes the initiative and thereby avoids having to be given guidance from superiors.

- General shipboard appearance

- The attitude of the chiefs and the officers. On top ships one would expect to find a positive attitude.

- The attitude of the crew, in general. A professional, business attitude would be found on the top ships.

- Retention rate and re-enlistment eligibility rate. One would find high retention rates and low re-enlistment ineligible rates on the best ships.

- The type of inspection the ship takes. This officer felt that the top ships would go through the more demanding PEB OPPE rather than the OPPE given by the Fleet Training Group in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

- The quality of shipboard personnel programs, eg, retention, leadership, and drugs. One of the ships this officer considered to be the embodiment of excellence in the surface force was considered to be excellent in all of these programs and that such excellence was a primary cause of the ship's overall excellence.

- Development programs for juniors, eg, SWOS and ESWS, are effectively administered.

- The chiefs take the initiative and do not get a lot of "rudder orders."

- There is a high degree of involvement at all levels of the ship.

- I Division is well done.

- There is a lot of recognition of good performance.

- If people do not do a good job, their shortcomings are pointed out to them, and if they consistently perform in an unsatisfactory manner they are separated from the service.

- People feel responsible for their work.
- Discipline is firm and consistent.

Whether or not a ship was able to achieve excellence, was dependent upon the ship's ability to use the "tried and true methods" of leadership and management, according to this officer. A strong chain of command was especially important as was the importance of setting standards. It was stated that the higher the standards the better and that it was very difficult to upgrade standards once they had been initially established at a lower than desired level when a captain first joins his ship.

The captain was the key to the success of a ship. He should be an overseer and a generalist. He should arrive onboard with a well thought out game plan on how he wanted to lead and manage his ship, and he should promulgate this game plan immediately upon assuming command. "This should be the first piece of paper he signs." The importance of setting a good example is important, yet one must be oneself. It was felt that many top commanding officers had been fortunate in the past to have worked for "super leaders."

Although leadership style was considered to be an individual matter, it was important that a captain had confidence in his own abilities and that his subordinates perceived the captain as being confident. It was also important that the captain delegate to the maximum extent possible and that "pushing things downhill became a way of life." Communications were also considered very important. The captain should talk to the crew regularly. This had the advantage of getting the word out and also letting the crew get to know the captain. When the captain first reports, he should get everyone together and tell them what he expects

of them. He should also keep people informed as to where "they fit in" in the organization. Stressing the importance of standards and communications, it was felt that the captain should "preach his views on what he expects, regularly and continuously."

F. CRUISER-DESTROYER GROUP COMMANDER

The following views were expressed by a group commander.

The only way to get a feel for a ship is to visit the ship. After one and a half hours, talking to the CO, officers, chiefs, and crew, one can obtain an accurate appraisal of a ship. Excellent ships have high morale and appear to be more cohesive. When talking to people you find that on excellent ships everyone tends to know what is happening in not only their work center but in the ship in general. There is also less back biting and "tilting at windmills." When talking to groups of officers or enlisted personnel, one can tell by the line of thought running through the questions and comments whether or not the officers and men have a positive attitude. You can also tell if the issues being discussed have been previously discussed. In general, the atmosphere during these discussion sessions with the admiral tend to be more congenial and the subject matter tends to be broader, i.e., people do not tend to grind their axe.

Looking at ships from afar, the following indicators tend to point out the excellent ships. The ship know more about their equipment, in particular, they know how to tell if their equipment is operating at top performance. This makes them better battle group assets. As an example, the admiral noted that some ships have their ASW passive

sonar streamed and don't even know if it is operating up to design parameters. The better ships are able to detect degradation in their equipment and are able to then initiate corrective action.

"The best ships are those with the best captains." They tend to perform better across the board. They do everything well. They give the admiral and his staff fewer surprises (admiral's number one peeve), they have fewer CASREFTS, they develop a better rapport with the staff, they have fewer liberty incidents, they have less substance abuse, and, in general, they have fewer problems. They know how to make "the system" work. They don't just submit a 2K and expect for the system to fix a broken piece of equipment. They follow up to insure that the repairs get made. They also emphasize self-help and being able to correct their own problems.

Additionally, the best ships tend to be more effective in meeting reporting requirements. Dealing with poor performing sailors, they try to turn an individual around rather than just kick him out of the Navy. They make use of Correctional Custody Units. The top ships not only perform well at assigned tasking, they also offer to help other ships that have problems. The admiral thought that of all inspections that ships must undergo, the OPPE was one of the best to measure a ship's excellence. Excellent ships would do well on this inspection. In judging ships, the admiral emphasized that before making judgements about a ship, one had to be familiar with the "class problems" of a given ship before making a comparative judgement of the relative excellence of a given ship.

Regarding cleanliness as an indicator of excellence, the admiral stated that he knew of only one ship that was a top performer that was not extremely clean. He felt that, in general, cleanliness comes with and is an indicator of pride.

The admiral had the following views on how best to achieve shipboard excellence. To begin with a ship must have a strong captain, and everyone must know what he demands. In general, the ship must "do things in parallel instead of in series." That is, it must be able to look and plan ahead (90% of every evolution is planning). For example, a ship must be able to prepare simultaneously for an at sea exercise scheduled to take place next week and an upcoming deployment scheduled to commence in a month. Furthermore, during at sea operations, the shipboard organizational leadership is able to not only focus on the day to day operations but also on reliability of equipment and quality of performance.

The better ships are not those that are necessarily more innovative at tactics, but they are the ones that know and understand current tactics and are able to best implement current doctrine. These ships tend to pay more attention to tactics, in general.

The best ships have an XO and CO who have similar leadership styles. (The admiral did not think that there was any one best leadership style, but that it should be more authoritarian than anything else. Whatever style was used should be seen as humane and fair, fair above all else. The key to optimizing one's leadership style he felt was that one must be able to "individualize one's own leadership techniques and know how to improve upon them." He added that the CC must be tough and demanding and make people perform.) The CC and XO have to have a good relationship. A bad relationship develops when goals and/or standards for the CC and XO are different. The admiral mentioned that in two of his four previous commands he and his XO did not have a good relationship and that the command suffered as a result. The XO should never be the social equal of the department heads. There must be a barrier. He also felt that the better ships tended to be fortunate and have better department heads.

Discussing relationships between officers and chiefs, the admiral stated that the relationship depends on how strong the chiefs' mess is. He noted that some people think that the system has taken some things from the chiefs in recent years, but the admiral did not think that this was the case. For example, some new third class petty officers brought up in the age of the PEB know more than some of their chiefs. Some chiefs adapted to this and increased their professional knowledge; others did not and just complained. The latter category should not be serving in ships. The admiral felt that it was up to the captain to force the chiefs' mess to do the job they are paid to do. On the best ships the admiral thought that the officer-chief relationship would be strong both going up and coming down. He felt that it was part of the educating of the officers and enlisted personnel to inform them that the chief's were partially responsible for the development of their officers.

The admiral did not think that there was any one best management system, and that the best managed ships did not do things very differently from other ships. He did think that the best ships had a better feel for where they were at any particular time.

The admiral stated that recognizing individual performance was important and that a lot of recognition should take place. He added, however, that when things go right, time should still be taken to discuss how they could have been improved.

Discipline should be consistent and fair. Everyone should know the rules and they should know that they will get slammed when they violate the rules.

G. CAPTAIN ON SURFACE TYPE COMMANDER'S STAFF

This senior staff officer felt that the most important indicator of the excellence of a ship was the Commanding Officer's interest in performing well. Inspection performance was important, especially the PEB, INSURV and command inspections, but the results were secondary to the attitude of the captain. In a previous assignment, this officer had conducted numerous shipboard inspections, and he felt that he could tell a good ship within four hours of being onboard for an inspection. He noted that some of his contemporaries felt that it only took about five minutes aboard a ship to tell how good it was. He pointed out that the appearance and professionalism of the quarterdeck watch did tell a lot about a ship, "If the quarterdeck is squared away, the ship will be." He also pointed out that he saw a correlation between excellent performance on major inspections and the amount of interest the captain and key department heads demonstrated in those inspections prior to their occurring. The example he gave was that he never seemed to have any problems with ships on inspections whenever the Captain and the cognizant department head took the initiative and the time to meet with his inspection party personnel a couple of months before the inspection.

During inspections, the bad ships tended to have just as good of personnel as the excellent ships, but the management seemed to be noticeably weaker. As an example, he pointed out that on the bad ships, the captain and the department head were the only ones who knew what was going on. He also found that in general the excellent ships did a lot better job of preparing for inspections and that the interest of personnel on the excellent ships seemed to be a lot higher than the interest of personnel on the poorer

performing ships. Picking up on the importance of interest as an indicator of excellence, this officer noted that on top ships, whenever a tech rep is sent to a ship the crew members show a lot of interest in what the tech rep is doing. They want to learn from the tech rep and they are interested in what he is doing to their equipment. This is often not the case on ships that are not excellent. He also noted that in excellent ships the crew tends to care more about what happens and they tend to pay more attention to detail. Both the attitude of the crew and the attention to detail are good indicators for determining if a ship is excellent. The best ship in the force, according to this officer, was a battleship. The two examples of excellence that this officer used to describe why he thought this was the best ship were that (1) materially it was top notch, and (2) the personnel were very committed to making their ship excellent. He cited as an example of the positive commitment of the crew the fact that when a senior officer from the staff visited the ship on a Saturday, he was immediately impressed that everyone was working as if it was the middle of the week.

Discussing inspections further, this officer noted that excellent ships not only have fewer inspection discrepancies, they also have a more positive attitude towards correcting discrepancies when they are pointed out by inspecting personnel. Citing the performance of one of the very best ships he ever inspected, a carrier, he stated that 76 restrictive discrepancies were identified on the first day of the inspection (a good performance for this class of ship), and by the time the inspection party returned the next day, not only were all of the restrictive discrepancies corrected but also numerous other similar discrepancies that the inspection party had missed had also been corrected.

How a ship performs at sea is a key indicator of the excellence of a ship. The best ships are responsive, do what they should before they are told to, and demonstrate a lot of initiative. There appeared to be a close correlation between performance in port and underway, but sometimes one does see a ship that does well deployed and does not do well in port. But, in general, the best ships do everything better than most of the other ships, operationally, materially, in competitive award competition, and in retaining good personnel. This officer also felt that ships that are excellent in peace time will be excellent performers in times of war.

As far as the type commander's staff is concerned, this officer stated that it was important not to let your ship's name become a household word. The staff tends to hear a lot more about ship problems than excellent performance, and in general, no news is good news at this level.

This officer provided the following personal views on how excellent ships are able to achieve their superior performance. The captain is the key! To have an excellent ship, you must have an excellent captain. The captain must be truly interested in performing well. The CO/XO relationship is also very important; however, much can't be done about the relationship. Describing two of the best ships he had ever had experience with, he noted that the commanding officers (both ex-prisoners of war) were extremely effective, inspirational leaders. They did not have as much technical knowledge as other officers he had known, but they were the best at inspiring their crews to strive for excellence, and, in the final analysis, they had the best ships. He noted that they had carrier commands and that they had a lot of senior technical expertise in their commands. Furthermore, smaller ships might not be able to get by with the technical leadership mix found on these ships. But, the

importance of leadership over technical expertise became clear to this officer after seeing these two commanding officers and their ships perform on a very demanding inspection.

Talking more about the importance of the commanding officer in the search for shipboard excellence, this officer stated that the captain's primary duty is that of a spot checker. He added that if a commanding officer just used the twenty eight page handout provided by the type commander's staff to spot check on his ship, he would be moving in the right direction towards achieving excellence. Spot checking was not seen as an end in itself, but it was an important function of command. It was also noted that it was important that the captain know what indicators to look for when inspecting and monitoring the performance of his ship.

Again making reference to his previous assignment as a material inspector, this officer pointed out that he was impressed with how well ships with aviator commanding officers performed on material inspections. He added that they tended to perform better than surface ships commanded by surface warfare officers who did not have previous engineering experience. He attributed this to the fact that the aviators had a built in respect for PMS and that they also saw ECSS as being similar to NATOPs. Both were the bible and would be followed religiously. He implied that this was not the case with surface warfare officers who did not have previous engineering experience. As an example of the effectiveness of some aviator commanding officers as overseers of material matters, this officer noted that one carrier commanding officer knew the complete material history of every piece of equipment in the main engineering spaces. This impressed this officer very much, for it indicated the captain's technical expertise and involvement with his ship.

Discussing standards and their importance, this officer stated that standards must be set by a new commanding officer the first day he reports on board. He must work at bring up low standards immediately. He cannot sit back and assess where the ship is at with regards to standards. He must take action immediately.

Other attributes of excellent ships were identified as follows: the captain must be a good shiphandler, and, in general, the captain must be good at his job.

H. AMPHIBIOUS GROUP COMMANDER

This commodore felt that for a ship to be excellent it had to have a strong and active CO. By active he meant that the CO had to be very involved with what was going on in the ship and that he had to have a lot of interaction with the ship's officers and men. Knowing what was going on was important because it gave the CO confidence. Being involved, however, did not mean making detailed decisions, for being over involved (micro managing decision making) can have a negative impact on subordinates. The commodore added that to be effective the Captain cannot involve himself in minute details. He has to concentrate on "what is important".

The commodore felt that "good" COs probably had been lucky and had had the opportunity to learn from "good" leaders. He added that was the case for him.

When assuming command, the commodore felt that the Captain had to go with the leadership style that had gotten him to where he was (it was too late for a change). He did not think that there was one best leadership style, but there were several ingredients that were common to good leaders, and the commodore looked for these when he visited his ships. One was whether or not the captain trusted his

personnel and demonstrated his trust. The commodore felt that he could detect in a relatively brief visit to a ship whether or not the captain being visited did, in fact, trust his personnel. The commodore said that when he visited a ship he would spend twenty minutes with the captain, take a tour of the ship, meet with the chiefs, lunch with the wardroom, and then have a question and answer session with the officers and chiefs. From such a visit, he felt that he could get a good feel for a ship, and he would make a tentative evaluation of how good the ship was. He added that there were times when he would change his opinion of a ship after having an initial favorable or unfavorable impression, but this did not happen very often. The commodore stated that autocratic leaders could get results, but "only on the face of it."

The commodore thought that recognition of good performance was another attribute common to top leaders and their commands. He looked to see if recognition was being given by the CO and others in positions of leadership on the ship. On an excellent ship, the commodore expected the attitude of the crew that he talked to to show interest, knowledge, pride, and confidence. On top ships he found young sailors saying things like "It's my space, and I am allowed to do my job." This was not usually the case on ships that were not front runners.

Another attribute that the commodore saw in the leaders of his best ships was that they were "tuned to people and their needs." The CO "was in frequency and in harmony with their ships." The commodore implied that caring for people and being in touch with them were means needed to gain commitment. He also noted that on his best ships the crew admires and respects the CO, XO, and their department head.

Regarding the chiefs, the commodore said that they should be involved, e.g., they should have or be in the process of getting their ESWS qualification. In the wardroom, the commodore was looking for some tangible evidence that officer qualification was recognized, e.g., was there a board on the bulkhead with the names of SWO qualified officers.

Asked for other indicators of an excellent ship besides the attitude of the officers and the crew and some of the traits of the CO, the commodore said that the well known indicators of excellence applied, that is, they did better on inspections, their programs were usually better across the board, they won a lot of departmental awards (but they might not be the battle E winner), they had excellent reputations for underway operations, and morale was high. The best ships also seem to give better reports to the staff. They are not afraid to tell superiors about their problems. The "put their marker down," that is, they let their boss know where they stand. The best ships will ask for help when it is needed, but they know that timing is the key when it comes to asking for help. A top ship does not ask for help in preparing for an OPPE the month before the OPPE, they ask for help six months before the event. The commodore stated that the number of CASREPTs definitely was not an indicator of excellence. Asked about retention, the commodore said that the best ships had better retention, in general. Innovation was another attribute that top ships seemed to have more of than average ships. The commodore mentioned a ship that had developed a computer system for aiding management. He saw this as being a valuable tool and as just another example of how a good ship did business in an excellent manner. Another example that impressed the commodore concerned how his top ship had redone its wardroom to give it a "pub type" atmosphere. The commodore said that

this was innovative and effective, in that, with such a fine wardroom the officers were more likely to come together and this would probably result in their working better together. This was what happened for this ship according to the commodore.

On his top ships, the commodore noted that the CO/XC team had good chemistry. He added that the Captain and the XO can still have differences of opinion, but the chemistry remains right. The CO and the XO probably have a lot of closed door sessions working things out.

A strong officer-chief relationship was evident on all of the excellent ships in the commodore's group. He described this relationship as follows: professional, respectful, not buddy-buddy, a team effort in running the ship. He added that the officers are aware of limitations imposed upon the chiefs, and the chiefs know that they can "put their marker down" with the officers. The chiefs and the junior officers realize that a large part of the chiefs' job is to train the junior officers, and the chiefs are anxious to see the junior officer develop. You hear the chief say things like "my MPA" rather than "the MPA" when referring to the division officer.

The appearance of the best ships is another indicator of their excellence. They are clean, the work areas "are fit" and well organized, and preservation (not just painting over rust) is considered important and is well done.

Discipline is good to the top ships. There are very few major disciplinary problems, and the commodore thought that there were fewer than average masts and special courts martials.

He then went on to describe the ship that was the best in his group. The CO typified the commodore's positive views regarding involvement. They did great on inspections,

in fact, they did great at everything they did. Even something as insignificant as the Combined Federal Campaign was seen as a opportunity to excel in this ship - each man averaged giving \$60 to the CFC, far better than any other ship. Their education program was exceptionally strong with many sailors getting their high school diplomas while assigned to the ship. The commodore added that he was invited to the ship on several occasions to award high school diplomas. This impressed the commodore because it showed him that the Captain was concerned with recognizing good performance. The ship had been tasked to take over a deployment of another ship that experienced material problems. The commodore said that he was concerned that this would have a negative impact on the morale of the excellent ship that was tasked to take on the additional six month deployment. However, the morale remained high throughout the deployment and the ship performed in an exemplary manner. The ship also received a surprise OPPE enroute to the short notice deployment. Again the ship excelled. She seemed to take everything in stride. He attributed much of the positive attitude of this ship to the Captain's positive attitude.

The commodore said that top ships realize that they cannot do everything. They make the effort to learn from the commodore what is most important to him, and they give him this. Other things will have to slide and they do, but this does not come back to haunt the ship, because their boss is getting what he wants. Excellent ships will make mistakes just like all of the other ships, but the best ships are able to minimize the adverse effect of their mistakes. They seem to know what is important, and have the ability to prioritize their work.

The commodore concluded the interview by stating that he saw the captain of a ship as being analogous to the conductor of an orchestra. Some captains could get their

crews to perform like a symphony (these were the best), others could get the crew to bang out marching music (these were good but not great), and others could only get noise. To the commodore, what made one play noise and the other only make noise, was the leadership and management talent of the commanding officer.

I. CAPTAIN ON SURFACE TYPE COMMANDER'S STAFF

This senior officer on a a type commander's staff stated that it was difficult to judge excellence in ships at the staff level. Mainly he relied on the "absence of negatives" as a way of judging ships. He realized the limitation of such a judging process. He then gave his views on what excellent ships did that separated them from fleet average ships. They were innovative. They had a "can do" attitude. They were aggressive in the pursuit of top performance. They did not do things like leave a bunch of sailors standing on the pier when the ship got underway. They were operationally oriented. They "bug" their superiors for assistance when they need help "but not in a negative way." In general, this officer thought that the newest ships performed better than the other ships. He noted that better crew comfort might have something to do with this.

This officer saw the winning of the battle E and departmental awards as being "the fall out" of having a good ship, and not as being goals in themselves. One of the keys to determining whether or not a ship was good was could the ship fix itself. He added that the admiral watched this very closely. He felt that the best ships had minimal requests for technical assistance. He did not think that the number of CASREPTs or the length of CASREPTs were indicators of excellence or non-excellence.

The better ships seemed to do a good job of keeping their superiors informed of any problems they were having. They also let their superiors know what they were doing to solve their problems.

Inport drills were considered an indicator of excellence. The best ships participated a lot in these drills. This showed that they were good at time management and that they put a high emphasis on training, two things that this officer thought were important to achieving excellence.

Operationally, this officer thought that the best ships were innovative and took the time to look at how they had done. They also show a lot of initiative. He remembered one ship that had impressed him operationally. The ship would send a message that said "this is how I am going to do it" rather than wait to be told how to do something. These ships also seemed to have a sense of competitiveness about them. They liked to take the tactical initiative. They also "tell it like it is."

When making after action reports, the best ships put some effort into their product. They were "not just after a check in the box. They wanted to produce something substantive."

This officer did not see routine messages as being an indicator of excellence. In fact, he said that he had to constantly warn his personnel to not type cast a ship because of simple administrative errors in messages and routine reports.

The best ships had crews that had a very positive attitude about themselves. They said things like "we look better and we do better." The captain felt that such an attitude was very important to a ship and that it had to be present for a ship to be excellent.

Overall high standards were another important indicator of a good ship. The best ships look better and so do their crews. The captain was seen as the key in the setting and maintaining standards. He had to be involved. "He cannot sit in his stateroom." The Captain has to articulate his standards by talking to the crew. More than just the chain of command is needed in getting standards known and raised.

The CO/XO relationship has to be good. Both have to back each other up. Their must be a two way, mutually supporting relationship. Ideally the relationship should be close professionally. The captain must know what the XO is doing.

As with the rest of the crew, the Captain has to bend to support the wardroom. He must appreciate the fact that mistakes will be made by his officers, but he should not give up on them just because they make a mistake. On the best ships, the officers tend to have a high opinion of the CC. It is important that the CO discuss his command philosophy with his officers, especially the department heads. It goes without saying that the CO should have similar discussions with the XO.

The captain is also the key in setting the tone for a command. How he treats the chiefs is a key in setting the proper tone. The captain should take the time to instruct the junior officers on what their relationship with the chiefs should be. Such things as having the chiefs attend mast was important. In general, the chain of command was found to be working well on top performing ships.

Good ships have good discipline. The captain is not "mister good guy." In fact, when a top CO takes over a ship that is not excellent, there will usually be a large number of masts initially while the captain is getting his standards across to the crew. This will usually level off after about six months.

J. COMMODORE OF SERVICE FORCE SQUADRON

This commodore, unlike many others that we talked to, did not think that a senior officer could determine accurately in a matter of minutes how good a particular ship was. However, he did state that he could make an accurate judgement of a ship after a day onboard in port and a day underway. He stated that he could get "a feel for a ship" after a day at sea and a couple of trips to the ship in port. His general feeling was that once he formed an opinion of a ship it hardly ever changed in the downward direction, that is, a ship first thought to be top notch invariably remained so, but a ship not judged as favorably might surprise him over time and improve its performance and image.

This commodore stressed the importance of the commanding officer as the key ingredient of a ship's performance. The best Captains tended to have the best ships. And, the best Captains were usually those with the most experience. He stated that the ships under his command were of uniformly high calibre, but that the best of the best were those with Captains who were more experienced and who could deal best with people. The difference in experience between commanding officers in this squadron was particularly obvious because half of the ships were commanded by limited duty officers with more than ten years sea duty experience and the other half by relatively junior officers who had about five to seven years at sea experience before assuming command. The LDOs tended to have the best ships. However, the commodore was quick to point out that this was not always the case.

With regards to leadership style, the commodore did not think that there was any one best way for a captain to lead his ship. He stated that his best captains knew that they could not do everything that was required of them, that they had the ability to "know what is really important", and that they were skilled at selectively ignoring the "right things." The commodore added that all effective captains simultaneously stressed the importance of accomplishing tasks; used sound management techniques, such as planning and coordinating; and showed concern for their men.

In describing the "best ships" in the squadron, the commodore stated that the officers and crew pulled together more, everyone felt that they are a part of the command, the chain of command was used in performing day to day work, and initiative was fostered and nurtured. The commodore stated that allowing people to use their initiative was important to achieving teamwork, a element necessary for a ship to be effective. He added that the crews of the best ships had very high respect for their captains.

The commodore stressed the importance of achieving "unit integrity" and stated that the relationship between the chiefs and officers was very important in this regard. The commodore was proud of the fact that ships in his squadron were not in the mold of the officers running everything on the ship. He stated that one of the reasons his ships performed well was that in his ships chiefs perform roles that were often performed by officers in other ships and the chiefs were part of the decision making process. This tended to get the chiefs highly involved in the running of their ships with the following benefits: the talents of the chiefs were more fully utilized and the crew became better integrated, that is, the chiefs were better able to keep their men up to speed on what the ship was doing and why. In his best ships, the commodore stated that there was

a high degree of mutual respect between the chiefs and the officers, and that the officers frequently sought out the chiefs for advice. He noted that this close professional relationship between the senior enlisted personnel and the officers was achieved without decreasing the traditional social separation between these two groups.

The commodore stated that morale was a very important indicator to him. Good morale manifested itself in the pride sailor's displayed for their ship. The commodore felt that he could gain a good appreciation of morale and pride in his informal personal meetings with sailors whenever he visited a ship.

Although the commodore did not stress the importance of retention statistics as an indicator of a ship's effectiveness, he did take pride in the fact that his squadron was a high retaining squadron. He felt that one of the key reasons behind the high retention rates of the ships in his squadron was the fact that the men in the squadron knew that their ships and the squadron staff would go to great lengths to get them the orders of their choice.

With regards to management techniques, the commodore stated that the best ships do not work harder, they tend to work smarter. That is, they have direction and a plan for achieving that which they want. He noted that top ships were skilled at setting and changing priorities when required.

When asked about whether or not the number of CASREPTs a ship had was a good indicator of a ship's effectiveness, the commodore said that it was not. He said that he was more concerned with a ship having a piece of equipment that was broken and not CASREPTed than he was with the number of CASREPTs.

Meeting commitments and passing inspections was discussed and the general conclusion with regards to these

two indicators as a measure of effectiveness was that it went without saying that effective ships would perform well when at sea and would do well on inspections. The commodore added that meeting commitments, by itself, was not the critical element for judging a ship's effectiveness. He noted that material casualties could arise which precluded meeting a given commitment. This was the nature of the ships in the squadron which were not built with redundant equipment.

K. COMMODORE OF AN AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON

This commodore said that the best ships have commanding officers who manage their crews in such a way that when tasked to do a particular job they make it happen. He focused the majority of his comments on one particular commanding officer whose ship embodied what the commodore considered to be the epitome of excellence. The commodore had the highest regard for this particular CO. He admired his ability to carry out assigned tasking, citing as an example a hazardous mission the crew had completed in an exceptionally fine manner. No matter what he was told to do, this CO always seemed to come through. "Here is a CO who takes an old ship and does things U.S. Navy ships are thought to do. He's a performer!"

The commodore went on to explain how he believed this CO was able to achieve such good performance. "It all comes from the captain. He's a strong leader who uses good, basic leadership techniques. He knows how to get the talent of the ship properly directed. He demands high standards but gives positive strokes when deserved. When problems come up, his priority is to get them taken care of right away."

The commodore explained that the support this CO gives his chief petty officers has made a significant improvement

in this ship. As a result, the chiefs have assumed their proper role. They really believe their chief's mess represents the technical competence of the U.S. Navy.

In visiting this ship, the commodore has noticed the following evidences of the strong CPO leadership:

1. An impressive looking CPO mess. "The chief's mess looks better and is as nicely served as any mess I've ever seen."

2. First class petty officers who express a desire to become chief petty officers.

3. Attention to detail that reflects a proud crew. The commodore was especially impressed by the appearance of the engineering spaces. Not only were they some of the cleanest he had seen but the men had made the extra effort to do such things as polish the brass tubing on the main feed pump. "It's because the chiefs do what they're supposed to do....and with pride."

1. COMMODORE OF A CRUISER-DESTROYER SQUADRON

This commodore made the following comments with respect to external indicators of top performing ships. The best ones make their commitments. They only have to be told to do something once and they do it right the first time. They are "self-sufficient" in that they require minimal "coaching" from his staff or from anyone else. For example:

1. They carefully establish their own schedules and stick to them.
2. They use good material planning.
3. They submit work requests without errors the first time.

The smartest ships recognize their limitations and live within them. They don't take on too much at one time. They don't try to do things they aren't capable of doing. They understand priorities. There are a thousand things a CO is

responsible for but only a handful he needs to keep on his mind all the time. Examples are safety, CMS, disbursing, nuclear matters.

The commodore places a lot of weight on initial impressions he gets when he visits a ship. He sizes up cleanliness, usually asking to see the best and worst berthing spaces and the galley. He notes the attitude of the crew. He likes to talk to department heads and leading petty officers. He looks to see if the crew is working. "The real challenge stateside is for COs to maximize the productivity of their men during the seven or so hours they're on the ship."

The best COs communicate effectively with the chain of command. What do messages originated by the ship look like? Are they clear? Concise? Do they raise more questions than they answer?

CFOs are involved on the best ships. The commodore says he hears from his staff when things aren't going well in a ship's CFO mess.

The CO/XO relationship is very important. It is best when the CO and XO get along and agree on how things will be done. They should complement each other professionally and temperamentally.

The CO's technical ability is becoming more and more important. He must understand what his people are telling him. He keeps them informed of what is happening.

A strong ombudsman program pays big dividends.

The CO must have the courage to do what he wants to do and be willing to take the flak when things go wrong. When things do go wrong, (and they will) he solves the problem coolly, calmly, and logically. When reporting a problem up the chain of command he presents alternative solutions with pros and cons of each alternative.

The best COs are consistent with discipline and are prepared to hold mast often so that discipline can be promptly administered.

Another index of a ship: how often they "shoot themselves in the foot". For example, with respect to equipment repairs...are they done right the first time? Are ships breaking their own equipment? "We don't have time to do things more than once."

It takes time, maybe as much as six months, for a new CO to get a ship moving in the direction he wants it to go.

M. CAPTAIN ON SURFACE TYPE COMMANDER'S STAFF

This post-command captain assigned to a surface force type commander's staff stated that the number one index of the best ships is cleanliness. He said that if a ship is clean then it would be unusual if it is not also a good ship.

Another good index: CASREPS, ie. how well they are written. Are they timely? Do they provide good technical information? Do they clearly explain the impact the casualty has on the ability of the ship to meet its mission? Every SITREP should have a restatement of the impact of the casualty on the ship's mission.

The best ships have a strong CPO mess. The chiefs have a feeling of ownership with respect to what's happening. They are actively involved in the management of the ship.

The best ships plan ahead to ensure more of their people complete required schools.

On better ships there is an esprit among the officers. This is primarily a function of the CO. He encourages "healthy competitiveness" between the departments on the ship.

Retention rate by itself is not a good indicator. Many ships are very good performers but don't have a very good retention rate.

Performance on competitive exercises is another index but not the best indicator. The best ships may not always get the top grade on exercises but they are actively pursuing completion of these exercises.

COs of the best ships have many different approaches to their command philosophy. But always...the CO is a quality control person. For example, he conducts PMS spot checks. This is because people are inherently lazy and need someone to check up on them.

Other indicators: KUDO messages and fitness reports on COs written by their deployed commanders.

N. CAPTAIN ON SURFACE TYPE COMMANDER'S STAFF

This post surface command captain on a surface type commander's staff stated the following are key external indicators of the best ships: 1. A clean ship with sharp looking sailors and high moral. 2. A ship that is responsive to its OPTEMPO ie. a ship that can get underway and do what its supposed to do says a lot. 3. A ship that can successfully complete certain key inspections such as OPPE and SMI. (Other inspections such as 3M, NTPI, INSURV are not good indices of excellent ships.) 4. Ships that win competitive awards such as the Battle "E", Battenberg Award, or Marjerie Sterrett Award. 5. Ships that maintain a good rapport with the commodore's staff, keeping them well informed. (When inport, CO should meet with the commodore weekly to keep him "pumped up".)

On the best ships the communication process is worked on daily. For example, Seaman Johnny Jones knows on Monday what's expected of him on Tuesday.

The CO/XO relationship is very important. There must be a daily rapport between the two to the point where the CO is confident he knows things are going as they should be. The XO should be able to take a lot of abuse.

The best ships execute 60 to 70 percent of what is planned at Planning Board for Training.

The attitude of the chief petty officers is critical. They must understand what the CO expects of them. How? The CO must communicate with them through the XO, department heads, and his day to day contact with them. CO needs to spend time walking around the ship asking questions of the crew. He gains crew's commitment by getting them to tell him how they think things should be done.

With respect to discipline, consistency is the key rather than harshness.

A new CO should not try to change things overnight but should establish his standards fairly early on. He needs a good period of assessment. He should make a list of what needs to be changed and then work on correcting one or two problems at a time.

C. CCMCDCRE OF A CRUISER-DESTROYER SQUADRON

The commodore said that in his opinion there are two primary ways to judge a ship: by seeing the ship and by the reports generated by the ship. He can tell a lot about a ship by being onboard and observing sea detail. Then he walks around the ship he looks at cleanliness. What do the bilges look like? The attitude of the crew is a good indicator. He looks to see if the sailors look him in the eye and speak with pride about their ship. This goes for the officers too.

Departmental excellence awards are creditable indicators. But the best ships also meet commitments with minimal staff help. They keep him informed of their problems. They give him the impression they can solve problems at the appropriate level in the command.

The best ships have a majority of the CPO's who take the initiative to train the junior officers. Most should be working on their enlisted surface warfare qualification. The commodore talks to the chiefs. If they complain more about things that are happening on the ship than they do about Navy-wide problems, then this may indicate some internal problems on the ship.

The best COs have short and long range goals. They meet frequently with their officers and CPOs to make certain they understand these goals.

The best ships have a good ombudsman program. They take less time to do things than other ships and have the best rapport with the staff. They tend to have more experienced department heads. Another good indicator: how many work requests are rejected when work packages are submitted?

The commodore requires his COs to communicate with him in writing once a month to discuss their accomplishments, upcoming goals, and problems they are currently experiencing. Good COs provide solutions when they report problems. If a problem gets to commodore's level of attention then he expects the CC to be able to explain it to him.

The good ships show initiative. For example they ensure assist visits are included in their schedules.

Retention is one indicator but not as good an indicator as some the others already mentioned.

The best COs develop a good command climate. The CC who is very autocratic can get good short term results but the price is that the ship will go downhill over the long haul. The autocratic CO is just buying performance at the expense of people.

The commodore finds there is high correlation between the fitrep the CO gets from a deployed commodore and his ship's performance stateside.

P. COMMODORE OF A SERVICE FORCE SQUADRON

The commodore believes that there are many indicators of top performing ships. One is the quality of the paperwork and reports they submit. Another is the number of SELEXES ships complete. Another is the ship's responsiveness to tasking, ie. the best ships have a "can do" attitude and are willing to go the extra mile. When asked to do something they really look to see how they can do it. An example would be the willingness of one ship to lend a sailor with a particular rating to another ship who needs him.

When the commodore visits or rides the best ships, he is able to gauge the positive attitude of the crew by how willing they are to talk to him. Also, their appearance is noticeably better.

Retention is an indicator one must be cautious in evaluating. Sometimes a good ship's retention rate is low because the CO needed to discharge a number of sailors who should have never been allowed in the Navy in the first place. But consistently poor retention over a longer period of time, coupled with poor performance in other areas, may indicate a weak ship.

Better ships do a superior job of executing individual programs like "I" division and ESWS, but the value of these programs as measuring sticks of a ship's excellence is sometimes exaggerated.

There is no one set of characteristics you can tie to a good wardroom or CPO mess. There are always going to be

individuals in each who provide a positive bent and others who provide a negative bent. The key is a good relationship between the officers and the chiefs.

The CO/XO team dramatically influences the ship. They are largely responsible for the positive indices previously described. The CO must be involved in every aspect of the ship. This does not mean meddling but rather displaying interest in everyone's work and providing guidance. He should be the final authority in matters concerning his people.

Q. CAPTAIN ON SURFACE TYPE COMMANDER'S STAFF

These comments were made by a senior officer on a surface force type commander's staff.

The best ships send timely, articulate messages that get right to the point when addressing problems.

The best ships have fewer CASREPS. They don't ask for outside help to repair equipment until they've exhausted all onboard resources. They take an organized, structured approach to troubleshooting equipment.

When he walks aboard a good ship he can tell the men are proud. They look sharp and talk about "their" ship. They're also proud of their CO and his shiphandling ability.

Good ships plan ahead and demonstrate initiative. For example they put training ahead of work.

Retention is one indicator. But he has known ships that did well and were very successful that did not have good retention.

Morale is a factor. The best ships tend to reward people more. But sometimes the crew is unhappy on good ships. This is because to be good, there's a price for the ship to pay.

Good ships have a strong, involved CPOs.

For discipline problems, speedy justice is essential.

There are all kinds of leadership styles. But three things are necessary: 1. Establishment of definable, measurable standards. 2. Education of the officers and crew as to what those standards are. 3. Enforcement of those standards. Most people want to excel and do well but they must know what the standards are.

On the best ships, work and accountability is forced as far down the chain of command as possible.

R. COMMODORE OF AN AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON

The commodore says he can tell what a ship is like by walking from the quarterdeck to the wardroom. He looks at the quarterdeck, the outward appearance of the ship, the uniforms, the passageways. He can tell a lot by the appearance of the mess specialist on duty in the wardroom.

The best ships communicate upward with their chain of command. COs keep him informed. They call him before they get underway and after they get back from steaming and brief him on how it went, although the commodore does not require any written narrative reports from his COs. But when they bring problems to his attention they tell him what they're doing about them.

Departmental awards are a good indicator of the best ships.

The best ships cause him less problems. He says he spends 90% of his time on 10% of the ships.

The commodore puts a lot of stock in the subjective feel his master chief gets when visiting a ship.

The best ships have a good ombudsman program. This really helps.

It all stems from the CO. He is the key. He must know where he wants to go and how he wants to get there.

The commodore mentioned one CO who did everything right. He was a very demanding CO who had taken three of his chief engineers to mast. With respect to engineering standards, the CO applied everything he'd learned at SOSMRC. For example, the CO required every EOW to report to the CO that all watches in engineering spaces had been properly relieved and that he (the oncoming EOW) had assumed the watch. The CO cared for his people, knew everyone by name, and planned ahead. Before getting underway for commitments he'd have a face to face report from each department head to get a detailed status on each department rather than a check list.

The CO and XO must work as one. Each must understand how the other thinks. Any CC should feel comfortable about letting his XO take over the ship. The commodore was impressed by one CC who left his ship by helo one day leaving the XO to bring the ship to port so that he (the CO) could attend a meeting the commodore had called for all the commanding officers in the squadron.

The best ships are self-sustaining. They are able to get underway within 48 hours. Self-sustaining ships don't get tied to an IMA or RSG for repairs. They don't assume that by filling out a 2K they'll see results without followup. The commodore doesn't mind when a ship asks for a techrep. But it does bother him to learn that a techrep is onboard working on gear while the ship's technician is not watching over his shoulder to learn as much as he can about that piece of equipment.

The best ships have more experienced COs. The commodore would like to see FCOs who have had two junior officer tours, two department head tours, and an XO tour on the same class of ship they will command. The best COs let the

junior officers handle the ship and learn from their mistakes.

The commodore places zero emphasis on retention because good COs may have to discharge a lot of sailors for substance abuse, etc. and this will impact retention figures. Also, one must be careful when evaluating inspection results. One of his ships did poorly on an SMI but one of the main reasons was that a second class petty officer was doing a chief's job because the Navy personnel system had not detailed the chief to the ship.

The better ships have excellent training plans, including long range plans for schools. They also take advantage of all local schools.

The best ships reward their men by letting them get time off to do things they feel are important. There should be an attitude of caring about the person. And no one should ever sit or request chits.

S. CAPTAIN ON SURFACE TYPE COMMANDER'S STAFF

This interview was conducted with a post command captain currently serving on a surface ship type commander's staff. From this position he uses the following external indicators to judge ships: 1. Retention statistics (Better ships retain more people.) 2. Degree of substance abuse as reported through urinalysis program (The less the substance abuse, the better the ship.) 3. Quality of message traffic (He expects messages he reads to make sense.) 4. Readiness ratings (If a ship is not C1 in a category he expects personnel from the ship will quickly brief him on how the ship intends to get to C1.) 5. Departmental excellence awards (In general, these are a good indicator of excellence.)

When visiting ships, he judges them first by looking at the external appearance, the appearance of the sailors, and how he is greeted at the quarterdeck. He would expect to see sailors who are productively employed and who are not afraid to talk to him. He would expect to see alert, bright officers who take pride in their ship and junior officers who are working toward attaining personal goals such as the Surface Warfare Officer qualification. He would expect to see CPOs who are aggressive rather than passive, ie. out working and involved in the activities of the ship.

This captain believes top performing ships are primarily a reflection of the CC. The best COs communicate well with their crew. They are firm yet approachable. They lay out their standards, communicating them at all levels of the command, and demand they be adhered to. The best COs make certain all hands understand their goals for the ship and how they expect to attain them.

This captain also placed importance on the CO/XO combination. He felt the ship would be less effective if either the CC or the XO are weak in their leadership ability.

T. COMMODORE OF A DESTROYER SQUADRON

This commodore of a destroyer squadron emphasized that he looks at everything when evaluating ships. "I look at the whole (ship)," he said repeatedly. When pressed for specifics, he mentioned the following marks of the best ships: 1. An attentive, sharp looking quarterdeck. 2. An efficiently run bridge when the ship is underway. Do people know what they're doing? Is the watch formal and professional? Does the OOD say "Hey Frank, check the starboard pelorus."? Or does he say "Mr. Smith! Check the starboard pelorus!"? 3. Ships that maintain sharp external and

internal appearance, ie. no Irish pennants, etc. 4. Ships that have good operating reputations, ie. that pay attention to detail. The commodore said he had been embarrassed on one occasion when one of his COs maneuvered in formation without taking into consideration the turn radius of his (the CO's) ship. 5. The commodore sizes up his ships by conducting short notice "top zone inspections." He and his staff spend three hours looking for discrepancies that demonstrate a lack of attention to detail. For example, they look for proper space markings, proper preventative and corrective equipment maintenance, proper stowage of gear and equipment, and lack of rust. 6. Ships that keep him informed. 7. His best ship gets the Battle "E" award.

The commodore spent the majority of the interview describing in detail his command philosophy which he shares with every prospective CO reporting to his squadron. The commodore felt that the most common failing of COs is that they fail to establish standards, they fail to hold people accountable, and they assume an adequate management system is in place when in fact it isn't. To explain his command philosophy, the commodore used a model which can be easily remembered by the acronym "SALEM".

The "S" of the model stands for standards. "If you don't set them (standards), communicate them, and hold people to them, then you're lost." The "L" of the model stands for leadership, specifically as it relates to motivating people. "A sailor will do whatever you demand of him provided you provide the leadership to back it up." It appeared that the commodore viewed leadership as being closely linked with the "people programs" of the command.

On the best ships, S and I are always in balance and at high levels resulting in high performance and a "happy" ship. If they are both in balance but low then you will have a reasonably happy ship but poor performance. If

the standards are high and the people programs low then you have a dissatisfied ship and the standards will probably not be attained. If people programs are high and standards are low then you have a "touchy-feely" environment where the crew thinks it's happy but no one is challenged. The commodore felt that the CO's first six weeks aboard the ship were critical in establishment of S and L. He said the CO must push the standards first, then the people programs. This can be done in small increments (which he considered ineffective) or in great leaps. The CO needs to drive his standards right to the top as soon as takes command. Once standards have been established, then the people programs can be brought up.

The "M" of the model stands for management system. Many officers assume an effective management system exists on the ship because there are standard procedures as defined in such documents as the SORM. But just because such systems exist doesn't mean they are implemented. Therefore, the commodore expects his COs to develop a management system that will enable them to account for every man hour of every sailor on the ship. The commodore said he didn't care how the CO designed the specifics of this management system but he (the commodore) expected to be able to go to any ship in the squadron, pick a sailor at random, and find out from that sailor's supervisors (or from the sailor himself for that matter) exactly how each hour of the sailor's work day was scheduled.

The commodore described the management system he used when he had command. His ship had a "Planning Board for Work Planning." This meeting produced a document that was promulgated as a ship's notice which spelled out in detail the work that would be accomplished by the crew in the following two weeks. Division officers had to account for every available man hour of their men. The commodore iden-

tified eight ways a sailor could productively use his time: FMS, FQS, drills, GMT, watch standing, corrective maintenance, cleaning, and "shipkeeping" (ie. preservation, painting, and work associated with making the ship look smart). As CO, he expected each division officer to make a "contract" with his chief as to how many man hours each man would devote to each of the eight categories. Allowances were made for "overhead time" ie. hours that were not spent in productive work because of sickness, leave, TAD, unauthorized absence, special liberty, etc. (Twenty five per cent of total man hours was normally acceptable for "overhead", although division officers were encouraged to use their management skill to lower this figure.) The agreed upon plan was then submitted via the department head as an input for the Planning Board for Work Planning.

The commodore said that the best of plans are meant to be broken and, therefore, while CO he did not require his officers to spend lots of time proving their plans were working perfectly. Rather, he chose to use his own personal observations as the primary means to determine how well the planned work was being accomplished. He did require department heads to tell the XO the approximate per cent of planned work their department had accomplished. He expected to be notified only if this figure fell below 75%.

The "A" of the model stands for accountability. This is an essential to maintaining standards and the CO should own the "levers of accountability", i.e., he should know in great detail whom to hold accountable for infractions of standards. On one ship the commodore had visited he noticed a poorly maintained bulkhead. When questions were posed as to who was responsible for that bulkhead, no one seemed to know. This is an example of a situation in which no one could "pull the lever of accountability."

The "E" of the model stands for energy of which the commodore described three types: physical, moral, and psychic. Physical energy is that needed to endure long work hours. Moral energy is that needed to base one's philosophy of command upon sound principles. Psychic energy is the will to lead. It's tested daily. It is the determination not to lower standards. Everytime there is a lowering of psychic energy then there will be a corresponding change in standards.

U. CAPTAIN ON SURFACE TYPE COMMANDER'S STAFF

This post surface command captain on a surface type commander's staff said that the best ships not only avoid doing those things that would give them a poor reputation but they also build a good reputation by doing other things exceptionally well. He said the surface force is run somewhat "by exception" because the only ships that normally come to the staff's attention are those that have done something particularly well or something particularly poorly. For example in reviewing OPPE results, the type commander's staff normally finds out about those ships that barely passed the inspection and those that passed it with very few discrepancies. Those commands that make serious blunders can very quickly gain a poor reputation. "It's the guy who ends up \$2000 short in his disbursing audit who gets our attention."

Another measure of excellence is the quality of the reports a ship sends. The best ships build credibility by not hesitating to report problems. Their messages are simple, straight forward, and easy to read. A person doesn't have to dig through the message for five minutes to determine what is being said.

Generally speaking, the captain felt the Battle E awards go to the best ships. But the very best ships stick out by winning awards in addition to the Battle E. The ASW and AAW awards are two of the ones the captain believes usually go to top performers.

The captain said that senior officers can get a flavor for a ship by simply visiting it to observe its day to day operations and the attitude of the crew. Although he wasn't certain why, the captain said that a certain type of attitude which transcends the best ships is not found on the fleet average ships. Furthermore, on the best ships the officers come across as being professionals. They not only look and talk professionally but they also get professional results. They seem to welcome opportunities to talk about their areas of shipboard responsibility, whether it be their equipment, their spaces, or whatever.

With respect to shipboard discipline, the captain said that the quality of the program depends on how carefully it is being supervised and managed. The command should give poor performers an opportunity to mend their ways. "I've seen poor performers who have been turned around. I've seen others that could have been turned around but weren't because of poor leadership."

The number of mast cases a ship has is a function of the philosophy of those in leadership positions on the ship. Some ships put people on report for things that other ships do not. Yet both could be good ships, although the best ships would probably not routinely have large numbers of mast cases over an extended period of time.

The captain thinks the best ships tend to have good retention, although a good ship might have a period of poor retention for one reason or another. For example, a ship might have poor retention because the command's career counselor was transferred before his relief arrived onboard.

The captain went on to describe the following ways he thought the best COs achieve excellence:

1. Leadership Style. "There are many leadership styles. A successful CO can be gregarious and 'happy go lucky' or serious. But every CO must communicate his standards, enforce them, and strive for excellence. His men must perceive his interest in what he is doing. He must somehow convey the idea that the ship has a mission to accomplish and at the same time make every man feel he's an important part of that mission."

2. CO/XO relationship. "It's important that the CO/XO relationship be harmonious and that the CO lets the XO do his (the XO's) job. There can be problems if the CO and XO are polarized and the XO can't seem to do things the way the CO wants them done. The CO must be seen as a 'good guy' who is fair but who can't be snowed. In contrast, the XO must be fair and firm, more regulated, and more structured in what he does. The XO must be in a position to correct people more than the CO does."

3. CO/Officer relationship. "The CO needs to get before his officers prior to every evolution and communicate his standards. It is also important for him to meet with his junior officers on a continual basis to impart to them his command philosophy."

APPENDIX B
SHIP INTERVIEWS

A. SHIP ALPHA

1. Commanding Officer

The captain believes in setting goals and communicating them to the crew. He took command of the ship when it was midway through an overhaul. His goal for the ship at that time was two-fold. First, to complete the overhaul early without overspending allocated funds. Second, to improve retention. Communicating these goals with the crew had the desired effect because the goals were attained. The goal he is currently emphasizing is for the ship to be fully combat ready by the time it leaves for the next deployment.

The captain stressed the importance of planning ahead. "We take a look at what we have coming up so we avoid getting into a crisis mode." He holds a weekly planning meeting with his executive officer and department heads. They use this meeting to plan for upcoming events such as the deployment and key inspections.

The captain believes in leading by example and letting decisions be made at the lowest possible level. When people come to him with problems, he expects them to provide possible solutions. He tries to let people make decisions themselves, but he provides guidance. He gave an example of a recent discussion he had with the chief engineer. The ship had been tasked to get underway on short notice for some previously unscheduled operations. At the

time of the tasking, one of the ship's two boilers was down for repairs. Because the chief engineer was confident repairs could be completed very soon after the ship got underway, he suggested leaving with only one boiler on line. Rather than tell the engineer he didn't want to get underway with one boiler, the captain asked him what he would do if the one good boiler developed a steam leak during sea detail. That question prompted the engineer to withdraw his suggestion.

When asked how he sets standards, the captain said he promulgated a "standards and policy" statement when he first took command. He said he notifies the appropriate people via the chain of command when he finds his standards are not being met. The exception is when he notices a safety violation, in which case he makes on the spot corrections.

The captain estimates he spends 60% of his time "out on the deckplates to get the pulse of the ship." He likes to talk to his men and express an interest in what they are doing. He also believes it is important to keep them well informed. To that end he frequently uses the POD and IMC.

The captain considers the crew's morale to be very good. He attributes this to their pride in serving in a ship which frequently takes on operational commitments of other ships. As he put it, "the crew thinks they're the best."

With respect to equipment casualties, the captain said he believes his men have the technical ability to accomplish virtually all repairs themselves. He only asks for technical assistance as a last resort. He expects his men to effect repairs as soon as casualties occur without "burning themselves out."

When asked about how he dealt with the squadron commander, the captain said he mainly tried to keep him well

informed. He recounted a visit by the commodore while the ship was in overhaul. The captain had prepared a detailed brief for him in which the department heads explained the exact status of all their repair jobs and how they were dealing with problems. The commodore apparently left that meeting with confidence that the captain had everything well under control.

2. Executive Officer

The executive officer attributes much of the ship's success to the emphasis placed on planning. In general, he tries to make planning the responsibility of the officer responsible for the evolution being planned. For example, POA&Ms are produced for all major upcoming projects and inspections. These POA&Ms are drawn up by the appropriate action officer and reviewed by the executive officer and the captain.

Shipboard evolutions are planned and executed as scheduled to the greatest degree possible. For example, fire party training is scheduled daily and conducted religiously. Scheduling is detailed enough to include the names of those scheduled for dental appointments or working parties. Everything is in automatic. Recurring meetings take place systematically. The Executive Officer believes this is important because people can depend on when things will happen.

Although he has his share of "problem" personnel, the Executive Officer sincerely believes this is the finest crew he has ever served with. Most of the men have a very positive and enthusiastic frame of mind. The Executive Officer theorizes this positive frame of mind perpetuates itself when newly reporting personnel get "swept up" into this atmosphere.

Some of the programs which receive heavy emphasis include PQS, ESWS, I division, cleanliness, PMS, retention, stricker selection board, and human relations. The latter three programs are ones the captain emphasizes most. The Executive Officer spoke highly of the ship's zone inspection program. He and the captain inspect one work center a week and thus are able to cover every space in the ship on a quarterly basis.

The Executive Officer appears to have a good working relationship with the captain. For example, when conducting ASW operations, the captain and Executive Officer share watchstanding so that one or the other is always supervising the operation. They communicate well. The captain periodically clarifies his expectations for the ship during their frequent discussions.

The Executive Officer also maintains close contact with the chief petty officers, saying he meets with them regularly.

One of the ship's innovative programs which the Executive Officer spoke highly of is the "Chief Petty Officer Conduct Board." This consists of a panel of chief petty officer who meet weekly to investigate all report chits and make recommendations to the Executive Officer concerning them. This simplifies the Executive Officer's investigation process and enables the chiefs to be more involved in the review of disciplinary infractions.

3. Department Heads

The department heads viewed the role of the captain as the key reason for the ship's success. They said his priority is to be battle ready and to "do all things well." They appreciated not being micromanaged by the captain, saying he "fine tunes" rather than dictate. For example, he

recommends courses of action more often than telling them exactly what they should do. They like the fact that he gets around the ship a lot, keeping in touch with the crew. He gives all hands the impression he is approachable and sincere.

Department heads viewed the CO/Executive Officer and officer/CFO working relationships as very strong. They thought cooperation among department heads was better than fleet average.

The department heads say the crew is very proud of their ship. Most crewmembers think their ship is the best.

Department heads believe all ship programs are receiving the necessary degree of attention. "Things are pretty much in automatic. There's very little crisis management. Although we are in the MINT program, our programs have been kept up."

The chief engineer commented at one point on the skill and unusually high teamwork of the boiler technicians. He has very little involvement with their work because, as he put it, "everything is in perpetual motion down there (ie. in the fireroom)."

The department heads mentioned the following other strengths of the command: 1. Fair but strict discipline. 2. High standards of cleanliness. 3. A top-notch equipment maintenance program.

4. Junior Officers

The captain's management style and a "people oriented atmosphere" appear to be the two elements which the division officers feel have contributed most toward building the ship's fine reputation and the crew's above average morale. One division officer said the atmosphere was people oriented because "We take time to think of the troops." An effort is made to strike a balance between work and pleasure

and to maintain a good rapport with subordinates. One way of doing this is to be honest and "up front" with the crew. Another is to solicit the opinions of subordinates by asking their opinions about shipboard matters.

The division officers had high regard for their captain. One said "I think the captain pulls us all together. He uses a common sense approach. Seems like everybody knows what he expects." They said his current priority is battle readiness.

The working relationships between CO/Executive Officer, officers as a group, officers/chiefs, and department heads/division officers are considered quite good. "We communicate," said one division officer. "For example, we (division officers) feel we can talk to our department heads when we disagree with a decision they have made.

Areas in which division officer thought high standards are stressed include cleanliness, retention, PMS, and damage control.

5. Chief Petty Officers

The chief petty officers see themselves, and to a lesser degree the first class petty officers, as the primary driving force behind the ship's fine reputation. One chief went so far as to say the chief's mess in this ship is the best in the fleet. The good rapport the chiefs have among themselves and their willingness to help each other out are two of the main reasons they gave for this. One chief described a recent situation in which two other chiefs had stayed up with him all night to assist in a repair job.

The chiefs took pride in their perception that they seized the initiative at their level to correct problems before these problems needed to be dealt with by those higher in the chain of command. For example, they say that

all onboard talent is exhausted before requests for technical assistance leave the ship. One chief said it was as if the command had its own mobile technical unit embarked. Another cited the example of an HT who used his expertise to repair the ship's air search radar during the last deployment.

A number of the chiefs encourage cross training of their men. The chief sonar technician liked the flexibility of having all the GMTs, STs, and TMs qualified to stand all sonar watches. Intra division teamwork is also common. One of the engineering chiefs said the men in engineering divisions are quick to lend a helping hand to each other whenever the need arises.

Without question, the chiefs perceived their ship as a top performer, primarily because of its excellent operational reputation. One chief's comment summed up their attitude when he said, "We used to try to keep up with the Jones'. Now we are the Jones'!".

One of the chiefs who was not a member of ship's company but who had orders to report in the near future said he had negotiated his new assignment to this ship because he knew it had a good reputation.

The chiefs had nothing but good things to say about their captain. They described him as personable, cordial, knowledgeable, honest, fair, frank, honest, open minded, and cool under pressure. One chief said the captain was the finest CC he had ever worked for.

Some of the more important shipboard programs that the chiefs mentioned include the enlisted surface warfare qualifications, the petty officer leadership training, damage control PQS, and PMS. They thought highly of the captain's habit of inspecting 3M workcenters on a random basis. This, they said, was just another evidence of his interest in the well being of the ship.

The chiefs think the captain's primary goal is to keep the ship in a state of readiness to carry out its primary mission, namely ASW. When asked what standards are emphasized, the crew's appearance was mentioned foremost. They spoke highly of a policy the command had initiated during the last deployment, namely that officers and chiefs had to wear ties when on liberty and E1 to E6 personnel had to wear slacks. (Jeans were not permitted.) They said the higher standards in liberty attire had the effect of reducing liberty incidents during the deployment.

The chiefs considered the captain to be firm and fair in administering non-judicial punishment. They thought the Chief Petty Officer Conduct Board (described in the interview with the executive officer) was important because it gave them opportunities to relate some of their experiences to those crewmembers suspected of UCMJ violations. They acknowledged the conduct board is primarily an investigating body.

The chiefs said that the excellent services provided by the ship's supply department was a tremendous boost to the crew's morale. They spoke highly of the barber services, the quality and quantity of food, the laundry services, efforts to get repair parts, and the disbursing operation.

6. E5 and E6 Petty Officers

The E5 and E6 petty officers also considered their ship to be one of the best in the fleet. When asked why, one first class petty officer said "We are a happy crew that gets along well." He attributed this to the respect that most senior petty officers have for their men. Another petty officer mentioned the high degree of cooperation on the ship. "If I need some help, I can go right to the

person who is responsible and nine out ten times he will stop what he's doing and help me out." Other petty officers made similar comments. One commented that the first class petty officers cooperated well with the chiefs.

These petty officers said the captain had a lot to do with the ship's good reputation. They considered his main priorities to be ASW operational readiness and damage control. They think the CO is very personable because he talks to crewmembers all the time and he never yells or screams. He keeps the crew well informed. One petty officer said "The CO gets the word out right away."

Several of the petty officers commented on the cleanliness of the ship. One said this was the cleanest ship he had ever been on.

These petty officers believe all shipboard programs are receiving adequate attention. "We do 'em all well. They're all covered," said one. PMS, PQS, AND training are three programs that say are emphasized. Discipline is considered firm but fair.

7. E4 Petty Officers and Below

The enthusiasm of the E1 to E4 group was the lowest of all the groups interviewed on the ship. Nevertheless, they felt their ship was better than fleet average because of the amount of time the ship had been underway to meet operational commitments. They thought their ship was frequently chosen to take on commitments of other ships that were unable to get underway.

These men thought that in general the crew was quite proud of their ship but that moral was somewhat lower than it had been because of the amount of time the ship had spent underway. Other than their respect for the captain and Executive Officer, whom they described as being "human,"

they did not identify reasons for their ship's superior performance.

B. SHIP ERAVO

1. Commanding Officer

Asked what he attributed the success of his ship to, this CO laughed and said that he did not have a one shot answer to this question. After some thought, he said that he stressed uniformity in the way business was conducted on the ship and in the standards used on the ship. He said that there was a sense of fairness and concern for the crew, and that "management knows their people." Regarding showing concern for people, the Captain said that he would not settle for anything less than a high level of concern for subordinates. He said that everyone in the chain was responsible for insuring that this requirement was enforced. He added that "I insist that division officers be close to their people, and that they strive to make their presence felt." When the Captain discussed "taking care" of subordinates, he mainly meant such things as insuring that their work and living spaces were up to high standards, that they were given help when they needed it in dealing with personal problems, and other factors relating to their physical needs; however, he also saw the importance of juniors feeling that their superiors truly cared about their welfare.

Several times the Captain came back to the idea of stressing the importance of improving the quality of life of the crew. He noted that the ship was twenty years old and not as habitable as some of the newer ships, and that it took extra effort to enhance the crew's quality of life, but, even so, this could and should be done by all personnel

in positions of responsibility. The CO later added that the ship's success was not due to the fact that personnel worked harder than on other ships. He implied that his crew was more committed and more efficient and this led to their being more effective than most ships.

To get his priorities and philosophy over to the officers, the Captain said that he holds meetings for all officers. Usually these meetings center around recent observations the CO has made walking around the ship and talking with the crew.

The Captain said that he tells the officers and the men that "We will be the best." He did not tell them that they would win the Battle E, however. He considered that they could figure this out for themselves, that is, if they were the best they would win the award. As it turned out, the ship did win the Battle E. The Captain related that he was asked by his superior what could be done in recognition of the ship's top performance. The Captain said that getting a trip to Portland would be well received. They got the trip. The Captain then went out of his way to impress upon the crew that the trip was in recognition of their hard work and outstanding performance.

The Captain felt that the ship benefitted a lot from its good reputation. He said that he always pointed out to the new men joining the ship that the ship had a good reputation. He would mention all of the ship's departmental excellence awards. In this way, the new people would realize that "they are serious about the ship doing well." At the indoctrination training for new personnel, the CO would always tell them that "the Navy is a way of life" and that pride and responsibility were key elements of this life.

The Captain felt that it was important that he display a high personal interest in what the crew was doing on a day to day basis. He spent a lot of his time walking

around the ship, visiting most spaces daily. He would ask crew members what their problems are and what were their plans for correcting them. He would also point out those things that he thought needed correction. He might also go to the division officer and say "I did not see a sense of direction in the work your men are doing." The Captain added that he took the time to get around the ship because he felt that if you take an interest in people they will respond.

The Captain said that he was continuously striving to get the junior enlisted men to take ownership for their work and to correct problems on their own, without having to be told to do so.

Training was one of the Captain's top priorities, and he was very proud of the existing training program, "It is second to none." Officers train daily. The ship uses an available class room at the head of the pier to do a lot of training. The Captain was surprised how few other ships availed themselves of this valuable training location. Once again he added, "We really push training." He noted that meaningful training was hard to do, but that it must be strived for continuously. He had a lot of interest in ESWS, and he was proud of the ship's program. He added, however, that the number of qualified personnel was not that high.

Concerning his vision for the ship, the Captain said, "Most people understand what we are striving for and how we will get there." He said that this was mainly communicated through informal communication with his officers and men. With a ship of this size (about 450 crew) he said that it was difficult to have captain's call, and SITE TV would not work as a substitute.

The Captain thought that the ship's petty officer indoctrination program was effective and well received by those who had participated.

In general, the Captain said that "He would like to see everyone do well." If he noted that a man was not doing well, he would go to the department head, point out the observed deficiencies in the man's performance and ask why this was the case, e.g., if an OS could not do maneuvering boards well, the Captain would ask the Operations officer why.

The Captain said that he took his job very seriously, adding "We exist because of our mission." He went out of his way to insure that the department heads also understood this.

The Captain said that welfare and recreation activities were stressed. Every division has a softball team, and a lot of softball is played. The ship has big dinner dances, and a lot of the crew attend these functions. The Captain was proud of this. In general, he thought that the officers and men had a lot of "esprit." When they walked down the pier to the ship, "They were happy to be a member of the crew."

The Captain said that he spent a lot of time discussing standards, i.e., his standards of excellence, with the Executive Officer and the department heads. He also insisted that these officers be out and about checking on standards and paying attention to details. He felt that it was better that such matters be discussed personally rather than being put in writing. He added that he did not put much in writing. As an example of where he placed efforts on standards, he said that he expected everyone from himself to the chiefs to be out paying attention to how painting was performed on the ship. The only standard acceptable was to have the ship painted in strict accordance with the applicable Navy instruction (NAVSHIPS TECH MANUAL) and it was the responsibility of all the khaki to insure that this was the way the ship did business. He stated that

if you paid attention to detail on such things as painting procedures, the more important things would follow. He reiterated that he insisted that everything would be done by the book, adding that he uses these same books.

The Captain considered himself a strict disciplinarian. He insisted upon military courtesy, such as, personnel calling out "attention on deck" when the Captain entered a space, proper rendering of salutes, and proper wearing of uniforms. He said that his people knew where he was coming from, that they knew his standards, and that he went by the book. He said that he had mast every Friday, without fail. There were not many repeaters at mast, and many of those who did come to mast again were gotten rid of.

The Captain said that he stressed recognition of good performance. All of the allotted Navy achievement medals were given as were command advancements. There was a monthly awards ceremony. In general, the Captain said that he stressed recognition rather than punishment. He also thought that this happened at the lower levels, but he was not sure.

Underway, the Captain said he used the IMC quite a bit. He shared this form of communication with the Executive Officer.

Asked about his relations with his superior (Group commander), the Captain said that he did not do anything special. He said that he did not worry about the staff and that he was not very political, in fact, he would yell at them for non-support. In general, the rapport between the staff and the wardroom was considered good. He felt that that his boss seemed receptive to the ideas, e.g., ship's schedule recommendations. Talking about the ship's schedule, the Captain said that he thought that most of the crew wanted to go places rather than remain in homeport. Therefore, he tried to get a lot of good port calls for the

ship. He added that getting underway a lot was better for the ship also.

All of the ship's programs, e.g., PMS, PQS, retention, were considered very strong by the CO. He said that he could not think of any programs that we are supposed to do that we are not doing.

2. Executive Officer

The Executive Officer had only be onboard for four months. He said that he was impressed with the positive atmosphere of the ship when he joined. The high quality of the junior enlisted personnel was especially noteworthy, there did not appear to be many "bad apples." He added that the ship was "quick to get rid of those poor performers that did exist." He noted that there are four legal officers and that they are all kept busy.

The Executive Officer said that the ship had had a big emphasis on cleanliness before he ever arrived and he had tried to maintain this emphasis. He felt that cleanliness had a very positive relationship with morale, the cleaner the ship the higher the morale.

Asked why the ship did well, the Executive Officer said that the CO concerns himself with the important things and that he is not a rickie and dime person. "He does what a Captain should do. He is not rapped up in micro-management." He also knows what are the "hard spots" in each of the departments. He directs his attention at these "hard spots."

The Executive Officer said that the CO stresses ship cleanliness. He expects perfection and consistency is stressed. As a result of the day to day high level of cleanliness, the ship does not have to go to general quarters for a flag officer visit, and this reduces crisis management a lot. The CO also stresses administrative

excellence. He expects things brought to him for signature to be 4.0, "He is not the proof reader and editor." This has forced junior officers to learn to write. The Executive Officer considered the CO a stickler for operational readiness, especially in the area of seamanship. He described the CC as the most knowledgeable officer for which he had ever worked. He noted that the CO has a quick temper, especially underway, but he did not see this as a negative trait. He saw it contributing to the incentive for officers to grow under this CC, and they did grow. The Executive Officer said that he and the CO never sat down and defined who would do what and what their roles were, but in general the Executive Officer run the day to day workings of the ship and the CO concerned himself with operational matters and material matters. The Executive Officer added that the Captain's feeling is that he does not need to be aware of the day to day functioning of the departments. Instead he spends a lot of time walking around the ship. He usually walks around the entire ship everyday.

The Executive Officer felt that the chiefs had a larger role to play on the ship than that which they currently were playing. He wants the chiefs to be the fulcrum point about which everything rotates and that is not the case for many of the chiefs, the chief boiler technician being one key exception. He feels the chief should be more involved in planning the divisional work and in training the division officers. However, overall he thinks that the chiefs are a good group. For the first class, he would like to see them show more initiative; he added that this is a typical comment regarding first class in the fleet. The division officers were considered to be top notch.

The Executive Officer said that he saw his job as that of a manager as opposed to that of a technician. He said he played down technical matters. He delegated as much

as possible, which he considered to be a lot. His goal is to try and not do anything, not because he wants to get out of work, but because he sees this as the way to make subordinates grow. As it turns out, he ends up doing quite a bit, and he felt that delegating would be an ongoing challenge during his tour. He added that he tries to keep and handle on everything that is supposed to be going on in order to see that it does. He said he spent a lot of time following through on what the CO says is important.

The Executive Officer said that athletics were stressed because there are a lot of people on the ship who do not know each other. Athletics brings these people together and contributes to enhancing teamwork and raising morale. The Executive Officer also said that professional growth for junior officers was stressed, noting that in the recent past none of the junior officer's had been selected for department head school and he wanted to change this quickly. In general, the Executive Officer felt that cooperation was high. He said that there was not any interdepartmental cut throat tactics. A lot of this had to do with the fact that the department heads got along well. The Executive Officer said that he was pushing the ESWS program because it was becoming more and more important for professional advancement. It also broadens a man's understanding of the entire ship and this makes him more professional.

Regarding training, the Executive Officer said that it was very important to maximize training in port. If needed, ship's force work had to get lower priority than needed off ship training. Officer training tended to be aimed at "whatever is important at the time," e.g., an upcoming exercise. He would assign an officer who had little knowledge in a subject, e.g., engineering, and have him prepare a training program. The department heads have direct access to the CO but they are expected to and do keep the Executive Officer cut in on what they are telling the CO.

3. Department Heads

The department heads felt that the ship did as well as it did because of the emphasis given to "paying attention to detail," the fact that problems and requirements were brought up and discusses will in advance.

The department heads saw the CO as being very straight forward and one who did not pull any punches. They seemed to admire him for this. They added that he expects everyone to do well and he only monitors their progress. He is very frank with department heads, but "he does not meddle." The department heads met formally with the CO once a week, inport and underway. At this meeting, the department heads bring up problems and give the CO information on what the department heads are doing. These meetings did not last more than an hour. The department heads liked these meetings because everyone got the same information, and because you you learned what the CO was worrying about.

The department heads were impressed by the fact that the CC was out and around the ship a lot. They also liked the fact that there was a great deal of respect for the Captain by the crew, in general, and that there was very little animosity towards the CC. The department heads also appreciated the fact that the CO was a stickler for uniformity and that he went by the book. They added that "not much gets by the Captain." When the Captain is out and about the ship, the department heads thought that he was looking for symptoms of problems, e.g., if he sees one fire station that is not 4.0, he will then check out several more to see if this is a broader problem. The CO's primary technical expertise was seen as engineering, and it was felt that he paid more attention to engineering than the other two departments because of his background.

Asked about the morale of the crew, the department heads agreed that "It was not as good as it ought to be." They thought that this was due to the large amount of time the ship had been in port recently. (The ship was getting near the end of a six month repair availability.) The Wardroom morale was considered "pretty good."

The department heads said that the crew felt that "they were pretty good, especially the technicians." They noted that a lot of the technical personnel get recognized for the achievements by the CO and the other officers on board.

Cooperation was considered to be one of the strongest attributes of the ship, "The cooperation on this ship is the best I have ever seen. The department heads get along very well. As a result, problems tend to get handled at a lower level." Asked why cooperation was so good, the department heads said that they have their people talk to their counterparts in other departments. They also thought that the personalities of the chiefs and officers were conducive to cooperation.

The department heads felt that the wardroom and the chiefs mess got along well. They added that, in general, they would like to see some of the chiefs show more initiative. They mentioned that on one occasion the CO had threatened to close the chiefs' mess because he felt that too many chiefs were spending too much time in the mess and not getting around their spaces. The department heads thought that some of the problems with the chiefs centered around the fact that the chiefs did not have a strong leader in the mess who would make sure that they got out and about. The department heads thought that much of the initiative to get things done on the ship was provided by themselves and the division officers. Again, they would have liked to have seen the chiefs playing more of a role in the initiating of

action. The department heads had a low opinion of the first class, in general. Again, the problem seemed to be that the first class did not show as much initiative as the department heads would like to see. They also do not get around their spaces as much as the department heads think they should. On the other hand, the department heads felt that the E5's on the ship, as a group, were great. They showed a lot of initiative. The department heads also felt that the E5's had benefitted the most from the current CO's emphasis on training.

The department heads described the CO/Executive Officer relationship as "traditional." Material matters were taken directly to the CO, and the Executive Officer ran the ship's administration.

The department heads had a high opinion of the junior officers. They were seen as being very energetic. However, their knowledge level was low and they needed to do more planning ahead. The department heads added that, in general, planning has been and is a problem for the ship. Not enough time and effort is expended on planning. The department heads attributed the lack of adequate planning to the fact that the previous CO was a "crisis generator" and the wardroom learned to become reactive to his demands. Under that CO's leadership, planning was only done on paper. The ship now needed to break the bad habits regarding planning that had developed under the previous CO. They noted that the present CO allowed them to plan and carry out their plans. He did not reshuffle their priorities, "there were very few if any do today deadlines." The present CO was considered "good at accepting the department heads long range plans." They added that he had a great memory, and if one of the department heads planned something and did not carry it out or follow it up, the CO would quickly bring this to his attention, and he would not be pleased.

The department heads felt that "all programs are emphasized on the ship." The programs that got the most attention were PMS and equipment readiness, in general, and training. "The Captain worries about these on a daily basis." Reflecting on priorities, the department heads said that the CO does not put his priorities in writing, however, the top priority are material readiness and crew training. He also hates to see "people shoot themselves in the foot." The department heads felt that everyone knew the CO's priorities. This was one of the reasons that people would work until something was being fixed without having to be told that this was what was expected of them. As far as implementation of programs, the department heads felt that this was left up to them. They added that the Captain's expectation was that "you take a even strain on everything." The department heads said that they willingly presented weak areas and problems to the CO, and when they did they always had a plan of attack for correcting any weaknesses.

The department heads fully supported the CO's philosophy to get rid of poor sailors, those that had recurring disciplinary problems.

In general, the department heads felt that the ship was a top ship that was getting better. Whereas in the past they performed well in a crisis atmosphere, they now performed well but "with a more solid foundation."

4. Division Officers

These officers felt that the CO was the driving force behind the success of the ship although they also had a high opinion of the Executive Officer, fellow junior officers, and the E5's and below. They noted that the Captain stressed individual accountability and doing things by the

book. On the bridge, the Captain expected an officer to be accountable and to take the initiative. He would not intercede when the going got tough on the bridge, as the previous Captain had; rather, he would let the officer of the deck solve any problems that occurred. (It was implied that, if the situation warranted, the CO would step in and involve himself in shiphandling problems, but these officers were appreciative of the fact that he demanded a lot of them on the bridge and then let them perform.)

Regarding doing things by the book, these officers noted that correspondence and associated staffing had to be perfect prior to it being presented to the CO. They stated that this was a times "a pain," but that they had learned a lot because of the Captain's demand for total staffing. They smiled when they reflected upon having to find references of references and how learning to write to the Captain's high standards had not been accomplished without some anguish.

They also stressed cleanliness and personal appearance.

These officers were proud of their ship and its accomplishments. They noted that the ship had a reputation for being among the best in its class and that most of the crew was committed to maintaining this reputation. They noted with pride that the ship was tops at its primary mission area, and they recounted that during a recent deployment the ship had consistently been the best at task group quick reaction exercises. They added that the ship's top performance was attributable to the fact that the CO made it known that expected to win. The junior officer's added that the ship was not used to losing.

These officers noted that underway the CO was a "screamer," but this did not seem to bother the junior officers. "He yells but he does not take things personally. He screams and then will be joking with you in five minutes."

These officers appreciated the fact that the Captain was very much involved in the ship, and they also liked the fact that they were not "micro managed." The Captain impressed upon the officers that he wanted them to also be involved. At all officer meetings the Captain would tell the junior officers that he expected them to get out and about their spaces on a regular basis. The junior officers appreciated the fact that the CO passed on his desires to them at meetings such as these.

The junior officers saw the Executive Officer running the ship in port and running the administration underway. They also noted positively that the Executive Officer "gets his time on the bridge." These officers had a high opinion of the Executive Officer. They saw him as being supportive of the CO, but they also saw him as a buffer, one to turn to after being chewed out by the Captain for making a mistake. The Executive Officer took on the role of providing the "why" behind the Captain's demands. In general, the impression was that the CO decided much of what would be done on this ship, the Executive Officer would fill in the why, and the department heads, junior officers, and enlisted personnel would determine the how.

Reflecting upon the Captain, these officers noted positively the following attributes of the Captain: he is a superb seaman; he tells officers individually when they screw up; he demands high standards across the board; he requires that the ship prepare for every evolution in advance; he is very well liked because he is very visible ("He does not dictate from his cabin."), he takes a personal interest in the crew and the jobs they are doing, and he never talks down to the crew. The junior officers also were impressed that their Captain was a steamer, and they mentioned with appreciation the fact that the CO had recently taken some junior officers to the race track with him.

In general, these officers thought that the ship had a fine wardroom, one in which everyone felt free to express his views, and one without cliques. They noted that several of the junior officers did a lot to enhance the positive "we" attitude that existed in the wardroom.

The junior officers felt that the ship was well organized. They noted that the ESWS and PMS programs were especially strong. They supported ESWS because they felt that it made enlisted personnel gain an appreciation of what their shipmates did on board the ship. They felt that the SWO program was not as strong as it should be, but they added that it was getting better. In the past they had been too much concern for putting the best person in a particular job rather than putting junior officers in assignments that would help them gain qualification and expand their expertise. Although they would like to see the SWO program improve, they did not seem displeased with their professional growth. They added that the Executive Officer had stressed the importance of junior officers gaining engineering officer of the watch qualification to enhance their chances of being selected for department head school. This added to their previously high opinion of the Executive Officer.

5. Chief Petty Officer

The chiefs stated right off the bat that they felt that their ship was the best of its class in the entire fleet. They added that the ship had started at ground zero during its previous overhaul (several years before) and that it had gotten consistently better. They were proud of the fact that the ship met all of her requirements. They added that now that they were "sitting on top," it was a continuous struggle to remain there.

They thought that the ship had a good crew, one which is for the ship. They also liked the way that the officers fit requirements for the ship in a big picture that helped everyone appreciate why things had to be done.

The chiefs stated that there was good command support for whatever had to get done, for example, when need be items will be open purchased. They were also proud of the fact that the ship had two sand blasters and a flame spray unit. Although not supply chiefs, these chiefs had a very high opinion of the ship's supply department. They also added that the cooperation demonstrated by Supply to other departments could be found at all levels of the ship. In fact, the chiefs thought that the cooperation in the ship was "great." They believed that the "great cooperation" was due in part to the fact that the chiefs talked a lot and so did the officers.

Although the chiefs did not think that morale was especially high at the time of the interview - they felt that the SRA they were in was the reason for morale being down. They did think that the crew was "gung ho."

The chiefs were impressed by the officer-chief relationship that existed. "The chiefs and officers are together" is the way they summed up the relationship. They noted that it was easy to talk to most of the officers.

When asked what the CO stressed, the chiefs quickly responded that "He stresses the mission of the ship." The CO was seen as tying things together for the crew. "He gets on the 1MC and says we accomplished such and such mission and what division made it happen." In addition to appreciating the CO's communicating to the crew, the chiefs noted with support that the CO "looks at everything." They also liked the fact that the CO was very visible and involved with the ship.

The chiefs said that all of the ship's programs were working. They said that the CO fully supports ESWS, PQS, off ship training, PMS, and the ombudsman programs. PMS and PQS were considered to be especially effective programs. One chief added that this was the first ship he had served in where "you can actually do PMS, because the Captain lets people take gear down when underway to do PMS."

The chiefs were proud of the fact that the ship, in general, expected a lot of its petty officers. They felt that the two day command leadership program contributed a lot to the successes of the petty officers.

The chiefs liked the fact that the Captain "tells you on the spot if you did good or bad." Although the CO will let you know when you do something wrong, the chiefs were glad that he had a short memory.

The chiefs said that their ship was the cleanest one in their homeport. They were proud of this. They saw the Executive Officer as the one pushing cleanliness in the ship. They supported him in this endeavor. They added that the ship runs hot and cold on personal appearance. (Personal appearance did not seem to get the emphasis that cleanliness did.)

The chiefs stated that a lot of planning was done in their ship and this contributed a lot to how well the ship performed. They added that the planning was done because everyone was aware of what is happening.

The chiefs saw themselves as the continuity factor in the ship. They said that when captains had changed there had not been any big changes and that there never had been any drastic changes when officers changed.

The chiefs felt that discipline on the ship was good. They said that a man gets strike one, but he is out with strike two. Drug use was considered to be almost nil.

The firerooms on this ship were the personification of excellence. They looked more like electronic spaces rather than main machinery spaces. They were clean beyond compare and they had a reputation for outstanding results during OPPEs. The chief in charge of the firerooms, one of the chiefs we interviewed, was considered to be the driving force behind the achievement of excellence in these spaces. He gave us a personal tour of his spaces. His pride was in check but it was obvious. Asked how he was able to achieve such superior results, the chief stated that to begin with one had to love what he did, and he loved being in charge of the firerooms. Asked where he came by such high standards, the chief said that when he was a second class petty officer he worked for a captain who demanded such standards. He learned then that "there are no two ways about it" you can get high standards if you are prepared to demand them and commit yourself to obtaining them. The chief said that he then learned that achieving such standards was not that difficult provided one committed himself and was able to gain the commitment of his men. He added that he also did a lot of planning and monitoring his plans executions. As for equipment repair, the chief said that he had his junior men do the repairs, but he was always sitting behind them watching their progress. The chief was proud of the fact that he now had a lot of VIPs visit his spaces. He felt that his men appreciated the visibility they received. To keep the spaces at the high level they were at the chief said that he worked his people from 0800 until 1400 and then he spent one and a half hours each day cleaning the space before securing. The chief added that he had never had to extend working hours for his men in preparation for the three OPPEs that he had had since being in this ship. He laughed at the idea of getting people from other divisions or departments to help him get ready for such an inspection.

He added that he was serving as a model for the engineer rooms and that they were making progress. The chief added that he recognizes accomplishments of his men whenever they do well and this results in a lot of recognition. Keeping people involved is also very important. He said that he hated to have to go back and redo something. His men do it right the first time.

6. E5 and E6 Petty Officers

These petty officers were proud of their ship and they felt that it was the best ship in the group. They felt that the ship did as well as it did because of the high emphasis given to training. They said that the Captain pushes training and that their ship conducts more and better training than other ships they had served in or knew about. They added that the CO demands that all requirements on the ship be followed rigidly.

The morale of the ship was considered good. A lot of this was attributed to the ship's good welfare and recreation program. They added, however, that morale varies a lot from division to division.

These sailors were impressed by the fact that the officers and chiefs in the ship presented a uniform front. In general, they had a high opinion of the chiefs mess and the wardroom. They were impressed by the fact that "the officers get together a lot in the wardroom." They also felt that the relationship between the officers and the enlisted personnel was very good. They cited as an example the softball games between the wardroom and the crew. "Sports brings the ship together." They added that sailors felt comfortable talking to officers, in general.

The CO's priorities were seen as readiness, preservation, and training.

The indoctrination division on the ship was considered good.

These petty officers had a high opinion of the Executive Officer also. They liked that he got around a lot and that he was "very reasonable" and easy to approach.

The petty officers felt that grooming standards were stressed on the ship but not as much so as some of the other ships of their class. They felt that the ship was clean, but maybe not the cleanest in their group.

The communications on the ship were considered very good. The POD was used effectively to keep people informed ("Sometimes it is five pages long.") and the Executive Officer gets on the 1 MC a lot and lets everyone know what is going on. As a result of the good communications, these petty officers felt that rumors were down on the ship. There were a couple of complaints about some of the division officers not putting out all the word from officers call, but this seemed to be very much the exception. The ship's suggestion box program was considered effective. All suggestions are given written comments, frequently from the CO personally.

It was felt that the CO was very concerned with the quality of life of the crew. They felt that he sincerely wanted everyone to be comfortable and happy. This attitude has had a positive impact on the crew's morale. They also liked the fact that the CO would "shoot the breeze" with the crew when he was walking around the ship.

Cooperation in the ship was considered excellent. The close nit chiefs mess had a lot to do with this. In general, the ship was seen as "a tight group." One petty officer mentioned that he had a friend over from another ship and the friend told him after the visit, "I never saw a ship where the sailors got along so well."

These petty officers appreciated the fact that there was a lot of recognition for good performance, "We get more recognition than on other ships." They added that someone from each department seems to get mentioned when people are being recognized for a job well done.

Discussing what the ship was good at, it was stated that the ship is the best missile shooter, someone else noted that the ship always gets underway on time. They also had a very high opinion of the ship's damage control program.

Concerning discipline, these petty officers noted that the ship has some "bad guys" but they get weeded out quickly.

Crisis management was considered to be prevalent, but these petty officers felt that this was the nature of sea duty and not the ship's fault.

7. F4 Petty Officers and Below

These young sailors felt that the ship was above average. They cited as examples of the ship being good: the good appearance of the ship and the low mast rate. They added that "Most of the things we have to do make sense." They also liked the fact that "people can ask questions." Officers are receptive to questions and people take time to explain what is being done and why.

Morale was considered pretty good. Athletics were seen as helping morale to improve. There were some negative comments about how recently the crew as a whole had been punished (liberty call held up) because a couple of divisions had problems. In general, however, cooperation on the ship was considered very good and this had a positive impact on morale. The vent cleaning tiger team was doing a good job and getting a lot of cooperation from all divisions.

It was felt that the Captain stressed the following: professionalism and doing things by the book.

They liked the fact that the CO gets around the ship a lot and that they could talk to him "like a human being." They also felt that they agreed with what the CO stressed. This had not been the case before the CO. The Executive Officer was seen as doing a lot of inspecting. They agreed with Executive Officer when he said, as he often did, that you can't sacrifice cleanliness and security. They were proud that the ship was clean and that the cleanliness of the ship impressed guests when they visited the ship.

When someone does a bad job, they can count on getting chewed out. The CO will personally chew someone out if he does not do a good job. "But the Captain lets you get on with your job." It was felt that the CO recognized good performance but that he did not go overboard. The previous CO was seen as giving too much recognition (when it was not due) and this CO hits a better balance.

There were some negative comments about the IPC's not doing their jobs as well as the junior personnel thought they should.

The training program was considered "really good," especially in damage control. The ship's education program was also very well received.

Alcohol and drug abuse were given a lot of attention. The younger sailors liked the fact that the ship did not tolerate substance abuse.

C. SHIP CHARLIE

1. Commanding Officer

This officer was interviewed two weeks after he had relinquished the command of one of the ships in our group of excellent ships. We had spent a day on board the ship a week before the interview.

This Commanding Officer had very strong views on how one achieves excellence in ships. He stated, however, that before he would provide his views on what a Commanding Officer, officers and crew should do to achieve excellence, he wanted to make perfectly clear his general view that he considered it mandatory that one "decide to use a positive approach" when taking command and not the very common "you can't do" attitude that he saw many Captains using. By this he meant that there were reams of instructions and guidance on what a Commanding Officer could not do. He felt that these were not worth the paper they were printed on. Instead of paying attention to what "the system" said a Commanding Officer could not do, he felt that it was critical that a Commanding Officer concentrate on what he could do to get the job done. He felt that it was his superiors job to tell him what they wanted him and his ship to do, and then it was his job to determine how he would achieve that which they had told him to do. He added that if a Commanding Officer played it safe and worried a lot about what he could not do, he would have an average, safe, uneventful and uninspired command tour. "You can't worry about your career. You must be comfortable with yourself." You can't have both the security of doing it by the book and the energy that comes from doing it the way you feel it should be done. Command of a ship must be seen as an end in itself, and the ship as the Captain's own little world. The Commanding Officer felt that it was important that in

instill in his subordinates a "can do" philosophy in sync with his own and that he give his subordinates the latitude to determine for themselves the "how" for the "what" that the Commanding Officer specified that he wanted. In general, the Commanding Officer thought that he was successful in getting his officers to think positively and to think in terms of how they could accomplish a given task rather than why they could not, however, he was not confident that these officers would be able to retain such a positive mind set when they went to their next command and they had to work for "can't doers." In general the Captain felt that most (95%) men wanted to do well at what they and their organization were doing, however, the system sometimes limited individuals. As the Captain, he felt that it was his job to remove the limitations on individuals and to instill in them the desire to the best at everything they undertook. As an example of this philosophy, the Captain made one edict of policy when he took command. He removed liberty call, feeling that he could trust people to work as long as it took to get the job done. This was done in conjunction with his charging the chiefs to run the day to day operations of the ship. He felt that if the chiefs were supported from above they were best able to determine when people would knock off work. Although the Captain put a lot of emphasis on the role of the chiefs, he did not ignore the division officers and department heads. He charged them to involve themselves in planning and to take care of their men. This latter tasking included such things as training and personal development.

When this officer took command of his ship he sized up the officers and crew and concluded that they were uninspired and not searching for excellence. Rather, because they had been told every day how good they were when in fact they weren't, they had an misperception of themselves - they

thought they were excellent but they were really average. To get the crew's attention and to introduce them to the standards that he wanted (which happened to be a lot higher than those that currently existed) the Commanding Officer demanded a lot from the ship for the first six weeks. He spent most of his time inspecting the ship and pointing out areas that were not up to his standards. During this period, he also refrained from praising the performance of the crew. One additional thing that he did during the first week of his command was to gather the crew together and tell them what he expected of them in the way of performance and commitment. He told them that if they gave him what he asked for the ship would become the best ship in the fleet, adding that this would require a lot of hard work but that it would also be a lot of fun and very rewarding. After he gave this speech, the Commanding Officer told the crew that he only wanted people on board who were committed to his plan, and he told them that if they personally did not feel committed they should walk to the other side of the flight deck and he would send them to another command. Some took him up on this and they were off the ship within a week. (In addition to getting rid of those who said that they did not want to be "on the team" the Commanding Officer got rid of a lot of poor performers during the first week of his command. The Commanding Officer said that he sent 26 personnel home the first week of his command.) He said that he put them on a plane and sent them home. He added that this was not in accordance with "the book," but it fit in to his "can do" philosophy, i.e., his boss had told him that he wanted the ship to be the best, with those marching orders it was up to him to decide how to become the best, and he felt that part of the key to being the best was to get rid of those who did not share in his vision. So, that's what he did. He got rid of those who "were not on the team."

His vision of the crew had them having a sense of ownership in the ship and developing pride. There would always be five percent who would not want to subscribe to this vision, and you might as well get rid of them off the bat.

The Captain felt that it took him six months to turn the ship into the best in the fleet. During this six months he worked himself and his crew very hard, but once they got the ship up to the standards he demanded, keeping the ship on top was not difficult and the Commanding Officer said that he then "worked on the fringes." The ship was more or less in automatic and he concentrated on motivating the crew to continue to strive for excellence. Working with the Executive Officer and the department heads, the Commanding Officer said that he would give them his philosophy on what he wanted done and he would leave it up to them to convert the philosophy into action. "If I said that we wanted to go north on a project and they were heading 355, I'd let them go, however, on the rare occasion that I wanted to go north and they went west, I'd let them know that they weren't giving me what I wanted and we would come to a meeting of the minds."

To keep the crew motivated, the Commanding Officer felt that it was his job to insure that there was some flare about the ship. He saw himself as the "father figure" for the ship, the one person most responsible for setting the tone of the ship. He did this in a number of ways, the key one being to "plan victories for the ship." By this he meant that he would look for competition that the ship could enter into reasonably sure that it would emerge victorious. This could be something as trivial as challenging other ships in the task group to a sailing competition knowing full well that their ship was the only one that had any sail boats, to going after the ship of the year award for ships competing in REFTRA. It also meant doing a lot for the

crew. (The Commanding Officer noted that everything he did was done for the crew, and he thought that it was extremely important that any Commanding Officer believe that "for the crew" was the ultimate criterion to be used when deciding what to do with the ship.)

Two other examples of winning that were, in themselves, not that important, but which fit in totally with the Commanding Officer's leadership philosophy were how the ship participated in the Combined Federal Campaign and how it went about having a ship's party. The Commanding Officer said that his bosses told him that the CFC was important. He agreed with them and concluded what they really wanted from each ship was as much money as possible for this worthy cause. As far as the Commanding Officer was concerned, that was the end of his involvement with forces external to the ship. He now needed to develop and implement a plan that would bring in the maximum amount of money possible. And that is what he did. The ship ended up giving over 400% of its fair share, more than twice the percentage of any other ship in the fleet. Some "can't do" rules had to be ignored to achieve this result, but everything done was ethical in the eyes of the Commanding Officer and the crew. Later he got some comments from above praising his crew's accomplishment, but he also got some advice on doing things in accordance with the regulations. He ignored these comments, but more or less let them slide. They were not in consonance with his "can do" philosophy. He added that this was risky. He could get fired for not doing everything that he was told to do. But, he felt that to be an effective Commanding Officer one had to take some risks and be prepared to be fired or to resign at any moment. You had to do what you felt was right and if the system said that it could not tolerate this, that you had to be prepared to leave. He mentioned that he had twice submitted his resignation over

matters of principle. (Apparently matters somehow resolved themselves.) When the ship decided to have a ship's party, the Commanding Officer reasoned that the crew deserved as much as any of the doctors and lawyers in the area and that they would go first class. They got the best hotel in the area and paid for the works, flowers for the ladies, open bar, etc. When talking to the hotel manager, he mentioned that he wanted shore patrol at the party and that he wanted to insure that sailors under the drinking age did not drink alcoholic beverages. The Commanding Officer sized this guy up as a "can't doer" and he said that he would take care of his concerns. The manager then dropped his demands. The party went great with everyone acting maturely and having a great time. They left the party feeling special, which is what they were.

Being average to this Commanding Officer was anathema. "Being average stinks. Sailors did not join the Navy to be average." You have to rise above the rest. One of the Commanding Officer's primary duties is to insure that the ship does rise above the rest. To stand out from the rest took planning. The Commanding Officer was very aware of the importance of symbolism, and he filled the role of orchestrator of the symbolism for the ship. A lot of this had to do with developing a positive public relations image of the ship. When the ship did well, those external to the ship should hear about it. Why? Because the crew deserved the recognition, and because their families deserved to know that their loved ones were doing something special in an excellent way. Again, this had to be motivated by "for the crew" and not the self-aggrandizement of the Commanding Officer or any other individual. He felt that sailors joined the Navy to be different and to be more than average. They were looking for someone who would lead them to being one a first class team. A Commanding Officer should show

risk and flare because "the young sailors love this." The Commanding Officer felt strongly that it was his job to provide the leadership and the excitement that these sailors wanted. He spent a lot of time and effort developing an atmosphere and a way of behaving that fulfilled the desires of the sailors to stand out from the herd.

Discussing communicating with the crew, the Commanding Officer felt that it was important to talk personally with the crew a lot. He held Captain's call once a week. He believed that the Captain should not philosophize with the crew. Give them in common language what you want and what you are willing to do to get it. Tell them in fundamental language what you are like. He let them know that he was human and that he was competitive. He challenged anyone on the ship to take him on at tennis. (He later added that no one ever beat him, and that this took a lot of physical effort on his behalf.) Another example of his communicating with the crew occurred shortly after he assumed command. His ship was overseas and tied up across the pier from the ship in their squadron that had just won the squadron Battle E. The CO got the crew together on the flight deck. His conversation with them went something like this: "Many of you are lazy and the ship is suffering from your being so. The ship across the pier has just won the Battle E. It would be simple for us to win the E next year. All each of you have to do is get up every morning and do a day's work, maybe six hours. If you are conscientious, we will put the Battle E on our bridge wing next year.

The Commanding Officer stated that it was the role of the chiefs to control the ship's day to day operations. He said that it took some effort and time to convince the officers, especially the department heads, that this is the way a ship should be run and would be the way this ship would be run, but once they came over to his way of thinking

they realized how right he was. They finally had the time to worry about those things they always wanted to but never had the time to, e.g., training and planning. The chiefs responded very positively to the additional responsibility demanded of them. They also came to love the Commanding Officer for allowing them to do what they felt it was their responsibility to do and for insuring that this was the way the ship was run. The Captain thought that his chiefs were top notch. Asked why this was the case, he said that most of it was the luck of the draw, but he added that he had recruited a couple of chiefs and they in turn had convinced some of their friends to get orders to the ship. This had not been done a lot, but those chiefs that did come this way were especially effective and had a very positive impact on the chiefs mess in general. The Captain added that he did fire one chief. He was removed from the ship not for lack of ability, but because he was lazy and would not get on the team. (Late in the Commanding Officer's tour he was made an honorary chief by the chief's mess. The Commanding Officer was very proud of this. He said he received this honor not because he was buddy buddy with the chiefs, he was not, but because he had convinced the officers and crew that the chiefs run the ship. This more than anything else gained the Captain the respect and commitment of the chiefs.)

The Commanding Officer said that the junior officer's job was to be trained by the chiefs and the ship's senior officers. The department heads were charged with putting the Commanding Officer's philosophy into action.

The Captain commented that being the Executive Officer for him was a difficult job. He would just give the Executive Officer broad guidance relating to the Captain's philosophy and then expect the Executive Officer to make things happen. The Captain added "I do not like to get into the execution business." He was proud of the fact that he

did not have a single file. He also mentioned that the Executive Officer would let the CO know when one of his ideas ran counter to written guidance. The CO would often acknowledge this and then go his own way, but he felt that it was beneficial to have the Executive Officer providing him with this type of information.

The command master chief was very important to the Captain. They met daily. The master chief was the clear cut representative of the crew to the Captain. He kept his ear to the deck and provided the Captain with a lot of useful information regarding the attitude of the crew. They had a very good rapport and the Captain appreciated more than anything that the master chief was honest with him.

Asked about how standards fit into his command philosophy, the Commanding Officer said that cleanliness was the key. "All else revolves around this." He noted that when he took over the ship it was not clean, and he told the crew that they might think that they are good but that it was impossible, in his mind, to be good even if you are dressed in a tuxedo when you are standing in a pig sty with muck up to your ankles, and this is the way he saw the ship. To get the ship clean to the Commanding Officer's standards, he made this a priority item at the time he took command. He divided the ship into 80 zones and he personally inspected two zones twice a week every week come hell or high water. This was how he would get his standards across to the crew. He would personally show them where they did not measure up. He also noted that the fanrooms on the ship were in a poor state of repair. To get them up, the Commanding Officer personally involved himself with one of the poorer fanrooms. Working with a small group of sailors, he had the fan room completely refurbished in strict accordance with the technical guidance on how a fan room should be. Once this was done the fan room looked great,

and the Commanding Officer sent a memo (one of his few pieces of written correspondence) to each of the officers and chiefs. It went something like this. There was a major reclamation project taking place in the county of (name of the ship) and the model property (the fanroom) had just been completed and was open for inspection by everyone. It was anticipated that within the next couple of months all of the units in the county would be of the same high calibre as the model. With this model (they could see what was expected of them. Questions did not have to be asked and answered.) the ship's fanrooms made a remarkable improvement within six months. The Commanding Officer felt that they were the best fanrooms in the fleet. The Captain added that he spends a large portion of his day walking around the ship talking to the crew. He does this to show his interest and to see what is going on. If he comes across a space that is not up to his standards, he does not tell the junior enlisted man in the space what to do to make things right, rather he goes back and mentions the problem to the Executive Officer or cognizant department head and has them determine why the unsatisfactory condition came to exist. After the cause of the problem has been identified, he expects the problem to be rectified and to not reoccur because the cause was identified and corrected.

The Captain felt that it was very important that the crew truly believed that he would give his all for them, just as he was asking them to give a lot for him. He said that he went out of his way to communicate this with the crew in plain, simple language and to back his words up with actions. As an example, he mentioned that two of his sailors had been stopped by base security for taking a couple of pallets. When this was brought to the CO's attention, he decided to give the guys a break and let their transgression slide. His reasoning was that these were good

sailors, and that with this break they would see that the Captain was doing as he said he would, supporting those who supported him. He said that he also knew that the word would get around the ship that the Captain had given some deserving guys a break and this would motivate others to perform so as to be "on the team." Stressing the idea of being on the team, the Captain said that it was common knowledge on the ship that he kept a bottom 5% listing of those sailors who by their action had indicated that they were not part of the team. These people knew that one of two things would happen in the near future: If they acted as if they wanted to be members of the team, they would stay and grow; if they did not change their ways, they would be gone.

The Captain said that one of his pet peeves was lighting. "I would go berserk if I saw a light that was not working." He felt that it was important that all lights be operational and bright. This was important because you could not clean dirt if you could not see it. He went as far as to make it policy that whenever one light went out in a group of lights, all of the lights in the group were to be replaced because they would soon go and this was more efficient.

In keeping with the importance the Captain attached to his ship having flare, he also thought it important that the CC have and demonstrate a high energy level. The CC had to crawl around on his hands and knees looking for and pointing out areas that did not meet his standards.

The Captain was proud of the high state of discipline on the ship. He added that good discipline was achieved while having the lowest mast rate in the fleet. He attributed the combination of good discipline and few masts to, in large measure, to two things: He required that for every man reprimanded there be at least ten commended (this

was not a hard and fast rule that was quantitatively measured and monitored, rather, it was a philosophy the Captain espoused and the leadership of the ship adopted) and the fact that he televised all masts and played them on SITE television during the noon hour. The men knew who the system worked and they knew that those who deserved punishment would receive it.

Training was very important to a ship. When he took command, the ship did not have effective training. He then made his second, and last, edict. He demanded that training be conducted for the first hour of every Tuesday and Thursday. He said that if he heard a chipping hammer during either of these training periods, he would go berserk. As he was walking around the ship daily, he would ask crew members about their training. Originally he got feedback from the crew that the training was not good. The Captain then went to the Executive Officer and told him that his training program wasn't hacking it. The Executive Officer squared away the program and it was very good from then on. The CO pushed off ship training. "The off ship training schedule was one of the few pieces of paper that I paid attention to." Again, when he walked around the ship, he would ask the sailors what training they had scheduled in the future. He was looking to see that there was some direction and perceived personal growth. It was the department heads and division officer's responsibility to insure that such direction existed.

The Captain said that he did nothing special to prepare for inspections and tasking. "Frankly, I did not worry about much. I was just concerned that we would do our best." However, the Captain was very proud of the ships accomplishments.

The Captain placed a lot of emphasis on indoctrinating new personnel. He met every new man personally, and

after shaking hands and giving them a ship's ball cap as he welcomed them to the team, he would tell them: you know right from wrong, never do anything that is ethically wrong; no one owes you anything, take care of yourself first; looking in the mirror in the morning, the only guy that counts is looking back at you; and then he would ask, "When is the last time you wrote home?" He would then tell them that if they did not write to their parents, they would be doing so in his presence. He told them to give their folks good news, adding that they deserved this for what they had done for the man.

2. Executive Officer

The Executive Officer believes that the strong chief's mess is one of the primary reasons the ship has such an excellent reputation. He said the chiefs are as solid a group as you could find on the waterfront. The fact that the captain liked and supported the chiefs was one important reason the Executive Officer believed they were such a good group. The captain courted the chiefs, inviting each newly reported chief to his stateroom for lunch. He gave them his full support. At captain's mast, he would solicit and generally award the punishments recommended by the accused's division chief.

The captain was also very supportive of the command master chief and often implemented the master chief's suggestions. He made a point of recognizing and talking to those crewmen whom the master chief thought were worthy of special recognition. The master chief attends all CO/Executive Officer/departments head meetings and his suggestions are considered whenever that group makes decisions.

The captain's support of chiefs boosted their power, encouraged stronger officer/CPO rapport, and above all won him their respect and admiration. They liked him so much that they gave him a special farewell gift just prior to the recent change of command.

The Executive Officer mentioned the following other characteristics of the ship:

1. Flexibility in following rules, regulations, and standard Navy policies. "Nothing is written in stone. If the rule is to do something a certain way and that doesn't suit us then we do it another way."

2. A standard of winning. "Only one standard is emphasized and that's winning. We strive to do well at whatever we do."

3. Emphasis on key programs. "We push the programs we can get the most mileage from such as Petty Officer Leadership Training, I division, Enlisted Surface Warfare Qualifications, higher education programs, and public affairs."

4. Communication with the crew. "The word gets out. The CO and other officers make a point of asking questions of the crew to find out if they are getting the word."

5. A competitive atmosphere. "The crew is not bullied or pushed into doing things. The captain did things to foster competitiveness but in such a way that nobody ever came out a loser."

6. Consistently firm and fair discipline. "We flush out our bad people but work hard to salvage the ones that have potential. NJP cases are televised on closed circuit TV. The crew is not required to watch these, but most of the men do. Televising NJP has had a very positive impact."

3. Department Heads

Department heads were clearly highly motivated and enthusiastic about their ship. They attributed most of the ship's success to the captain. The following are some of the reasons they believe he is such a good CO:

1. He is very personable and people oriented. He tours the ship every day and frequently stops to talk to the crew. He requires every enlisted man to have his name properly stenciled on his shirt so he can learn their names.

2. He is very knowledgeable of the ship and all aspects of his position as commanding officer.

3. He is big on public relations. He keeps the ship in the eye of the public by getting the local media (such as local newspapers) to publicize information about the ship and its accomplishments.

4. He keeps the crew well informed via the IMC and the POD. He encourages officers to ask crewmen questions to find out if they have read the POD.

5. He keeps one step ahead of everybody else. "Once, while the ship was underway, he anticipated that the commodore would order the ships in the formation to go to general quarters and report when ready to fire guns. Our ship was already at general quarters and prepared to fire well before any of the other ships."

6. He seems to know exactly what to say and when to say it.

7. He encourages teamwork. When he first came to the ship he called the crew together and asked those men who did not want to be a part of his team to identify themselves. Those that said they didn't want to be a part of the team were transferred off the ship.

The department heads also mentioned the following other strengths of the ship:

1. A strong chief's mess. "The chiefs run their divisions. They stay out in their spaces to supervise their men's work."

2. The officers and chiefs work well together. "We're locked in synch."

3. Good communication and cooperation among department heads.

4. Far more recognition for good performance than rebuke for poor performance. "For every thirty positive strokes there is only one negative."

5. A standard of maintaining constant readiness for inspections and other evolutions. "We get ready every day."

6. Maintenance of all shipboard programs. "Enlisted Surface Warfare Qualifications, PQS, and zone inspections receive special emphasis."

7. A policy of not having an established time for liberty call. "The crew seems to like this policy. They know they'll get off the ship when their work is done."

4. E5 and E6 Petty Officers

The comments of the E5 and E6 petty officers reinforced those of the other groups that were interviewed. In the opinion of these petty officers, the crew has high morale and crewmen really care about what they are doing. The following is a list of reasons they believe their ship is a top performer:

1. Chief petty officers run the ship. They carry more of the load because the captain has charged them with greater responsibility. "On here the chiefs have control. The officers stand back. And a lot of the junior officers have a learner's attitude."

2. The captain stresses teamwork and the goal of being the best. He visits working spaces frequently. His

thorough zone inspections have improved the materiel condition of the ship.

3. The command shows confidence in the skill and ability of the petty officers. Petty officers sense they a good deal of responsibility.

4. The crew is kept well informed via the PCD, morning quarters, and announcements by the captain over the 1MC. Dependents are kept well informed through the ship's cmbudsmen program.

5. High standards are maintained in cleanliness and food preparation. "Our food is better on here." "People remarked about the cleanliness of the ship even during the restricted availability."

6. Good performance of duty is recognized with verbal praise, especially from the captain.

7. Discipline is fair and the entire crew knows the results of captain's mast. "Because of the televised NJP, we all know exactly where the CO stands on disciplinary matters."

8. The command has a policy of not setting time for liberty call. "Because of this policy, we work more quickly and efficiently. This encourages us to do our work right the first time."

9. The public affairs program receives a great deal of attention. "We like the PAC effort."

10. The command has a good sponsor program and an effective "I" division for newly reported personnel.

11. Junior personnel are constantly being trained by those senior to them.

5. E4 Petty Officers and Below

The E1 to E4 personnel were just as enthusiastic as the other groups interviewed, if not more so. They are all

aware of the ship's fine reputation, which they obviously believe is well deserved. They take pride in the crew's high morale and the teamwork that pervades the command. One sailor said the ship is like a big family. Another said teamwork is fostered from the time a new man checks aboard the ship. This is because of the effort the new man's shipmates make to help him out. "The attitude at all levels is to help people."

The men claim they are given responsibility and allowed to take initiative in their work although they didn't know why they seem to get more responsibility than their peers on other ships. They each sense they are an important part of the ship as a whole.

The men shared the following additional characteristics of the ship:

1. There is high quality leadership from the captain on down. They greatly admire their captain. One sailor said he believes the captain is primarily concerned for the welfare of the crew. Another sailor made the observation that officers and chiefs have good working relationships and they really seem to want to help individual crewmen. Another said "We've learned a lot about leadership by example." (ie. of those in higher leadership positions.)

2. Dissemination of information to the crew is considered very good. "We know when something is happening and why. For example, we were notified of an upcoming personnel inspection a month before it took place."

3. Favorable comments were expressed about activities the command has sponsored for the crew such as the tiger cruise and a dinner dance. The men appreciate the fact that time is allocated for the entire crew to participate in athletics. They feel the Human Resource Council has been a vehicle through which numerous improvements to the ship have come about. top

D. SHIP DELTA

1. Commanding Officer

The Captain felt that he had an excellent ship. He stated that the ship had a deserved good reputation when he assumed command. Operationally it had done fantastic. However, he quickly realized that the administration of the ship was not up to his standards. He felt that the reason the ship had done so well operationally inspite of having poor administrative programs was that the ship had a good reputation and was, therefore, more or less left alone. He noted that the ship was in MINT (Minimum Inspection Program), and this allowed the ship to let the admin slide. The Captain mused that it was interesting to note that this was a top notch ship inspite of having poor admin programs. He wondered allowed "What does this tell you about the importance that is attached to admin programs?"

As much as the Captain might have liked to have kept the ship on its previous course to success, he realized that he would have to make some changes, especially in the administration areas. The changes had to be made because the ship was in overhaul when he took command (??) and when it came out it would be put back into the full blown administration cycle and would be subjected to all of the Navy inspections the come following and overhaul. The Captain proudly noted that the ship had been out of overhaul for about half a year and during this time the ship had done well on all of the inspections that it had had. Although the ship had not had much operational tasking since leaving the shipyard, the Captain felt that the operational performance of the ship was excellent to date and would continue to improve.

Asked why the ship performed so well, the Captain said that it was due primarily to "intense command interest" on his behalf. He noted that he had previously served as a chief staff officer on a tactical destroyer squadron in the Atlantic Fleet, and during this tour he had become convinced that "the Captain makes the ship." He said that during his destroyer squadron tour he had closely observed eight commanding officers and their ships, and there was a perfect correlation between the performance of the ships and the

The Captain insured that he was very involved with his ship. He got around the ship a lot and he had officers constantly briefing and advising him on what was going on in their areas of responsibility. He added that he personally spent a lot of time reading professional material and keeping himself abreast of what was going on. He saw himself as the ship's long range planner and priority setter.

Later the Captain said, "The more I am here, the more I become convinced that it is the people that make things role."

In dealing with subordinates, the Captain felt that subordinates should be given almost total latitude to do what they want until they get into trouble. Once it became apparent that they were heading for trouble, the Captain would step in and put them on course. He would then leave them on their own again.

The Captain felt that it was very important to communicate with the crew what he expected of them and of the ship as a whole. In addition to verbally telling the officers and men what his command his command goals in writing. He noted that he got the idea for specifying and promulgating his command goals in writing when he was in the IMET FCO course enroute to this command. He saw another FCO

doing this and he concluded that it made a lot of sense, even though he had not seen this previously done. (During our later interviews with a cross section of the wardroom and the crew, we asked them if they were familiar with the Captain's command goals. We found that they were, and that they were able to give accurate specifics of what the goals were. We also noticed that although these personnel were familiar with the goals and more or less subscribed to them, they did not place a large emphasis on the importance of the existence of these goals to the overall success of the ship. Our hunch is that they are more important than many of the crew members realized.)

In communicating with the crew, the Captain said that he continually stressed the bottom line: "the ship's mission and why we are here."

This Captain put a very high priority on his communicating with the crew. He said that he preferred face to face communications and spent a lot of time walking around the ship talking with crew members. He also held a more formal Captain's Call every three months. After the Captain's Calls he always published the questions asked and the answers given so those who were not there would get this information. He did not use SITE TV to communicate with the crew. He found it too impersonal.

The Captain also discussed the subject of leadership with the officers and chiefs. He felt that these discussions had an impact on the khaki. Some officers and chiefs followed his lead in leadership style, and some did not, but he felt that he had had a positive impact of those on the fence. In addition to discussing leadership, the Captain put a lot of importance on personally setting the correct leadership style.

The Captain felt that he had a great chiefs mess, "the finest one I have seen." He added that it was not

great because of what he had done, it had just sort of happened. For the past year each of the new chiefs seemed to be better than the ones they were replacing. He especially liked and appreciated the enthusiasm displayed by the chiefs. During the first six months of his command he had told the chiefs frequently that which he did not like, but when he met with the chiefs now, it was just to pat them on the back and to tell them to keep up the good work.

High standards were one of the keys to the success of the ship according to the Captain. He instituted a new zone inspection program early in his tour, and it has paid great dividends. He came up with the idea of dividing the ship into 27 zones (one per work center) having seen a very successful commanding officer do this on another ship earlier in the Captain's career. He personally inspects four of these zones every week. He concentrates on material condition, cleanliness, safety, and damage control. Although this takes a lot of time and work, he thinks that the results are worth the effort. Accountability is stressed in the zone inspection program. When he arrives in a space he expects the person presenting the space to be standing there with the Zone Inspection Deficiency List (ZIDL) in his hand and that this man has a complete status on every discrepancy. The Captain keeps a big black binder with all of the ZIDLs on his desk and the department heads and division officers come in regularly to update this book.

FMS was also closely monitored by the Captain. He received a weekly report from each work center listing what will be accomplished for the week and what was not accomplished for the past week. The department heads personally brought this report to the CO and briefed him on it. When he initiated this requirement, the department heads would not know the reasons for maintenance actions that had not been completed. But they quickly realized that this was

part of their job in the eyes of the Captain, and they got involved with their departmental PMS programs. Now, personnel will work overtime to accomplish PMS. They do this on their own. The bottom line is that the department heads are now maintenance and material managers.

The Captain saw himself as the long range (more than six months) planner for the ship. The Executive Officer ran the planning board for training, and working with the Ops Officer they handled the short and intermediate range planning. The CO personally starts planning for major inspections and evolutions six months in advance. He also causes his subordinates to start planning six months in advance of an important event. He required the cognizant department heads to do the research associated with an upcoming event, to develop a plan of action, and to brief the Captain on their proposed plan. Once the plan was agreed upon, the department heads briefed the Captain frequently on the progress of the implementation of the plan. The Captain also watched the priorities that his personnel were attaching to various undertakings. He did this in an informal way, mainly by asking questions during discussions with department heads and division officers. He added that watching priorities was important because "you cannot do everything, and it is important to make conscious decisions regarding what things will not be done."

Asked for his views on motivating people, the Captain said "You have to convince people to think that this is the greatest ship in the world." He added that we only have 300 people to do a job that probably requires 500, and you have to come up with a way of getting maximum effort out of people. He told his personnel a lot that they were good, and he let them know that if you are good you can raise hell with the system. He then proudly noted that he did raise hell with the system a lot.

The Captain said that retention was high on his commodore's priority list and on his own. However, he would not ship over poor performers just for the sake of improved retention. He added that he got a lot of bad sailors from other units.

In dealing with the Commodore, the Captain went out of his way to keep him fully advised as to what was happening with the ship. He added, "If I need help, I ask for it." He felt that the Commodore was confident that he knew what was going on on the ship, and as a result, para he did not have to worry about the ship. The Captain said that he personally calls the Chief Staff Officer a couple of times a week to bring him up to speed. The department heads were also required to keep their staff counterparts fully informed. The Captain would regularly ask, "Did you talk with your staff counterpart?"

To get off on the right foot with the staff, the Captain had invited the staff to lunch when he first took command. He noted that they were very appreciative. In general, the Captain had a high opinion of the staff personnel.

The Captain was proud of the fact that his personnel "scramble to fix anything that goes down." What he was most proud of was the fact that this occurred without his involvement. Technical assistance would be requested when needed, but it was viewed as a last resort. He felt that the ship's motto "Nobody does it better" summed up the ship's opinion of itself.

The morale on this ship was considered to be very good by the Captain, although he was not so sure this was true of the officers. He noted that he pushed the officers pretty hard. He said that he tried to keep people motivated by letting them know that what they did was important. When underway, he would use the IMC a lot. He would tell people

what they were doing and when they were doing good. He found that the longer he was in command the more he used the 1 MC to keep the sailors in the picture. Although habitability was considered good on this new ship, the Captain felt that it had almost nothing to do with the ship's high morale. To let his men know how good their ship was he would try to send a lot of them to visit other ships so that "they could see how good they have it here."

Asked about his relations with his Executive Officer, the Captain said that they did not sit down and discuss who would do what. Their roles just evolved. The Executive Officer concentrates on administration and cleanliness, especially in the messing and berthing areas. The Captain said he attempted to let the Executive Officer know that he was second in command and to stress developing the Executive Officer for command at sea. The CO noted that his and the Executive Officer's leadership styles were initially quite different. The CO saw the Executive Officer as being more abrasive than himself. However, he had noticed a change in leadership style over time. The CO said he tried to set an example that the Executive Officer would want to emulate somewhat, although he realized that they would always have different styles of dealing with people.

The CO thought that he had a good wardroom but not one that blessed with more than fleet average ability. He thought that the close relationship that he had with the Executive Officer and the department heads was well above fleet average and that this had a lot to do with how effective they were as a group. The Captain said that he was constantly driving his personnel to push things down the chain of command.

In dealing with officers and enlisted personnel, the Captain said that he attempted to stress humanity and integrity. He wanted to be seen as being approachable, and he felt that he was.

2. Executive Officer

The Executive Officer attributed the success of the ship to the overall involvement of the entire chain of command in all aspects of the ship's life. The CO was the key to this involvement, setting the example for all others to follow. The CO was not the type to sit back and wait for problems and information to come to him. The Executive Officer and the department heads kept things moving on the ship, and this gave the CO time to look and plan ahead for the ship.

Describing the CO, the Executive Officer said that he was very active, arriving early to work each morning (0650), doing a lot of reading about material relating to the ship's operations and management, and stay very active when underway. The high involvement of the CO was perceived positively by the officers and enlisted personnel. It was not felt that he was too involved or that he was micromanaging the ship. He involved himself in such a way that those he worked with liked to seek out the Captain with their ideas and problems. The CO required that officers keep him up to speed in what is happening on the ship. He does this by having officers brief him very frequently. During these briefings, the Captain asks reasonable questions. He does not give directions. He sticks to asking questions and making suggestions. The Executive Officer said the people knew what to expect from the CO. Furthermore, he does not raise his voice often, and when he does, you know he is mad. The CO praises in public and censures in private. (I mentioned this to the CO later, and I could feel that this comment made him feel good. He

mentioned that it was hard to do this.) He gives detailed feedback to officers when they need to improve their performance, e.g., after a recent unprofessional sea detail, the CC had the officer in charge of the evolution come to his stateroom, and the CO went over in detail what went wrong in an attempt to prevent a recurrence of such poor performance. The Executive Officer stated that during evolutions, he, the Executive Officer, would take notes when mistakes were being made and then he would discuss these with the CO. When the CO considered the performance to warrant discussion with the personnel involved, he would bring them to his stateroom and go over the mistakes in a professional manner.

Asked about how the Executive Officer and CO divided their efforts on the ship, the Executive Officer stated that he tends to watch things inside the ship, e.g., administration, and the CO watches things that deal with outside activities. The Executive Officer added that when he first took over as Executive Officer (the CO had been onboard for a couple of months prior to the Executive Officer arriving), he found it difficult to get used to the fact that there would be a division of labor. He did not make this observation in a critical manner, but as a comment on how he felt. The Executive Officer's only operational involvement was as the ship's navigator. (The ship had been out of the shipyard for about six months at the time of this interview, and had not participated in any significant deployments.) During the recent overhaul, the CO had handled all material matters and the Executive Officer had concentrated on administration. The Executive Officer also takes care of monitoring all crew services, e.g., messing and berthing.

The Executive Officer thought that communications on the ship were good generally. There was a crew's suggestion box to augment the chain of command. There were about two

suggestions a week, on average. Each of these were answered in the plan of the day by the Executive Officer. This was a requirement of the CC. When a question is asked that is in the pervue of the chain of ccommand, it is forced back on to the chain of command. The Supply Officer also answers or comments on all meal evalutations. When a crew member came up with a suggestion upon which he could have an impact, he was told that he had to do his part to make it happen.

The Executive Officer felt that morale was pretty good for the crew and very good for the wardroom. He said that he asked every man who left the ship (transferred or separated) how he thught the ship was doing and what could be done to make the ship better, and he usually got positive comments from these personnel about their perception of the ship. Contributing to the good morale in the wardroom and with the crew was the fact that there were no longer roudy officers and enlisted personnel. Under this Captain, such behavior is not acceptable, and it no longer exists. The Executive Officer also felt that officer morale was high because the officers were not affraid to tell the CO what they thught knowing they would not be jumped on. The Executive Officer added that the wardroom "really respects and admires the CO." and that the CO was the best one he had ever worked for. He remembered that when the Captain was being nominated for a prestigous leadership award, it was up to the Executive Officer and to the department heads to provide comments on why the Captain should be selected (all this occurred unbeknownst to the CO). He said that this was one of the easier tasks that he had ever had to undertake. He and the department heads could write reams on what a great leader the CO was.

3. Junior Officers

-- New officers do not have the "I am an officer and I do not want to hear" attitude.

- DH's come and go

- Have had exceptional CO's

- CO laid back. Not afraid to mingle

-- Talks to you

-- Not afraid to listen to ideas

- See some officers developing CO's ways

- We have to hold up a reputation

- Keep the best on the job all the time

- Ship is a steamer

- CO willing to get rid of bad people

- Always helping good people who want to reenlist

- Good ESWS. Mandatory unofficially.

- PMS is big. Can't be stressed enough.

-- DO's hold a lot of spot checks.

- Down gear is first before liberty

- Not a lot of crisis management

- GTMC just blasted though. Did great.

- Clean because of CC's standards

-- Zone inspections

- Grooming pretty lax

- Drugs way down

- No one felt that they had ever been on a better ship

4. Chief Petty Officers

- Chain of command gets in the way
- Strong chiefs make a strong ship
- Good CC
- Chiefs work together, but will stand up to the others when required top - One of the strongest chiefs mess (self-image)
- Unity
- Great skipper
 - Honesty
 - Will chew you out when required
 - Recognition
- CO backs chiefs
- Not afraid to CASREPT
- During CSRR captain said let me know if there are bad inspectors and he'll get things changed.
- CO knows what is going on.
 - Constantly making rounds.
- ESWS run by senior chief
- Tight on damage control PQS
- ESWS gets people around the ship
 - Stressed mainly for E6 and above
- Morale pretty good

- Ship has always had a good attitude
- CO feels he's a part of everything.
- CO uses 1MC a lot
- Top operating ship, none better.
- A lot of pride
- Can fix other ships (aware of their successes; accent the positive)
- Need some tech reps and not scared to ask for help
 - My sonar system was down. Had to CASREPT to get tech assist.
- Do well at ASW
 - Proud of AUTEC performance (planned success)
- Good cooperation for things like working parties
- People turn to when they know they are serving a purpose. (Vision and purpose communicated to all)
- A lot of seaman talent
- CO not afraid to get rid of doppers. We were topping the Navy on UPGRADE -Can do more with fewer men quality over quantity
- Discipline works well
 - At mast CO goes with recommendations from below
 - Average number of masts
 - Use liberty risk program
 - Little theft and no vandalism
- Cleanliness
 - CO emphasizes

- CO does zone inspections
- Proud of having kept ship clean during overhaul
- Department E's are just "by the way" events
- Don't see the staff much. Have good rapport with them.
- One officer handles training. Centralized. This works well. Good off ship training program appreciated.
- Chiefs try to instill pride in individuals. Job well done will be recognized.
- Put young men in challenging situations
- Proud that GTMO said that ship had a bad attitude

5. E5 and E6 Petty Officers

- Hard working, tough sked, pride, professionals, do work now.
- More emphasis on all programs. CO is the driving force.
- 1/C support CO
- Proud of top performance of ship personnel at fire fighting school
- Jobs done on ability
- All divisions work as a team.
- Everyone trained to do the other's job.
- A lot of cooperation
- Engineers must be able to do a lot of jobs because of unmanned spaces.

- Supply can call for assistance and he gets it
- Cooperate like a family
- Being underway is the common enemy
- Engineering does best when steaming
- People want time off and keep gear up
- Real positive on cooperation. Can rely on each other.
 - Don't know where this attitude comes from
- Great plank owners originally
- Ship on an upward trend (after yard and after winning Battenberg)
- Got some good new people
- Chiefs stay out of junior peoples way
- Chiefs are a good buffer zone
- People treated with dignity and respect
- Chiefs generally good

6. E4 Petty Officers and Below

- Good crew, work well together, good size ship, everyone works well
- People on board have been here for a long time
- Good CC
 - Knows what is going on in the ship
 - Gets around
 - Will get help with problems

- Things come down the chain of command
- Day to day work: do right now.
- Supply and engineering know what they will be doing a day or two ahead.
- Morale
 - Primarily OK
 - Have seen it higher
 - Sked impact
 - People proud. Feel they are the best.
- Cleanliness
 - CO always checks on progress during zone inspections. Must have old ZIDL's and tell CO corrective action plan.
 - Expects outstanding zone inspections. Will not tolerate dust. "If this is your prep for zone inspection, how will you handle the everyday work?"
 - CO emphasizes cleanliness
 - "Can never get too high."
 - Visitors comment on how clean the ship is
- CO will pass down the chain of command if petty officer did not do good cleaning job.
- Drugs: "No way."
 - 5 to 20% estimates
- 1/C and chiefs are the only cliques
- People go on liberty with people from other divisions and departments
- Know what is going on
- Number one priority: equipment

- Change cut of main engine by ship's force. Pride.
- LPC's can usually grant liberty. No problem getting time off. Do not have to run a chit for a problem.
- Four sections is about right.
- PO leadership course was interesting
- Time is the big problem for ESWS.
- Divisions press you to be ready to take the exams.
- Reenlistment benefits
 - Five days basket leave
 - 30 days no duty
 - Reenlist wherever you want
 - People attend reenlistments
- Cook gets a lot of personal satisfaction
- Chow is good overall
- Underway a lot; this makes us better.
- Starts with respect.

E. SHIP ECHO

1. Commanding Officer

This captain stated that he comes from the "KATN" school of leadership tempered with some judgement. He said he runs a disciplined ship, following rules and regulations to the letter. Everyone is required to follow his policies. "It's a military organization and that's the way we run it."

The captain believes high standards must be set in every area, especially combat readiness. "Once you get a ship up to a certain level of excellence, you're job becomes easy. Then the ship runs itself. This takes a lot of hard work at first but not too much time."

The captain believes 99% of his officers and crew are motivated to do their jobs well and they want to be told what the standards are. He said that within a week of taking command he was able to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the ship. Then he made a point of meeting individually with each leadership group (ie. with all officers, CPO's, PO1's, PO2's, PO3's) to tell them what his standards are. For example, if a piece of equipment breaks then he expects the cognizant technicians to stay and work as long as it takes to effect the repairs. He said since he has been in command of the ship he has met with these groups on three different occasions to promulgate his standards.

The captain emphasized the importance of high standards in personal appearance, ship cleanliness, damage control, safety, and FMS. He expects 100% PMS accomplishment. He said he makes a point of telling newly reporting personnel that he expects them to be ready for an inspection at any time.

The CO said that once standards are set, he holds everyone accountable. When problems are discovered they require immediate investigation and action. "Problems tend to get worse. You can't assume they will get better unless you jump on them and solve them." For example, when he finds his standards aren't being met, he holds the responsible chief and division officer accountable. He said "I call 'em up to my stateroom and nail 'em to the bulkhead."

The captain also felt it was important to be "people oriented." "You've got to take care of your people. You

must lead with a degree of compassion. For example, if a guy has a personal problem, I believe in letting him have time off to take care of it."

The captain likes to reward good performance and said CO's must look for ways to do it. How? Since he has been in command, he has given over 35 medals and 150 letters of commendation. He encourages every officer to bring by those men who have done something worthy of recognition for a personal "well done" from the captain. He said he has a relaxed liberty policy and doesn't care how many people are off the ship as long as their work is done. He rewards his deserving officers by giving them strong fitness reports.

The captain believes it is important for him to plan ahead. He looks ahead to upcoming scheduled evolutions such as key inspections or other events that have a big impact on the ship's reputation. He decides what programs and events are important and which are not. "For example take the Combined Federal Campaign or Navy Relief.....What do they have to do with readiness?"

The captain solicits the ideas of his subordinates. When an admiral recently mentioned that the ship's retention was low, the captain held a meeting with his department heads and the master chief petty officer of the command to solicit their ideas to improve retention. Twenty-five ideas were proposed and implemented. As a result retention improved.

With respect to supervision, the captain believes it is important to identify the best leaders and place them in key positions. For example, the captain took a first class petty officer who had done a very fine job of improving the appearance of the after fire room and gave him responsibility for the forward fireroom, promising him a navy commendation medal if he succeeded in bringing up the appearance of that space. The captain also mentioned that he

assigns his best division officers to be DCA or first lieutenant since, these division officer positions require stronger leaders.

The captain believes zone inspections are very important. He said they are a good tool to identify and correct materiel problems. But it is important to follow up on discrepancies that have been identified during zone inspections to make certain they have been corrected.

2. Executive Officer

The executive officer of this ship appreciates the fact that he and the captain have similar management philosophies. Specifically, they both believe in setting high standards and holding people accountable.

The Executive Officer believes it normally takes about a six month period to "turn a ship around" (ie. bring up the standards). He sees this as a very difficult time for the ship because the crew's behaviour is being changed. He claims it only took four months for this to be accomplished on this ship because it was deployed when he and the current CO reported, thus providing them with a captive audience for the remainder of the deployment.

The Executive Officer considers zone inspections to be very important. Prior to his arrival onboard, the ship was not conducting zone inspections. Now zone inspections are conducted regularly by teams consisting of the CO, Executive Officer, and three department heads. The inspections are structured so they can be completed in no more than one to one and a half hours. "Every space is seen every two months by either myself or the CO. This program forces tremendous progress (in the material conditions of the ship). Because of our zone inspection program, we did extremely well in our INSURV inspection."

The Executive Officer claims he has learned from experience that the difference between a successful and an unsuccessful major inspection is the executive officer. This is because most key inspections require ship-wide mobilization and the executive officer is in a position to ensure this mobilization occurs. How? 1. He promulgates a FOA&M in advance of every inspection. 2. He provides department heads with inspection related administrative support from ship's office. 3. He holds rehearsal inspections, getting people from outside the ship (such as from various staffs or assist teams) to pretend they are inspectors. 4. He uses check lists. 5. He and the captain show inspectors they are interested and involved. For example, a schedule is promulgated for the inspectors and everything is laid out for them prior to their arrival. The idea is to get the inspectors in the proper "mindset" from the time they first walk aboard the ship.

The Executive Officer stated the ship's damage control organization is very important. He sold the CO on the idea of letting the DCA devote his full attention to damage control matters. The DCA was given a cadre of HT's to maintain repair lockers. (A, E, and R divisions were assigned to other division officers.) Allowing the DCA to concentrate his efforts on damage control resulted in the ship attaining a high degree of damage control readiness during refresher training.

The Executive Officer goes out of his way to accommodate and cooperate with the staff, especially when embarked. He stresses the importance of this with all officers. "Once the officers started operating this way (accommodating the staff) things got a lot easier."

The Executive Officer believes that the captain's emphasis on battle readiness has been one of the main reasons the ship has done well (ie. Arleigh Burke Award).

The message from the captain to all hands has been that whenever the ship steams over the horizon, he expects it to be battle ready. To this end, preventative maintenance is the number one priority followed by training. Also to this end, the captain expects around the clock effort to repair equipment when it malfunctions.

One of the Executive Officer's concerns is that most officers seem to be willing to sacrifice their time for the benefit of the ship but they are generally more reluctant to have their men do the same. He has discussed this concern with them.

The Executive Officer said the captain uses the 1MC almost exclusively to communicate with the crew. At sea the captain talks to them daily, keeping all hands informed of the status of current evolutions. The captain usually uses the 1MC to recognize those divisions that have done something well.

3. Department Heads

The department heads attributed the ship's good reputation to the high standards set by the captain and themselves. One such standard is excellence and maximum effort in everything. "If a problem occurs, we fix it right now. For example, a list of discrepancies resulted after a recent Aviation Readiness Assist Visit. "We took the list and worked on it the very day we got it until every discrepancy was corrected."

The supply officer explained the desire that he and others have to "go the extra mile." For example, he does more than just submit a requisition for a part that is not readily available from the supply system. He calls other ships and does everything he can to get the parts to correct equipment casualties. "If the system isn't supporting us, we get the part anyway we can."

Enlisted men are also expected to "go the extra mile" and they often do. For example, a number of men voluntarily worked over a weekend to complete a renovation project on the mess decks. Also, when equipment malfunctions, the men know they are expected to begin corrective maintenance right away and keep working on it until repairs are completed. The men take pride in using techreps as little as possible.

The department heads believe an attitude of pride for the ship prevails among crew members. The men often don't like the new standards, but they take pride in believing they are the best once the standards have been raised.

The department heads have what they describe as a very formal working relationship with the captain. They believe he really cares about the ship and appreciated opportunities they have to brainstorm with him to solve shipboard problems.

The department heads see the captain as being "uniquely able to spot when things are wrong." For example, he is quick to tell them when they have misplaced priorities. He gets around the ship a lot and brings problems he finds to the attention of the Executive Officer and HOD's.

Involvement by officers and CPO's in the management of the ship is considered high. As the operations officer put it, "I don't think you can run a ship without heavy khaki involvement." The working relationship between officers and chiefs is seen as being quite good.

Department heads considered the crew's moral to be quite high, although they acknowledged there is always a small number who complain no matter how good the conditions on the ship are.

4. Junior Officers

The junior officers attribute the ship's fine reputation primarily to the fact that all hands understand the captain's standard of excellence in everything. This motivates them to do their best. "The ship revolves around the CO and what he expects. Everything is a priority and the most successful officers are able to figure out where the CO is focusing his attention. He accepts nothing less than perfection. For example, if I am responsible for a SEIEX and my men score less than 100, I'll be up on the bridge telling the captain why I didn't get the 100 and what I'm going to do to attain that score next time."

These division officers think other reasons the ship has a fine reputation include the perception that "everybody thinks we're number one" and "everything we do is distinctive." For example, the crew can be easily identified when off the ship because when in uniform they are required to wear white dixie hats and when in a liberty status they are not permitted to wear tennis shoes or shirts without collars.

They believe that planning has contributed to the ship's success. "We were preparing for our INSURV inspection months ahead of time. In this ship we never do anything tomorrow."

The junior officers see the captain's management style as "abrasive." As they put it, the quickest way to get an audience with the captain is to make a mistake. On the other hand, divisions officers were quick to proclaim their ship as the best ship in the fleet. One said if he had to go to war (on a Navy combatant), he would want to go with this CO in command.

5. Chief Petty Officers

The chief petty officers consider their ship to be one of the best in the fleet and one which is getting better all the time. They stated that the crew is highly motivated and the majority of crewmembers also believe this ship is one of the best. The chiefs cited a number of examples of the good performance of the ship such as competitive awards that have been won and key inspections that have been successfully completed.

The chiefs gave many reasons for the ship's success but they seemed to be particularly impressed with their executive officer. They view him as a dynamic and personable leader who gets involved in all aspects of the ship without micromanaging anybody. "His presence and knowledge of the ship means a lot. People complained about him when he first came onboard because he started enforcing a lot of standards and regulations that hadn't been enforced prior to his arrival. He does things by the book. For example, if the instruction says only 10% of the crew can be on leave, then that's the way it is. He is very strong on maintaining shipboard cleanliness. He holds the crew to a very stringent dress code. You don't see our sailors in crummy looking uniforms or civilian clothes on the beach."

The chiefs felt that the enforcement of standards and regulations by the Executive Officer had built pride in the crew. "After a while they started to notice their ship is better than others. Everybody likes to be on a winner."

The following are some of the other positive attributes of this ship which the chiefs believe have helped it attain its fine reputation: 1. A good indoctrination program (series of lectures) for newly promoted petty officers and chief petty officers. 2. A strong ESWS program. They claim ninety five percent of the chiefs are wearing the

ESWS pin. 3. A lot of emphasis on damage control. They noted the enthusiasm of crewmembers who participate in damage control drills. 4. Firm, fair, and consistent discipline. The urinalysis program has been effective in identifying drug users, and alcohol abuse is strongly discouraged by the Executive Officer. 5. Good intra-divisional cooperation. "We help each other out." 6. Recognition of good performance. 7. Recreation and special services programs are considered to be very good. 8. High standards are maintained for watchstanders, especially for the import COD and CDC.

6. E5 and E6 Petty Officers

The seven E5 and E6 petty officers we talked to noted a dramatic improvement in the performance and reputation of the ship since the current executive officer and captain reported. "The ship has done a complete 180 since this captain and Executive Officer got here, although it's taken a lot of hard work to get standards to where they should be." These petty officers were proud of the ship's good reputation and said they now want to maintain this reputation. For example they mentioned their desire to repeat attainment of departmental battle efficiency awards.

These petty officers believe the captain has been most influential in raising standards. They were well aware of the captain's standard of "battle readiness" and his expectation that they be prepared for inspections at any time. They seemed to accept the fact that the captain's high standards have often meant longer working hours for many crew members. They were also conscious of the captain's interest in all aspects of the ship. "He has his hands in everything. He stops and asks a lot of questions of the crew as he is walking around the ship."

These petty officers also mentioned the following positive attributes of the ship:: 1. Strong emphasis on 3M and damage control. 2. A consistent zone inspection program. "The zone inspections have really brought up materiel standards." 3. A "closely knit" crew. 4. Crew is kept well informed of current operations and how the CO evaluates their performance during operations. 5. Chief petty officers interfere as little as possible with their work (primarily that of the first class petty officers). 6. High standards are maintained in cleanliness, food preparation, and quarterdeck procedures. Special mention was made of the strict standards set for civilian clothing, ie. neither sneakers or shirts without collars may be worn off the ship.

7. E4 Petty Officers and Below

The E1-E4 group we interviewed said that the ship has really made a turn for the better since the arrival of the current CO and Executive Officer because they have demanded high standards and held people accountable. The executive officer was viewed as being the primary driving force behind the ship's improvement.

The enthusiasm of this group was relatively low when compared with that of other groups we talked to on the ship. A number of them said many of their contemporaries have a poor attitude toward the ship. One man said morale is currently not as good as it has been in the past and that it had not kept up with standards. When asked why, he said "because we are pushed to the limit." Another complained that the crew only does things right because they know if they don't they will just have to redo them.

Although these men considered morale to be low, they all seemed proud of their ship's reputation. Most said they

would want to stay assigned to this ship if they were given the opportunity to transfer to another ship with the same schedule. One man said this would be a good ship to be assigned to during wartime.

These men mentioned the following positive attributes of the ship: 1. Their peers "stick together." 2. They believe they are kept well informed. 3. Crewmembers are skilled in their jobs because of the emphasis placed on training. There is a lot of off-ship schooling. 4. Equipment maintenance and cleanliness is considered better than on other ships. 5. The ship has a good ombudsman program. 6. Discipline is considered to be firm and consistent. There is zero tolerance for drugs. 7. The command supports a strong athletic program. "He limit." Another complained that the crew only does things right because they know if they don't they wi

F. SHIP FOXTROT

1. Commanding Officer

The Commanding Officer was not available for interview.

2. Executive Officer

The Executive Officer attributed much of the success of this ship to the tight crew, a condition that existed prior to his arrival. He was not sure as to why the crew was tight, but he thought it had something to do with the fact that the ship was small (crew of about 100) and that it had a single, easy to identify mission.

He also felt that personnel were recognized frequently for their accomplishments. The ship gives out a

lot of letters of appreciation and commendation, and the commodore frequently presents them to recipients. Furthermore, professionalism was pushed from the top. The ship stresses cleanliness, "The ship will be clean, period!." Underway, when out of sight of other ships the crew is allowed to wear casual clothing.

When it came to getting a job done, the Executive Officer said the ship had a "group grabble" philosophy. Everyone who could lend a hand was expected to do so.

Reflecting upon the ship's last OPPE (this ship was the first one of her class to pass recently mandated OPPE requirement for this class of ship), the Executive Officer recounted that the engineers were in their spaces on the day of the inspection, and the rest of the crew was standing by to help out. For example, if something happened and the bilges needed cleaning, a tiger team on the mess decks would be detailed off to accomplish the job. The Executive Officer was personally in charge of these non-engineer tiger teams. This form of teamwork manifested itself frequently on this ship according to the Executive Officer. Regarding how the specifics of the OPPE planning for the involvement of non-engineers came about, the Executive Officer said that the CO said this is the way it will be.

The Executive Officer felt that the ship had a fine wardroom and a tight chief's mess which had a lot to do with the ship's success. The ship was the current squadron Battle E winner and had a reputation for excellence on the squadron staff. The Executive Officer felt that the ship's fine reputation was deserved. He believed that the ship was, in fact, the best ship in the squadron. Winning the battle E was not considered a goal for the ship, rather that goal was to excell at everything the ship did.

The Executive Officer noted that the wardroom benefitted from having a lot of prior enlisted officers.

The CC, Executive Officer and five of the other seven officers in this ship had prior enlisted service. This experience was considered to be a very strong plus for the ship.

The Executive Officer stated that the CO lets him run the ship, and that the CO spends a lot of his time walking around the ship talking with the crew. The Executive Officer added that he and the Executive Officer expect and let the department heads run their departments. The Executive Officer described the CO as a non-coerser, and added that he, the Executive Officer, was a little more of a coerser than the CO but that he was not a screamer.

The Executive Officer felt that the crew shared his high opinion of the ship and much of his commitment to keeping the ship on tcp. He said that every man feels this is the best ship, and that they do not have to be told to stay around and finish a job, they stay on their own. The Executive Officer added that when the ship does get a bad sailor, the CO is willing to kick the guy out if he does not come around, but this does not occur often. Concerning discipline, the Executive Officer said that the ship had a very low mast rate. He attributed the rareness of discipline problems to, in part, the fact that the CO is a stern and consistent disciplinarian and that the crew knows this because whenever there is a mast the entire crew is required to witness the mast. The Executive Officer also noted that there was zero tolerance for drug use. If a petty officer uses drugs, he will probably get a special courts martial.

The Executive Officer was proud of the fact that the ship has good retention. He felt that this was mainly a by-product of having an overall good ship. Later the Executive Officer added that after each weekly planning board for training there was a professional development board headed by the Executive Officer with all the department heads participating. At this board these officers

discuss the professional development of the ship's crew. Preparation for advancement was pushed. The Executive Officer said that he would tell a sailor who was remiss in preparing for an upcoming advancement exam, "I'll do the course work, you take the test, and when you get promoted, you give me the additional money that you will be getting." The Executive Officer added that if an undesignated sailor is interested in a rating not found on the ship, arrangements will be made for him to visit a ship that has the rating in which he is interested. The Executive Officer added that he and the ship's career counselor, and 1/C personnelman, made a good retention combination.

The relationship with the squadron staff was considered good. The commodore is usually invited down to the ship once a week for coffee. Underway, daily SITREPs are sent to the commodore.

When underway, the Executive Officer said that the crew is provided with a lot of information on what is happening using the 1MC.

The Executive Officer said that the PMS program on the ship was emphasized. Asked if there were any programs that were not emphasized, he stated that the SWO program did not get a lot of emphasis. Training, in general, however, did get a lot of attention. Three hours a week were set aside for work center training. Additionally, off ship schools were used a lot to train personnel. The ESWS program was considered good by the Executive Officer. It was run by the chiefs. One hour a week was set aside for ESWS training. The Executive Officer added that ESWS was not mandatory, but that he thought that it would be difficult to be a 4.0 sailor without being ESWS qualified. He thought that about 65% of the E5 and above on the ship were ESWS qualified.

Describing a typical Executive Officer's day in port, the Executive Officer said that he pushes paper until the 1000 messing and berthing inspection. In the afternoon he walks around a lot and on occasion visits other Executive Officers to "talk shop."

The Executive Officer described the officer-chief relationship on the ship as "friendly, but not buddy buddy." He added that khaki (officers and chiefs working together) run the ship.

Asked about management and planning in the ship, the Executive Officer said that he did not believe in plans of actions. They were just useless pieces of paper.

When new people join the ship they are given an indoctrination PQS package to complete. This program is run by the command senior chief. To make new men feel part of the team, they are given a ship's ball cap when they join.

3. Department Heads

This officer thought that the cause of the ship's success starts in the wardroom. He noted that two years ago this was not the best ship in the squadron, but the officers rotated and got a lot better. The current group of officers show a lot of initiative, and when a new officer joins he picks up on this. He also added that the department heads do not just pass identified problems down hill. They intercede and try and develop solutions that will have a minimal negative impact on their subordinates. Asked why the officers showed a lot of initiative, this officer stated that it was because they were treated as someone expected to get the job done. He added that this is not the type of ship where the Executive Officer says "This has to be done by liberty call. There are deadlines, but they are reasonable." This

officer said that when he makes a mistake that impacts adversely on the ship, he feels very sorry. He added that everyone feels sorry when one of their subordinates screws up. He concluded by saying that the relaxed manner of the ship seems to contribute to its success.

As the Executive Officer had stated, this officer noted that the CO had made it clear when he first joined that the goal of the ship was "to do things right," not to just be number one. He said that winning the Battle E "just happened." According to this officer, the ship won the Battle E because when given an assignment "we do it professionally and do it well." He thinks that the crew feels that they are the best, although they display some cynicism. They think that the ship volunteers for things. This officer said that he was not so sure this was true. He noted that now that the ship is number one, we want to remain on top. In fact, things that we laughed at in the past have become important because they might impact on our remaining on top. He sighted as examples the competition for Christmas decorations and the squadron nightly inspections as examples of requirements that had taken on increased importance since the ship won the Battle E.

Asked about morale, this officer said that it is fairly high, but that it fluctuates drastically depending on what the ship is doing operationally. Getting short notice tasking to do jobs of indefinite length takes its toll on morale, however, the crew recovers quickly whenever morale gets low. He said that the CO and Executive Officer pay the crew back after they work hard, for example, after a successful six month Med deployment there was a one month standdown with only the duty section required on board. Realizing that their hard work would be rewarded, the crew worked very hard to paint the ship before it returned to port.

Concerning planning for upcoming events, this officer said that the officers were looking at the POM requirements now, six months in advance. This officer felt that the overall performance of the ship had improved so much over the last couple of years that people now had time to look ahead. According to this officer, the senior petty officers are involved in the planning for the ship and this has very positive consequences. Furthermore, the senior enlisted make their juniors plan. A lot is delegated to junior enlisted personnel. This gets them involved.

Another positive attribute of the ship was its teamwork. "There is a lot more cooperation on this ship than I have seen on bigger ships." The chiefs' mess works together well. In fact, the chiefs' mess is very strong and on an upswing. The CO demands a lot of the chiefs and they produce a lot. The department heads also work well with each other and with the chiefs. The department heads go out of their way to solve their problems among themselves and not in front of the Executive Officer. The crew is very much the same, in this regard, they like to solve their own problems. The mission of the ship probably contributes to this. The crew is so team oriented that on occasion they have to be "driven off the fantail" when they want to help out and they are not needed. Asked about the command policy that other divisions help the engineers during an OPPE, it was felt that this grates on some, but that it was effective.

The crew is, in general, average, but they excel because they work well together. However, the divers on the ship are especially good. Only the top graduates from diving school get to come to this class of ship, and there is a lot of competition to get these assignments.

This officer also felt that the ship had a good rapport with the staff.

The current CC/Executive Officer team was considered to be an improvement over the earlier team. They appear to be more in sync. There was not a big change when this CO came on board, but he does seem to take more interest in what is happening. He will tour your spaces and ask people to do things. Underway, the CO spends a lot of time on the bridge. When the CO sees something that he wants corrected, he does not demand that it get fixed, he just points it out and expects the person to take care of it. On occasions he will start to get fed up, but he will not say "Do it now!" Whenever the CO asks a question, people take it almost as an order. That is, they want to please him. The crew appreciates the fact that the CO takes pride in their spaces.

This officer also thought that the fact the CO held mast with the entire crew present contributed to the ship's good discipline and low number of masts. This officer said that when the CO first said that he was going to make mast an all hands evolution, that he had some concern about the wisdom of this idea. He no longer has such concern, and he thinks that the idea is great.

Retention is good because of the high personal interest in a man's career shown by the department heads, Executive Officer, and CO. Mainly the CO and Executive Officer get people what they want.

The SWO program is not pushed. It is left up to the individual officer, however, it is easy to get signatures and get qualified. The ESWS program seems to go up and down depending on the ship's schedule. This program is also left to individual initiative.

Part of the reason the crew is involved is because they are kept informed as to what is happening. "Top people want to be kept informed."

The CO's priorities, in addition to excelling at everything the ship does, are cleanliness and preservation. This is probably due to the fact that he used to be a first lieutenant. Grooming is not pushed.

4. Chief Petty Officers

The chiefs saw the primary cause of the ship's success being the high quality of the personnel assigned to the ship, especially the junior enlisted personnel (E5 and below). They felt that people in the ship, in general, put out more of an effort than on most ships. As to why this was the case, they were not sure, in fact they had trouble coming up with any reasons, but with some coaching they attributed the high motivation and commitment of the crew to the following: the ship has a good reputation, everyone knows this, and people want to keep this positive reputation; there are one or two key individuals in almost every work center that are particularly outstanding and they are helping to carry their work centers. These key people want to achieve excellence and they do. The chiefs' also saw the chiefs' mess as a positive factor in the ships getting better over the past two years. There used to be something of a "union shop" attitude among the chiefs, but now they care more about departments other than their own. The chiefs cited the following relevant example. In the past when someone needed something from another division to do a job people would not loan it out. The chief remembered needing a cutting torch and the only available was in the damage control locker. When he asked another chief if he could borrow the torch, he was told that he could not have it because the DC gear could only be used for damage control matters. Now when something like this happens, all the

chief has to do is to mention that he needs some help and the other chiefs are going out of their way to see how they can be of assistance. The more the chiefs talked about cooperation on the ship, the more they saw it as being a key ingredient of the ship's success. They concluded by saying, "The cooperation on this ship is great!"

Although the chiefs agreed that their troopers were great, they commented that at times the chiefs had to push them to get to work. Some of the chiefs felt that the crew would perform even better if more recognition of good performance was used. Right now people are working for self-satisfaction rather than recognition, which was implied to be fine, but a little more recognition was thought to be warranted by some, others did not agree saying that they got a lot of pats on the back.

As everyone was discussing how good the ship was now, one chief commented that even in the past when there were more "bad people" the ship was good. No one took exception with this point, but the comment was again made that the ship was now better.

The chiefs felt that another reason the crew performed well was that they knew they would get rewarded for a job well done. After a recent operation, the CO gave the ship a three day standdown in recognition of the efforts of the crew. The chiefs liked this.

Several of the chiefs mentioned that because of the age and the size of the ships, the ship was not very habitable. Everyone agreed, but several added that the CO was doing as well as he could to minimize this problem. The chiefs mentioned that there was a sign on the ship's quarterdeck that said "This ship is not just a ship, but also a home." This seemed to summarize how the crew treated the ship. They mentioned that the CO did a lot of personal things to get this message across to the crew.

Talking again about the quality of the crew, in general, the chiefs mentioned that they were amazed at the crew's ability to stick to a job and put up with a demanding schedule. "I kept expecting the crew to fall apart but they did not." was the comment of one chief and several others nodded in agreement. They also brought up that if a job required a sailor to work until 0200, the sailor was likely to do the job and not complain about it. The chiefs added that the crew has a lot of pride and they will not tolerate a "bagger." The norm was that everyone was expected to put in as much time as it took to do his job.

The chiefs brought up the fact that both the CO and Executive Officer were prior enlisted. The chiefs said that there were good. The CO was seen as being very job oriented and demanding. One brought up the fact that the CO would tell "the way it was when I was a sailor" stories and these were not well received. This did not seem to be a big point, however.

The chiefs felt that the high enlistment rate of the ship could be attributed in many ways to people asking for and getting orders off of the ship. They implied that it was not the ship that people wanted to get away from but rather the operating schedule and the large amount of time away from homeport and families.

Asked about the CO's priorities, the chiefs said that the CO pushes pride and gave as examples having the ship always looking good. The chiefs said that you could sense the Captain's pride in and love for his ship. This impressed the chiefs.

Although the chiefs felt that the ship did too much steaming, they were proud of the fact that on the last Med deployment the ship had done a lot more steaming than their sister ship who had been in the Med before them. The chiefs were also proud of the fact that the ship had done outstanding during their last REFTRA.

The chiefs said that the ship had its share of crisis management. They felt that this was a given part of shipboard life.

The chiefs were pleased with the fact that petty officers did not resort to a report card whenever one of their men made a mistake. Rather, the petty officers deal with the problems and their causes. The chiefs said that the ship did not have any discipline problems.

The chiefs said that they did not see the squadron staff very much and what contact the ship did have with the staff was at the command level. This was fine with the chiefs.

The chiefs were very proud that the ship had won the squadron Battle Efficiency E. "When we won, you could feel this in the soles of your feet."

Asked if the ship received much outside assistance, the chiefs said that she did not, but they added that they were willing to ask for help if they needed it. They attributed the general lack of outside assistance to the fact that the skill level of the ship was high, "people know what is happening and what needs to be done."

The chiefs felt that the ship benefited from having a lot of second class petty officers who had only served in this ship. They came on board as seamen and firemen and made second class all in one tour. Advancement was stressed and the ship and the individual was seen as benefiting from this emphasis on personal growth.

5. E6 Petty Officers and Below

These young sailors (22-29 years old) felt that the keys to the ship's success were pride, teamwork, and the fact that the crew was small. They said that they felt that they were the best ship in the squadron because they got the best inspection results. They felt and acted as if everyone

in the crew was "tight." "We make sure that new guys hear about how the ship does things. We are tighter than the other ships in the squadron because of our underway time. We are reliable. We look better, and we work better."

These petty officers noted that the CO and Executive Officer talk among themselves to raise the morale of the ship. They felt that the CO and Executive Officer were sincerely concerned with their welfare. "The Captain tries to please the crew. We know we can talk to the Captain and he will understand us." They commented positively on the CO's open door policy (none had ever used it) and on how the CO lets them swim at sea when the schedule permits. They felt that they had some fun and this helped their morale. They added that it was a big plus having a Captain who was ex-enlisted. They felt that the CO and Executive Officer worked well as a team.

Commenting on the chiefs, one said "They are pretty cool." The others agreed. They added that it was easy to talk with the chiefs.

Asked what the priorities of the ship were, they replied with a lot of energy that it was "to get the job done." "The sooner we get done, the sooner we can get on liberty and go home." They added that inspections were emphasized and that they thought one of the reasons the ship did well on inspections was because everyone got the word. These sailors said that inspections hurt morale, but they obviously took a lot of pride in how well the ship did on her inspections.

All shipboard programs were thought to be stressed. Everyone said that they were working on gaining ESWS qualification and planned on gaining it. One commented, "It's here to stay. why not get it?"

These sailors were proud of the cleanliness of the ship. They added that "everyone is more or less proud."

They noted that peer pressure prevents a lot from showing their pride, but it is there. The sailors we were talking to had no compunction about showing their pride in their ship.

The sailors thought that the attention given to indoctrinating new personnel was very important and produced high dividends. They said that the key to the success of the indoctrination program was the fact that only the best men were assigned as sponsors and these men took this responsibility very seriously. When a new man did join the ship, he was "welcomed with open arms by everyone. We tell new men that we are small but tight, and once you get to know everyone you are in."

To these sailors winning the E was definitely a primary goal of the ship and of themselves. They said that they worked hard to get the E and that it was a group effort. "We wanted that little ribbon. It means you have worked hard and done your job. There is no doubt that we will win the E the next time."

They were impressed with the wardroom. They felt that the officers would ask for advice from the sailors and would be prepared to take their advice.

They agreed that talent is recognized on the ship, that responsibility comes to those with talent and that people will take the word of responsible men, no matter what their seniority.

Discipline was considered to be very good. "People get what they deserve at mast." They liked the fact that any one doing drugs "got the max." They recalled that when the CC reported on board he had a captain's call and told the crew where he stood. When a man goes to mast he is reminded of the CO's words. They liked the fact that mast was held in front of the crew. It was especially good for the younger sailors.

The command senior chief was viewed as working hard for the crew and as effective.

These petty officers felt that the cooperation among the enlisted was very good and that whenever they needed help from someone outside of their division or department it was easy to get.

Commenting on teamwork, these sailors added that in addition to having great teamwork on the ship there was good squadron teamwork.

Asked if they could think of anything they would change on the ship, they said they could not. They repeated again that it was important to give people responsibility and allow them to do their job the way they know it should be done. They said this is the way it is on their ship and that is why they like their ship so much.

6. W4 BOSUN

This 57 year old W4 bosun thought that a major contributor to the ship winning the Battle E was the fact that the mess decks (junior enlisted personnel) "knew where they stood." The command kept them informed and the command was consistent in its leadership and management. The Captain tells people what he wants and they do it. The bosun felt that the Captain ran the ship, but added that the CO and Executive Officer were in tune. The bosun felt that there were too many mustangs on the ship.

The bosun was especially impressed by the enlisted personnel who worked for him. He said that they were the best group he had worked with in his thirty years in the Navy. They had been this way before he arrived. They work hard and they do not gripe. The second class are especially great. They take charge and they are smart.

The bosun thought that retention was good because the ship went out of its way to get people what they wanted for orders. This is just one more example to the crew that the command cares about them, and they do feel that the ship cares. They get a lot of recognition which has a positive effect on the individual's motivation and commitment. His men know he will go to bat for them, and they appreciate this a lot. The bosun says that he takes the time to care about people. People will bring him their problems because they know he cares and will help.

Discussing the importance and power of recognizing good performance, the bosun related that after a recent difficult deck evolution he went below and wrote letters of commendation for all who participated. He said that such recognition goes a long way. He said that he learned the importance and power of recognizing good performance relatively late in his career when he was on the receiving end, and now he wants to do the same for others.

The bosun said that cooperation on the ship had improved over the past year. In the past people would not talk to some of their shipmates. This existed even among the officers. This was no longer the case primarily because several key officers had changed and the new ones were more cooperative. He said that in the past people used to stab each other in the back. He added that "I am amazed that this does not have to happen."

To win the E the bosun said you first have to think that you are number one. You also have to set your own goals on winning the E and being number one.

The bosun said the ship pushed advancement "the right way." They did it by the book. They did not gun deck requirements, instead they made sure they knew who needed what requirements on a continuing basis and they then made sure the men completed the requirements.

The bosun felt that the officers and chiefs had to worry about the crew and that sometimes you had to make them (the crew) worry about themselves.

The bosun was a big advocate of 3M. He said that he required that it be accomplished. Among other things, it was important because if you failed the 3M inspection you could not win the E. But, to accomplish a lot of 3M you have to plan and allow a lot of time for it. You also have to be prepared with the tools and greases required. The troopers know that 3M is important to the bosun. He gets involved with 3M and the men appreciate this. He added that you cannot run a division from behind a desk. You have to be involved and visible. "There is too much paperwork, but don't let it stop you from getting out and about."

In general, the bosun felt that an officer or chief should lead by example and should spend a lot of time talking with his petty officers. He added that if you are wrong you have to be able to admit it.

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